A SECOND PART OF OBSERVATIONS, CENSVRES, AND CONFVTATIONS OF DIVERS ERROURS IN Mr. *HOBBS* his LEVIATHAN:

Beginning at the ſeventeenth Chapter of that *BOOK*.

By *William Lucy*, Biſhop of S. *Davids*.

LONDON:

Printed by *S. G.* and *B. G.* for *Edward Man* at the *White Swan* in S. *Pauls* Church-yard, 1673.

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To the Reader.

READER,

Before you go further into this Treatiſe, I think it fit to premoniſh you of three things. Firſt, How it is writ. Secondly, Why by me. Thirdly, Why now put out: Concerning the firſt, expect no other but to read the ſtrongeſt Diſcourſe in Politiques, betwixt Mr. Hobbs *and me, that ever was writ; for the Art of Polity (being more properly ſignified by the name of Prudence) is always, by thoſe who writ of it, from* Plato *and* Ariſtotle *downward, until you come to the very laſt, is naturally powder'd with ſentences, and interlarded with Hiſtories; for it being not a Science whoſe demonſtrations come from neceſſary cauſes, where* poſita cauſa *moſt certainly follows the effect, or grant the effect, you muſt own the cauſe from whence it came; but a prudence, which diſpoſeth men to a wiſe conformity, not by the force of a neceſſary efficacy, but by the perſwaſions which fear and love induce to, which are not neceſſary, but arbitrary; men in the manage of ſuch affairs do moſt diſcreetly, when they produce the ſentences of wiſe men who have gone before, and by great experience, found thoſe ſentences effectual in ſuch occaſions: and becauſe there is nothing new under the Sun, therefore Hiſtories of our Fore-fathers, in like conditions, are moſt excellent Guides for the prudent diſpoſure of our lives, who indeed do but repeat what they have done: but* Mr. Hobbs, *preſuming upon the greatneſs of his own wit, which indeed is great, (and*

it is a thouſand pities he beſtow'd it ſo ill) ſcorns to tread in beaten paths, and thinks by the ſtrength of his own fancies to make his feet leave ſuch an impreſſion, as all others ſhall follow him, not he them. I muſt follow him, for whoſoever is to be confuted, muſt have it done out of his own Principles, and therefore I fall upon him with only downright reaſons; therefore if at any time my Pen hath dropt a ſentence, or a ſtory unawares, which was oppoſite to the buſineſs, (which I believe is very ſeldom) I though it not worth the mending, but let it paſs: And ſo having ſhew'd the Reader why I writ ſo unpolitically of Politiques, I paſs to the ſe ond Adverti ſement.

The ſecond Premonition is a queſtion why I ſhould write of this piece, and my Anſwe is ſhort, having ſpoke to the former part of his Leviathan, *it was proper for me not to ſtep over this, but take him in order as he writes: But a man may object, and ſome have objected that were acquainted with my undertakings, that this is not ſo proper f r a Biſhop (whoſe time ſhould be taken up with his Profeſſion, which is Divinity) to meddle with ſuch State affairs. I anſwer, that* Mr. Hobbs *his writings are ſo interlined with ſo much Heterodox (ſhall I ſay) or Heretical and Atheiſtical Divinity, that it befits none ſo well as a Divine t meddle with them. And again, I ſaid, that although there is a Generation that think we ſhould be Fools in any thing elſe, yet let them know, that if ſo, we muſt be Fools in that likewiſe, as well as other things: for* Theologia Dininity, *is not only* Scientia, *Knowledge, but as many of the School-men,* Mr. Hobbs *h s good friends,*

ſpeak,

ſpeak, it is Sapientia, *we may render it in Engliſh* Wiſdom, *which is the higheſt knowledge, whoſe principles are the higheſt and firſt Rules which habitually are imprinted in man, and whoſe concluſions are the premiſes of other inferiour Sciences: And they ſay moreover, that this which is called* Scholaſtica Theologia, *School Divinity, differs from Natural only in this, that it adds one principle to the other, which is the Faith in the revealed Will of God, which I am forced to fight for in this Treatiſe with* Mr Hobbs: *And becauſe this is the nature of this great Wiſdom of Divinity, it may preſcribe the Rules to all Sciences and Prudencies, and all conditions of men, from the King to the Cobler, how they may live and demean themſelves vertuouſly: But beſides this, let thoſe men conſider, that there is one piece of a Divines ſtudy (without which he will be lame and very deficient) which muſt needs teach him a great deal more of this Prudence, then I have need to uſe in this Diſcourſe, unleſs he be a very dull man, which is Eccleſiaſtical Story, wherein he ſhall find ſuch acts and ſubtilties practiſed by Hereticks and Schiſmaticks, (whom I have always obſerved to be more crafty, though not wiſer then the Orthodox part) ſuch applications to Emperours, to Empereſſes, to Favourites at Court, ſuch cloaking evil intentions with pious pretences, ſuch artificial ſlandering the perſons of their Adverſaries, that he cannot but know the polity, yea the baſe crafts of men, and knowing them to be ſuch, may the better learn to avoid thoſe ſnares which have catched men heretofore, and will (if not prevented) do ſo again; yea ſhall find that many times the wiſdom of learned and pious Biſhops*

have

have been the prop and ſtay of both the Empires, Eaſt *and* Weſt; *and which is more, even in the practick peace of Polity, you ſhall find Biſhops execute them in the moſt excellent manner for wiſdom and courage, that ever any men did: I write not this to invite men of that condition to muddle themſelves with the trivial affairs of this world, no, as S.* Paul *to the* Philippians 3. 20. Our converſation is in heaven. *The word which we render Converſation, is in the Original* πολίτευμα, *which is excellently noted by* Beza, *that it is that kind of Converſation which agrees to the Polity, of ſuch as are Citizens of the heavenly* Hieruſalem: *So that although the Apoſtle affirms this of all men who aſpire to Chriſtian perfection, that ſuch men ſhould live and converſe in that Polity, which conduceth to the eſtabliſhment of that ſpiritual ſociety, which are parts of that Kingdom, yet in a more eſpecial manner, it agrees to them who are exalted to that high dignity in that ſociety, that the Polity of their abilities ſhould be applied to the advance of that Kingdom; and in order to that, when the benefit or ill of a ſublunary Kingdom or Commonwealth ſhall conduce to that Kingdom in heaven, it will become ſuch men to interpoſe their counſels in a way moſt proper for them to imploy themſelves in: But my intent in writing this is to ſhew, that a poor old man, ſitting in his Study, and principally applying that ſtudy to Divinity, may eaſily by that ſtudy give advice and admonition to greater doubts then are in his Politiques, which indeed are groſs miſtakes, from the firſt corner ſtone he laid in the Foundation, to the top-tile in the Roof..*

But

But then it may further be enqnired, why I put out these Papers now, and not before: My Answer is, That about three years past, when I came up to the Parliament, I brought up a rough draught of either all, or most of these sheets, thinking at leisure time, in the intervals of business, I might smooth them over, but then I was informed that he was about such a work himself, to c rrect his own Errours, which I should have been most glad to have seen. O Mr Hobbs, *if this comes to your hands, give me leave to tell y u that would be a glorious work, and let me say to you as the Philosopher did to him, who blushed coming out of a Tavern,* Blush not to come out, but going in: Humanum est errare, *but* perseverare: *Nay, I may say it is the most glorious work of a Christian to repent, every man may erre, but none but a pious man can repent: I would to God you would do it, and do but consider how you oppose in your Opinions the whole Catholique Church in many things, which never Christian man did before you: You write as if your* Leviathan *were the B ok in which the* Rosiecrusians *in their* Fama *speak of, which should be able to instruct men sufficiently in all things, both* Theological *and* Philosophical, *were all the books in the world lost besides, and a* Pythagorean ipse dixit *might suffice for your Scholar: But good Sir, think that there have been wise men in Philosophy, in Policy, in Divinity, before your book was writ, yea before you were born, or thought of doing this great work your self, and save me the labour of tiring my old decrepid Age with such unhappy cnotentions, which else, at such leisures as I can snatch from my greater*

duties,

duties, I ſhall be writing to ſome other miſconceipts of yours.

Reader, I intreat you to forgive this diverſion to Mr. Hobbs, *and further only know, that I have taken care that his words ſhould be put down ſtrictly in a diverſe Letter; and I deſire this may be printed in* Quarto, *to be joyn'd (by them who have the other) to my firſt Piece, and then I have done, who am*

From my Houſe
at *Brecnock*
March 12. 1673.

Your Brother in Jeſus Chriſt
Will: St. David.

Maii 16. 1671.

Imprimatur iſte Tractatus a Reverendo Confratre noſtro *Gulielmo* Domino Epiſc. Menevenſi elucubratus

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A SECOND PART OF Obſervations, Cenſures, and Confutations OF DIVERS ERRORS IN Mr. Hobbs HIS LEVIATHAN.

Beginning at the ſeventeenth Chapter of that Book.

CHAP. I.

The Introduction to the whole Diſcourſe.

I Have briefly touched the chief heads of his firſt Part. And am now arrived at his ſecond, part, which is entituled of Common-wealths, and this part begins at the ſeventeenth Chapter of the whole Book ſuperſcribed *of the cauſes, generation and definition of a Common-wealth.*

He begins with the final cauſe moſt rightly, which is *cauſa cauſarum*, and ſets the whole at work. And I find no

fault with what he writes concerning that.

Secondly, I approve what he ſaith at the bottom of the 85. *page*, *That ſmall numbers joyned together cannot give them ſecurity to live peaceably.* Small is a Relative, ſmall in reſpect of their Neighbours, of whoſe injury they may juſtly be afraid, unleſs they are ſupported with Natural, or Artificial Fortifications, or their number may be equalled by the weight of the internal vertue, or gallantry of the Inhabitants; ſome way or other it muſt be made up.

Thirdly, I approve what he ſaith, *pag.* 85. *That be the People never ſo numerous* (I may add or ſtrong) *yet if their actions are directed by their own particular Judgments and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no Defence, nor Protection.* His Reaſons likewiſe I approve.

Fourthly, I cenſure not his Concluſion in the ſame page; That the Government for their Good, muſt not be for one Life or Battel, but Perpetual.

Fifthly, He makes a very Ingenious Diſcourſe upon the difference betwixt thoſe ſociable Creatures, as Bees, and Ants, (which *Ariſtotle* calls Political) and hath very handſom applications concerning them, to the middle of the 87. *page*; but then I muſt begin to examine him with leſs approbation: In the Margent there is noted, the generation of a Common-Wealth, and it begins thus.

CHAP. II. *SECT.* I.

This Generation cenſured, firſt from that Word only, *which cannot be true.*

THE only way to Erect ſuch a common Power, as may be able to defend them from the Invaſion of Foreigners, and the Injuries of one another; and thereby to ſecure them in ſuch ſort, as that by their own Induſtry, and by the fruits of the Earth they may nouriſh themſelves and live contentedly, is to confer all their Power and ſtrength upon one man, or upon one Aſſembly of men, that

that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices unto one will, which is as much as to ſay to appoint one man or Aſſembly of men to bear their perſon, and every one to own and acknowledg himſelf to be Author of whatſoever he that ſo beareth their perſon, ſhall act or cauſe to be acted in theſe things, which concern the common peace, and ſafety, and therein to ſubmit their wills every one to his will and their Judgment to his Judgment. Thus far he, A bold and ſtrange aſſertion in that ſevere Language; *(the only way)* what? (Mr. *Hobbs*) no other? Certainly there have been many Common-wealths in the World which have lived peaceably and quietly, and enjoyed the fruits of their Labours, and have abounded with all the comforts of their aſſociation; And yet I dare ſpeak it with confidence there was never any thus generated, that is to appoint one man or Aſſembly to bear their Perſon, and to allow themſelves to be Authors of his Actions, to ſubmit their Wills to his Will, and their Judgments to his Judgment.

SECT. II.

A Supream cannot receive his Authority from the People.

1. CONſider here (for fear I may forget it hereafter) that the King or Supreme, by him, is but the *Perſon* (as he moſt improperly ſtyles him) and they (the Multitude) the Authors of what he doth; ſo that he acts only by their Authority (as you may ſee thoſe words expounded in the 16. *Chap.* pag. 81. and 82.) ſo that by him the People give the Supreme Authority, which is a mighty diminution to all Supreme *Authority*, and indeed an Incroachment upon the Prærogative of God, *by whom (and whom alone) Kings reign, and Princes bear rule*; ſo that as we rightly ſay, that all Authority in a Kingdom is derived from the King, who is the Fountain of all Authority he makes a circle in it, and ſaith, the head of this Fountain is derived from the People.

SECT. III.

It is impossible they should do it.

BUT let us examine the possibilities of it, *Nihil dat quod non habet*, either *formaliter*, *eminenter* or *Virtualiter*. Nothing can give what it hath not Formally, Eminently, or Virtually; Certainly neither of these can be affirmed of the People, if they have it any of these ways it must be *Conjunctim* or *divisim*, either as severed or conjoyned; either as distinct, or united, but neither of these: if severed, then either every man had this Power, or a few, or one alone; the first branch of this Division will abide the chief Dispute with him, because he hath said before, That every man hath right to every thing, to all things, to all riches, persons, wives, lives, what you will before they are covenanted into a body, this hath been confuted heretofore, yet this very occasion will be able to shew the absurdity of it further.

SECT. IV.

The Multitude cannot make a Leviathan, *because he had all their rights before.*

FOr which let us lay a Foundation, suppose this Kingdom were unsetled, and yet now endeavouring to be setled, and all the People being free and and without Covenant, have right to all the things in the World, these are met together to chuse a *Leviathan* (as he terms him) for setling their beings most securely. In this Election what did they give him? you will say the Authority over them all, that is nothing; he had that before by the Law of Nature: but he will say he hath upon this Election their Rights; Their Rights are no more than what he had before; he had by nature right to slay, take, make use of any thing conducing to his contentment; though they were a hundred Millions, they can give him no more

more than what he hath even by Nature. I but he will reply he had Right before, but now he hath Power; I anſwer, the Queſtion here is not about Power, but Right; Power may be in Rebels, Uſurpers, but not Right, that is only in the lawful Soveraign; but ſuppoſe we ſhould examine his Power by theſe preceeding directions: I doubt we ſhall find it moſt weak and unconſtant.

SECT. V.

Their Power is moſt uncertain.

FOR if from the People they will vary with their unſetled reſolutions; for they who made the firſt, being once taught that the Right of making Kings is in them, will eaſily be perſwaded that the unmaking is in their hands likewiſe, and reaſſume that Power again: Take that moſt abundant inſtance which that unhappy time, we lately lived in, affords us, when Mr. *Hobbs* was firſt undertaken by me, when this Doctrine of his was infuſed into the Kingdom, they altered and changed the Government four or five times in a moment. A very ſhort ſpace of time, and none of thoſe *Leviathans* lacked the aſſents of the People, who at the leaſt pretended with the higheſt proteſtations, that men could make, that they would live and dye with them, in the maintenance of their Rights; and yet in one ſix weeks they made likewiſe ſuch another proteſtation to the next Uſurpers. Here you may diſcern how weak a Foundation this popular Covenant yields to his *Leviathan*, nor need he boaſt more of the ſtrength, than the Right of his Authority, for certainly any buzze put into the Peoples head of miſgovernment (which no Government can be free from in the execution) will put Seditious Spirits into them; and men who love to fiſh in troubled Waters may with eaſe raiſe theſe Rumors: ſo that it ſeems to me, to appear that ſuch a tottering and unconſtant foundation as the Peoples univerſal Covenant, ſhould not be the ſupport of ſuch a mighty ſtructure, as is a *Leviathan*, which ſhould be perpetual.

What

What I have ſaid of the whole, may more abundantly be affirmed of any part, becauſe they will be as unconſtant as the whole, or more.

SECT. VI.

The People cannot give Power conjunctim.

AND for what was interpoſed of the People Conjunctim, is impoſſible (according to his Principles); for there can be no Conjunction before this Covenant, they are according to his Doctrine at War one with another until that; And it is a ſtrange thing to imagine that ſo many ſeveral heads contending one with another about Superiority, and the ingroſſing the World to their particular Intereſts, ſhould concenter with one mind, to the exaltation of the ſame Perſon, or Perſons to whom they would ſubmit themſelves, and their conditions by a total deſertion of them both. Nay indeed a man cannot do it, for it being *Jus naturale* a natural Right, as he himſelf hath expreſſed before, *Chap.* 14. pag. (65) and (66) (to which I have ſpoke already ſomething) he cannot lay down his Natural Right, until he lay down his Nature: and therefore indeed he cannot, by this Doctrine, give away his Right to be King, to any other: but if he can deveſt himſelf of his Nature, yet he in expreſs termes, ſaith, *That a man cannot give over his Right to reſiſt by force, wounds, and impriſonments with which he cannot live contentedly*: and may not the ſame be ſaid of a Kingdom? perhaps that man cannot live contentedly without being King; ſurely then it is not probable to think that men will ſo put off their *Jura naturalia*; neither indeed can they do it by his Polity.

SECT. VII.

The manner of the Reſignation makes it impoſſible.

BUT then conſider the Reſignation it ſelf; it is far more unreaſonable to think that reaſonable men ſhould do it. Conſider the particulars; To own all *Leviathans* actions as if every particular of the People were Author of it, *To ſubmit their Judgments to his Judgment, their Wills to his Will.* I thought it had been obedience enough for Subjects to ſubmit their perſons to his Government, but to own all his actions which may be wicked was not to be exacted from any Subject; yea, if we will allow his Doctrine, delivered before, it is worſe; for then we muſt be Authors of his actions; he but our perſon imployed in them (as he ſpeaks pag. (82) and therefore not his own. I but ſaith he, *in order to their peace.* I cannot aſſent to that, for many Supreams have done horrid things in order to the publique Peace, as Murders, Sacriledges, oppreſſions, to which although my perſon may ſubmit, yet neither ſhall my Judgment approve, nor my will conſent; for although when he doth wickedly, I will not do ſo too, and Rebel; yet neither will I by conſent to them juſtifie his Acts by conſpiring in his ſin: his Vertues ſhall not ſave me, and, I am confident, his vices cannot damn me, which yet they would, if I aſſented to them. I go on with him; *This is* (ſaith he) *more than conſent or Concord, it is a real Union of them all in one and the ſame perſon, made by Covenant of every man with every man in ſuch manner, as if every man ſhould ſay to every man, I authorize and give up my Right of Governing my ſelf to this man, or aſſembly of men on that Condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authoriſe all his Actions in like manner*:) If this be the only way to live in Peace, I chuſe War, which is the hatefulleſt thing in the World, but Sin. But this laſt Phraſe of Authorizing all his Actions whom I cannot rule nor controul, nay perhaps not come at to Petition, is ſuch a forſaking of Humanity,

and

and contempt of the glorious means of Salvation, as no man with a face of Piety, dare affirm to be fit, I ſhall handle theſe things more fully ſhortly.

CHAP. III. *SECT.* I.

This cannot be the only way to eſtabliſh a Government.

THIS *done* (ſaith he) *the multitude ſo united in one Perſon is called a Common-wealth, in Latine Civitas.* (Thus he.)

But if this only make a Common-wealth, or *Civitas*, there was never any in the World, nor ever will be, as ſhall be ſhewed more largely hereafter. More true is that which follows, *This is the Generation of that great Leviathan:* I mean his Book; for to vent this extremly wicked folly he wrote this Book; and except in this Book, a Common-wealth was never called *Leviathan*: a name from which never man expected good, he proceeds; *(or rather to ſpeak more Reverently) of that mortal God to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and ſafety.* I anſwer we owe him nothing; there was never ſuch a Power Erected: I ſhall omit what follows in that Chapter, and come to his 18. *Chapter* which is page 88.

CHAP. IV. *SECT.* I.

His definition of a Common-wealth diſproved, firſt becauſe not practicable.

HE begins with a definition of a Common-wealth by Inſtitution thus, *A Common-wealth is then ſaid to be inſtituted, when a multitude of men do agree, and Covenant, every*

every one, with every one, that to whatſoever man or aſſembly of men, ſhall be given by the greater part the Right to preſent the Perſon of them all (That is to ſay, to be their Repreſentative;) *every one, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted againſt it, ſhall Authorize all the Actions and Judgments, of that man, or aſſembly of men in the ſame manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongſt themſelves, and be protected againſt other men.*

This is but a Dream of his, there was never ſuch a thing, nor is it practicable; this Book was writ in *Engliſh*, and therefore proper for *Engliſh* men: ſuppoſe then we were in the firſt State, without a Soveraignty, we are none of the greateſt Common-wealths in the World, yet is it poſſible that here in this Kingdom there ſhould convene ſuch Multitudes of men, ſuch an Univerſality as by him is required to make this Covenant, which he labours to prove in his ſecond part *De Corpore Politi.* Cap. 3. *Numb.* 2. becauſe ſaith he, there, *Nor can an action be Attributed to the Multitude, unleſs every mans hand, and every mans will (not ſo much as one excepted) have concurred thereto.* It ſeems he would have it in writing, that he requires every mans hand to be put to it. And ſo likewiſe *Num.* 3. *The firſt thing therefore they are to do is expreſly every man to conſent to do ſomething*; by which ſomething he underſtands this project of *Leviathan*, ſo that it is evident he means every particular, *ſingula generum*, which is an impoſible fiction; the very meeting is impoſſible. And then that all theſe who meet with ſo many ſelf-ends, and particular Intereſts, and ſo many weak capacities ſhould conſent in any thing is moſt incredible. I will give him all the Scope I can, he may ſay that they may meet, as they do to elect Knights for the Parliament, they may meet in Shires and chooſe Repreſentatives which may act for them; I could ask who muſt divide thoſe Shires? that muſt be done by a Supreme. Then conſider, if that ſhould be granted, they muſt chooſe little *Leviathans* firſt, which muſt repreſent theſe their particular Shires, before the great one is choſen: And then, conſider this hath a great unfitneſs, if not an impoſſibility with it, which was fore-ſeen by our State, and therefore only ſuch men who had forty ſhillings free-hold

were adjudged fit to have voices in these Elections: which heretofore was a very considerable Estate; and yet I believe scarce ever half of those met at any Election. But then let us look about and we shall find much the greater company without the lists of that condition, besides Women and Children, which have as great Interests in the Common-wealth as others. So that this fancy of his, was not only not practised, but not practicable in such a Kingdom as this of ours; When men write Romances they should write things possible to be, and then they are useful to the Reader, for they are of such things which a mans life may meet with, at some time or other; but impossible fictions are such as can be profitable to no man, and therefore it was a vain thing for him to deliver such a conceipt, and not vain only but ill, to deliver it in such a peremptory Rule as to make it seem the only way of Instituting a Soveraign.

SECT. II.

Mr. Hobbs *his definition inconsistent with Reason*

BUT let us proceed, and we shall find it appear by every word more inconsistent with reason. Can a man think that men, such numbers, would ever consent so fully to forsake themselves and their own reason and wills, as to submit themselves either to man or men in such an ample manner as to esteem his Princes Judgment or his Will, for his own. In that great height of Infallibillity to which the *Pope* in many mens Judgments is attained, they put the *Pope* in *Cathedrâ* when they say he is Infallible, and afterwards dispute what that *Cathedra* is: But out of this *Cathedra* he may err in his Judgment, and they must not approve of that, he may sin with his will and they must not consent to that. But Mr. *Hobbs* confines his *Leviathan* to no Chair, but absolutly pronounceth him free from Error both in Judgment and Will. Nay that is not all, but we must allow, yea authorize his Errors in both; and this is the Foundation upon which all his Politiques are built;

by

by which let a man endeavour all vertue and Religion in his own perſon, yet he may perpetrate all the horrid villanies in the World in anothers perſon, whoſe actions he is bound to Authorize, and then, by them, and for them periſh everlaſtingly, which I am perſwaded not only no Chriſtian, but no *Turk*, *Mahometan*, *Indian*, the moſt barbarous perſons in *America*, or any unknown Country can be induced to do, and yet this by him is made the ground-work of all Politique Government.

SECT. III.

Right not derived by this ſuppoſed Inſtitution from the Conſent of the People.

HE proceeds (from this *Inſtitution of a Common-wealth are derived all the rights and faculties of him or them on whom Soveraign Power is conferred by the conſent of the People Aſſembled*).

To this I have anſwered that there was never any ſuch thing, and therefore no right, or faculty can be derived from hence, nor indeed ever will be: *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, that which hath no being, cannot cauſe any thing. Nay, I may ſay further, that there was never any Power conferred by the People (of which I expect an opportunity to ſpeak more fully hereafter) for although we may find Common-wealths altered and ſet up by the Rebellious force, and violence of great numbers of the people, yet thoſe who got the Soveraignty at ſuch times, had it not by any ſuch Inſtitution, as is here deſcribed by the peoples authoriſing that Perſon to theſe Actions he is exalted to; but from the Peoples ſubſerviency obtained by his wit or fraud to his great Ambition. Here I might put an end to his Politiques with a little enlargement upon this Subject, for the Foundation being deſtroyed the building muſt fall. But I will touch upon his Inferences, which will make this Foundation appear more weak.

CHAP. V. *SECT.* I.

Mr. Hobbs *his first Inferrence affirmed, the Soveraign absurdly termed the person of the People.*

HE first infers that (*because they Covenant, it is to be understood that they are not bound by a former Covenant to any thing repugnant thereunto*) This must be most true, not of this Covenant only, but all other Covenants. No man can alienate any Estate twice without his leave to whom he alienated it first; and so where one has disposed his allegiance to one, he cannot take it away and dispose it to another afterward. I like the conclusion that follows also thus. (*And consequently they that have already instituted a Common-wealth being thereby bound by Covenant to own the Actions and Judgments of one, cannot lawfully make a new Covenant amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore they who are Subject to a Monarchy, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude; nor transfer their Person from him, that beareth it, to another man, or Assembly of men.*) This hath truth with it, out of the grounds formerly spoke of. But this senseless name of calling their Soveraign, *their person*, or to found the Allegience to their Soveraign upon their Covenant, which never was nor could be, is to make it extreamly weak; and his reason is most illogical and without force, (for saith he) *They are bound every man to every man, to own, and be reputed Author of all, that he that already is their Soveraign, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that one man dissenting, all the rest should break their Covenant made to that one man which is injustice*) I do not understand the consequence of this Argument, That if one man dissent all the rest should break the Covenant made to that man, for his dissenting may break his Covenant, but why it should make them break their Covenant is not visible to me.

SECT. II.

SECT. II.

His expreſſion, of giving the Sovereignty to him that bears their perſon, further cenſured.

HIS following diſcourſe is not more reaſonable than this (*And they have alſo every man given the Soveraignty to him that beareth their perſon; And therefore if they deſpiſe him, they take from him that which is his own, and ſo again it is Injuſtice.*) That phraſe, (*Given him the Soveraignty who bears their perſon*) is not rational, for according to his own Doctrine, it is the ſame thing to be Soveraign, and *bear their perſon*; if he had ſpoke logically according to his doctrine, his phraſe ſhould be *who is their perſon*, for ſo he makes the Soveraign to be the perſon of the Common-wealth, not to bear it, which is another thing. But then mark you what a ſlight thing he makes Rebellion only a little Injuſtice, for ſo that word *Injuſtice* may extend it ſelf, to any the leaſt Injuſtice, *He takes that from him that was his*; a poor piece of buſineſs every little Theft doth ſo.

SECT. III.

The irrationality of Mr. Hobbs *his arguing further diſcovered. Covenants may be made immediately with God.*

HE adds another reaſon very weakly; *Beſides* ſaith he, *If he that attempteth to depoſe his Soveraign be killed or puniſhed by him for ſuch attempts, he is author of his own puniſhment, as being by the Inſtitution, Author of all his Soveraign ſhall do. And becauſe it is Injuſtice for a man to do any thing for which he may be puniſhed by his own Authority, he is alſo upon that title unjuſt*). Certainly (Reader) you may wonder at the ſtrange unreaſonableneſs of this Arguing. This proves

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by his ſuppoſed Inſtitution no faultineſs in this Treaſon; for ſuppoſe a Soveraign ſhall puniſh a Subject for ſpeaking truth, he doth it according to his inſtitution by the Authority given by that Subject, and that Subject is Author (according to his Doctrine) of killing himſelf for Truth, as well as for Treaſon, becauſe he is Author of all his Actions, and there is as much injuſtice in the one as in the other; eſpecially conſidering another Inference, which he makes, and will be diſcourſed on hereafter; *That a Supream can do no Injuſtice.* But he adds not another argument, but an anſwer to another Objection. I will ſpeak to that, his words are (*And whereas ſome men have pretended for their diſobedience to their Soveraign, a new Covenant, not made with men, but God; this is alſo unjuſt: for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of ſome body that repreſenteth God's Perſon, which none doth, but God's Lieutenant, who hath the Soveraignty under God. But this pretence of Covenant with God, is ſo evident a lye, even in the pretenders own Conſciences, that it is not only an act of an unjuſt, but alſo of a vile, and unmanly diſpoſition*) Thus He. This I yield unto ſo far, that it is ſinful and wicked to engage in any Covenant with God againſt his Soveraign, but his means of obtaining it, I deny. He ſcarce ever ſpeaks or names God, but with an Error: in particular here; what a falſe affirmation is this to ſay, *That there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of ſome body who repreſenteth Gods perſon, which none doth but Gods Lievtenant who hath the Soveraignty under God.* Certainly a man may make Covenant with God, betwixt God and his own Soul, in private, in his Chamber; before men, in Company; divers are recorded in Scripture, and pious men often uſe it, and practice it accordingly, and when theſe Covenants are holy and devout God bleſſeth them, and thoſe perſons are obliged to thoſe duties. But it is true in the caſe in which he inſtanceth all ſuch Covenants are wicked in the making, and moſt abominable in the performance; for it is a Covenant with God in himſelf, to deſtroy him in his deputy; a Covenant with God in Heaven, to oppoſe him on Earth; the iniquity lyeth not in this, That the Soveraign is the peoples Perſon: for then the height of the ſin lyes in this, that the people are affronted;

affronted; but in this other way, God; in his way it is but an injury to such as themselves; but in this it is to our politique Father, to whom under God we owe all our obedience; and is the first command of the Second Table with promise in this World. Of this Nature are those contracts betwixt man and woman, concerning Marriage, those promising Oathes which men make one with another, which oblige the contractors in a strong tye; for breach of which they shall answer at the last day. And now, I go on with him; this which follows, and much of that which immediately preceded is *pag.* (89).

SECT. IV.

Mr. Hobbs *his Second Inference examined, and censured. The Soveraign obliged to protect the People from Injuries, and Invasions. His reasons, to attest this Inferrence, refuted.*

HIS Second Inference is *because the right of bearing the person of them all, is given to him they make their Soveraign, by Covenant, only of one to another, and not of him to any of them; There can happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the Soveraign, and consequently none of his Subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture is freed from his Subjection.* His conclusion is again true in the material part, but his inference is faulty; for his conclusion I am perswaded, that none of his Subjects can be freed from their Allegiance to him by any act of his, unless dereliction of his Government, and that may abide a Dispute too. But to raise this conclusion out of that Ground, because he made no Covenant with them is exceeding weak. *First*, There is the same reason, by his Doctrine, betwixt him and the Subject; for the Subjects (in the very Paragraph which was but now transcribed,) make their Covenant one to another, and not to the Soveraign, so that there must be the same reason out of the Nature of the Covenant, that the Subject should not forfeit his Right to him, as he to the Subject, for the Covenant being only made one to another, the breach of that

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that Covenant is only one with another: but I am bold to affirm it an impoſſible caſe, as he imagines it, that there muſt be mutual approbations betwixt both, and all. For, certainly it cannot be imagined, that ſuch a generality of men, as muſt convene to do ſuch an Act, ſhould ſubmit to ſuch a total dereliction of themſelves, without ſome promiſe, or Covenant on his part; that he will protect them from injuries at home, and Invaſions from abroad; but he being exalted above all other Earthly Powers is ſubject only to the King of Kings, which is God, who will Judge him: but the Subjects are examinable, reſponſible, and condemnable by him. But he labours to infringe this reaſon in his following diſcourſe thus, *That he who is made Soveraign makes no Covenant with his Subjects before hand, is manifeſt; becauſe either he muſt make it with the whole Multitude as one party to the Covenant, or he muſt make a ſeveral Covenant with every man; with the whole as one party, it is impoſſible; becauſe as yet they are not one perſon).* I will not put down his reaſon againſt his ſecond branch, becauſe I ſhall not need to diſpute againſt that, having ſhewed the poſſibility of the firſt. But I will begin with his diviſion, and deny that it is neceſſary that the Covenant ſhould be made with the whole as one party, or with every particular ſeverally; for there is a Medium participationis, which is more reaſonable than either; for without doubt the Fathers of Families were Natural Governours from the beginning of the World, and they had by the Law of Nature Abſolute Government over their Families, theſe when they find themſelves not able in little diſtinct bodies to defend themſelves, may treat amongſt themſelves how by an Union they may make themſelves ſtrong, againſt forreign and domeſtique dangers, and to that end erect a Supream over themſelves; and this certainly hath a greater ſhew of Reaſon, then any of his thoughts, that every perſon who hath no Judgment nor Authority ſhould be introduced to make a Covenant for ſo high concernments. Therefore that diviſion was not good which did not comprehend the *totum diviſum*. Then for his Argument *that he could not Covenant with the whole as one perſon, becauſe as yet they were not a perſon.* I anſwer, firſt that they neither are, nor in truth will

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ever be *one perſon*, but becauſe by his unimaginable conceipt they are after their Covenant repreſented ſo by him, I will anſwer to himſelf; That firſt this Company meet together, then they conſult upon that great work of chooſing a Soveraign, the buſineſs is concluded upon by both parties, Soveraign and People, firſt they engage for their Patrs; then he may Covenant for his, and this is no otherwiſe then is apparent in all contracts, one muſt ſpeak firſt, and after another, ſo in marriage firſt one ſpeaks and then the other; and in all bargains, which yet are conditional until the ſecond word confirms the contract. Nor is it poſſible, as I have ſaid, to think that men would ſo deliver themſelves to anothers will, from whom they have no promiſe or the leaſt verbal engagement to govern them juſtly and prudently. What he ſpeaks againſt this Covenant with the ſeveral perſons, I let go, thinking it impoſſible

CHAP. VI. *SECT.* I.

The difference between the Soveraign's making a Covenant, and taking his Authority upon a Covenant; A Soveraign may Covenant to Govern juſtly, and yet not forfeit his Soveraignty, if he breaks that Covenant

AND I paſs to another Argument by which he would prove, *That a Soveraign can make no Covenant*, which begins towards the bottom of his 89. *pag.* thus (*beſides if any one or more of them pretend a breach of the Covenant made by the Soveraign at his Inſtitution, and others or one other of his Subjects or himſelf alone pretend there was no ſuch breach, there is in this caſe no Judge to decide the Controverſie.*) First, I blame him here for putting no difference betwixt Covenanting in taking his Authority, and taking it upon Covenant. The firſt may be, and, without queſtion, muſt be, in any Inſtitution of Government: the ſecond cannot be diſcreetly done by any; for it would leave a mighty gap to let in Treaſons. Obſerve it

in all contracts, *Titius* lets Land to *Sempronius*, he hath diverse Covenants for to observe, which he may implead *Sempronius* for, and yet never a one to forfeit his Estate; come more closly. The Subject in this Institution of his Contracts is to perform all obedience, yet although he offend in many things, there be few such as exempt him from the just protection of the King, from further injuries then that Legally exacts, how much more must it needs be that the King should lose the total obedience of the Subject, though he should break his Covenant, and unless such a Clause were put into his Covenant, there was no pretence of reason for it; and it were as much against Reason, to put such a Clause into his Covenant. I have delivered my opinion of this before. The King of Heaven will Judge him severely for his breach of Covenant, to whom he must be left. That which follows is true, *If there should be such a Covenant, and no Judge to determine, it would return to the Sword again, and every man recovereth the right of Protecting himself by his own strength contrary to the design of the Institution*] This is true, but I do not approve what follows, *It is therefore in vain to grant Soveraignty by precedent Covenant*] to grant a Covenant in the Institution of Soveraignty is most right, to wit, that he will Govern his People Legally and Justly or the like, without doing of which no person is fit to be Soveraign; but to Covenant, to lose his Soveraignty if he do otherwise, which he seems to understand generally by this word *Covenant*, is absolutely naught and unfit, because it must needs produce Confusions and Distractions in the Government, for the People upon any hardship they suffer, though never so just, will repine against their Superiours, and blame them, and upon any surmise of faultiness in them, would be ready upon such pretence to desire, and endeavour a Change of Government be it Monarchical or Aristocratical.

SECT.

SECT. II.

The Impiety of Mr. Hobbs *his aſſertion, that Covenants have no force but from the Vindicative Power of the Sword, Diſcovered.*

THen what follows is wicked, in my Judgment [*The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his Power by Covenant, that is, upon Condition, proceedeth from want of underſtanding this eaſie truth, That Covenants being but words and breath have no force to oblige, contain or protect any man, but what it hath from the Publick Sword, that is from the united hands of that man or aſſembly of men that hath the Soveraignty and whoſe actions are avowed by them all, and performed by the ſtrength of them all, in him united,*] This ſpeech hath ſome ſemblance of truth with it, if he had confuted the World into Atheiſme, who think there is no God, noe reward or puniſhment hereafter; and perhaps it might find ſome entertainment amongſt men given over to baſe ſenſuality, ſordid worldly people, who have no ſenſe of honour or vertue, becauſe ſuch men value no contract, which conſiſts not with their unhappy Condition, but with men which believe there is a God, who governs heaven and earth, and will judge all one day (which ſure the generality of men do) with men that have felt any ſting of Conſcience, and have felt the happineſs of *nil conſcire tibi*, this breath of theirs hath ſuch power with God, that in things of ſuch high nature as this is, what they covenant on earth is confirmed in heaven, and is ſo eſteemed by them; and becauſe it is ſo eſteemed, millions of men do and have thought it better for them to forſake all worldly felicity, then to violate ſuch Covenants, and by preſerving them, Kings and their Kingdoms have lived in peace and proſperity, but by the breach of them came to ruine and deſtruction: ſo that this which he calls but breath, at the ſame inſtant that it comes out of the mouth of man, it is engraved in their hearts, and recorded in Gods Eternal Regiſtry in heaven.

CHAP. VI. *SECT.* III.

The Sword hath no power but from the Covenant (according to Mr. Hobbs *his Doctrine) it may compel, but is not properly the obliging cauſe of obedience.*

WHat is added, That *the breath of the Covenant is an ill foundation of Monarchy, and hath no power of obliging but from the publick Sword.*] I did wonder why he did uſe ſuch various and ſuch emphatical expreſſions againſt the Authority, which is derived from a Covenant; for this united force of the publick Sword, according to his Doctrine, muſt be derived from that Covenant, which by him is made the ſole foundation of Government: And if a Covenant (which by him is but breath) hath no obliging power, neither can the publick Sword which is derived from that Covenant have any; if he inſtead of other Verbs which he uſed there, had interpreted this one of *Compel*, that this Covenant without the publick Sword had no power to compel any man to obedience, it might have received ſome credit; becauſe when we loſe theſe vertues of fidelity and obedience, it is only the publick Sword which by force can make them ſubmit; but yet that which the Sword can juſtly compel any unto, muſt be by the obliging vertue of the Covenant. But whereas he placeth the obliging power in the Sword, he gives all right of intereſt to it, then which nothing can be more deſtructive to Monarchy: Let Kings know that their Swords may ruſt, or looſe their edge, and then he who hath the keeneſt Sword may plead the beſt right. This encouraged the late Rebels, who having got a longer Sword then the King, upon that Title, preſerved their Uſurpation to the utmoſt they could. And the wickedneſs is very apparent, for by his Doctrine whoſoever can force his Superiority, may juſtifie his exerciſe in it, which is the greateſt encouragement Rebellion can deſire: But perhaps that phraſe (*The Publick Sword*),

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may bear him out in it, for by this he underſtands the National Power in that Man, or Aſſembly of men, which hath the Soveraignty, all whoſe actions are acknowledged by them all. What a foolery is this? Was there ever any Rebellion in which the Rebels did not deny to approve the actions of the Supreme they rebel againſt? And ſuppoſe that impoſſible Fiction of the univerſal meeting and aſſent to that Covenant, yet when the ſame perſons renounce, who made that Covenant, how can the Sword authorize his actions, which pretend his power from the breath of this Covenant? which yet being but *a Breath* (as Mr. *Hobbs* terms it) is long ſince gone and periſhed, and a new Breath ſtarted up in its place: The right of the Sword is given by the breath of the Covenant, with promiſe to own his actions; that Breath is gone; they breath contrarily and revoke it, if any man can get the Sword, he will make them blow ſuch an other Breath upon his Sword, as they did upon the firſt Supreme. The truth is, Mr. *Hobbs* makes the power of Government to conſiſt immediately in the Sword; but that founded upon a Breath, which is blown away with any little croſs wind; and certainly this makes a moſt unhappy inſtitution and ſettlement of any right. That which follows in the top of the ninetieth page, I let paſs, as not material to any thing preceding or following after, and I paſs to his third Inference, which begins thus.

CHAP. VII. *SECT.* I.

Mr. Hobbs *his third Inference examined; No man to be deſtroyed for his diſſent to the unjuſt actions of others. Mr.* Hobbs *his Political* Inquiſition *more ſevere then that for* Religion.

THirdly, becauſe *the major part hath by conſenting voices declared a Soveraign, he that diſſented muſt now conſent with the reſt, that is, be contented to own all the actions he ſhall do, or elſe juſtly be deſtroyed by the reſt.* This is a very ſad condition, either he muſt own all the actions his Soveraign doth,

or justly be destroyed; I believe never Murder was so justified upon such terms before; own all his actions? No Christian, no honest man will do it; his Soveraign may be Antichristian, a *Hobbist*, whose actions no Christian man can avouch; he may act foolishly, which no wise man can authorize; he may act wickedly, which no honest man can consent unto, (*or else justly be destroyed by his fellow Subjects*) which he understands by that word (*the rest*) destruction is the greatest mischief can come to a man, and is never inflicted but for some mighty crime, which I do not find this man charged with, but only a dissenting or protesting against the general Vote; a thing often done in Parliaments, and yet no such Sentence passeth upon the Dissenter, nor were it just to do it; men are not bound to be all of one mind: Mr. *Hobbs* would make his Inquisition for Politiques more severe then any Inquisition for Religion: But he hath reason for what he writes (for, saith he) *If he voluntarily entred into the Congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently thereby declared his will (and therefore tacitly covenanted to stand to what the major part should ordain.)* I thought by what went before he must have declared his assent; but now it seems it is enough if he be amongst them; but what if he be not amongst them, (as I have shewed it is impossible all should) what condition is that man in? He proceeds with his proofs, *And therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make protestation against any their Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant, and therefore unjustly.)* Suppose all this, Shall a man be destroyed for every breach of Covenant, or every unjustice? Certainly Mr. *Hobbs*, if he were a Law-maker would out-do *Draco*, or the bloudiest that ever acted in that kind: This is a foolish consequence, that because he did unjustly he should justly be destroyed. He goes on (*And whether he be of the Congregation or not, and whether his consent be asked or not, he must either submit to their Decrees, or be left to the condition of war he was in before, wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.)* The madness of this condition of war before this Covenant I have spoke to heretofore, but that he may justly be destroyed by any with whom he will not joyn in the Covenant is wicked:

We

We have in *England*, I believe, abundance of ſtrangers of Foreign Nations, which neither have nor will enter into ſuch a Covenant, may they be juſtly killed? Nay, amongſt thoſe millions which are the Kings Subjects; there was never man entred this or the like Covenant; may we juſtly kill one another? Nay, I think, few would make ſuch a Covenant; may all theſe be knocked on the head thus? This hath ſuch a force of injuſtice, that men with humanity about them cannot conſent unto. I leave this therefore and come to his 4th Inference.

CHAP. VIII. *SECT.* I.

Mr. Hobbs *his fourth Inference cenſured and refuted from his own concluſions. He that impowers another to do juſtly, though he make him Pleni-potentiary, is not guilty of his unjuſt actions; his firſt reaſon refuted.*

Fourthly (Becauſe every Subject is by this Inſtitution Author of all the actions and judgments of the Soveraign inſtituted: it follows that whatſoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects, nor ought he by any of them be accuſed of injuſtice.) Accuſed, What doth he mean by that? to be convicted, arraigned, condemned? This certainly he cannot, becauſe the power of Judgment ſuppoſeth Superiority, which cannot be over the Soveraign in his own Kingdom: But let us obſerve the conſequence of this Argument out of theſe impoſſible premiſes, that becauſe by his fancy of the Inſtitution every ſubject is Author of all his actions, he can do no injury to any of them; certainly this doth not follow by his own Doctrine; for put the caſe, that the Supreme doth authorize a Judge to hear and determine ſuch cauſes, doth the Supreme only do injuſtice in it, when the Royal Authority gives power to the Judge, who acts unjuſtly by that Authority, which was given him by the Supreme, or the Judge likewiſe who abuſeth that Authority? I believe no man will affirm it; or if he

do,

do, he muſt deſtroy Mr. *Hobbs* his concluſion, which makes the Kings acting by the Authority of the peoples grant, not to offend in himſelf; for (which is his reaſon before ſpoke to) if the Author do ſolely perform, not the Actor or the perſon who immediately operates, which he delivered before, the King not the Judge doth unjuſtly, when by his Authority the Judge decrees wickedly: But he proceeds with another reaſon, (for ſaith he) *He that doth any thing by Authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whoſe Authority he acts.* This is not true generally, a Judge judgeth by the Authority of the Supreme, but if he Judge unjuſtly (yea, judgeth a cauſe againſt the King perhaps unjuſtly) he then doth the King an injury by his own Authority. Again, a General with Plenipotency to kill, ſlay, &c. from the King, he turns now his Army to the Kings deſtruction perhaps, doth not he then do the King an injury by his own power?

SECT. II.

Mr. Hobbs *his ſecond reaſon invalid from the falſity of his ſuppoſition. Conſent or diſſent gives not the ſtamp of* Juſtice *or* Injuſtice. *He that gives power to do any act, may complain of ill Execution of that power.*

HE goes on. (*But by this Inſtitution of a Commonwealth, every particular man is Author of what the Soveraign doth, and conſequently he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraign, complaineth of that whereof he himſelf is Author, and therefore ought not accuſe any man but himſelf, nor himſelf of injury, becauſe to do an injury to himſelf is impoſſible.*) It is firſt obſerveable here, (which runs throughout the whole Politiques) that it is built totally upon that foundation which neither is, nor is probable to be in any, but is impoſſible to be in a great Commonwealth, and therefore muſt needs fall of it ſelf: But ſuppoſing that impoſſibility, let us conſider his inference, every man is Author of what the Soveraign

veraign doth; the reason of that is before expressed, because he covenants to avow his actions: Now if he do avow them, it follows not, that therefore they shall be just; many a man owns that act which is unjust, his owning of it makes it neither just, nor unjust: These are qualities inherent in the act, not adherent to others Opinions, or acceptance, or disacceptance of them: But (saith he) *Consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraign, complaineth of that whereof he himself is Author.*] I return, that he may do that, and complain that he himself hath done amiss, men do, and it is vertuously done of him who doth it, but much rather of that which he acts by anothers hand; that which may be good in the Institution, may be spoiled and hurt in the Execution; and although they did institute him with such a power, yet his mannagement of it may be ill and unjust, and that they may complain of.

SECT. III.

A man may do an injury to himself. Mr. Hobbs *his distinction between* Iniquity, *and* Injustice, *or Injury, disproved and censured.*

UPon this ground will appear the faultiness of what follows, which is [*And therefore ought not to accuse any man but himself, no nor himself of injury, because to do injury to a mans self is impossible.*] To the first piece I have shewed, that though he were Author of *Leviathans* Power, yet his evil usage of that power may be complained of. To the second, I think a man may injure himself, when a rich man through niggardliness shall deny his belly or his back those expences which were necessary for the support of his health, he deals unjustly with himself; when another foolishly desperate shall adventure his life upon idle and frivolous occasions, he deals unjustly with himself, by hazarding so Noble a Creature upon so base and unworthy a prize: These things, and multitudes of more, are unjust dealing towards a mans self: But he

hath a nice distinction at the bottom of this Paragraph; *It is true, that they that have Soveraign Power may commit Iniquity, but not injustice or injury in the proper signification.*] I would he had expounded the proper signification: At the first I was amazed at this distinction, and did doubt there was some great and excellent Notion in it, but duly considering the words, I find they were airy, and do signifie no more difference, then if I had affirmed Mr. *Hobbs*, or the Writer of *Leviathan*, said this, or that, meerly nominal: For what is iniquity but unequal dealings? which in him who is bound to deal equally in distribution, or commutation, is *injustice*; and indeed injustice is nothing else; and *injury*, what is that? but not just, or right; and I am sure injustice is nothing else: But where some Law directs this or that, he doth otherwise: This is the proper and genuine sense of the words, and unless he had shewed us some more proper use of them, there is no reason why we should be forced from this common acceptation. Here now I might justly break off from further discourse of this business, having answered what he objects; but because I would give some satisfaction to the Reader in this Conclusion, I shall a little insist further, and shew, that *Leviathans*, or Supremes, may do unjustly.

SECT. IV.

A Soveraign may do injustice by himself, and by his Ministers impowred, and not punished by him.

IT will be a strong foundation for this discourse to produce the Actions of the King of Kings, God himself, which I may do in the eighteenth of *Genesis*; ye may observe there, that God was pleased to reveal to *Abraham* his intended destruction of *Sodom*; *Abraham* after he had undertaken to plead for them, in the twenty fourth verse, puts the Question, Peradventure there will be fifty righteous within the City, wilt thou also destroy, and not spare the City for the fifty righteous that are therein? Then in the twenty fifth verse, *That be far from*

from thee to do after this manner, to ſlay the righteous with the wicked, and that the righteous ſhall be as the wicked, that be far from thee; ſhall not the Judge of all the Earth do right? In which you may obſerve, that *Abraham* in a bold manner did dare to intimate, that God himſelf ſhould have done amiſs, not right, but unjuſtly, in puniſhing the righteous with the wicked; and ſhall we be afraid to ſay that *Leviathan* can do unjuſtly, when they ſhall ſlay the righteous as the wicked, which many of them have done? If we conſider all the Species, and ſeveral ſorts of injuſtice, we ſhall find that they may, and have perpetrated them: They have broke the equity of *diſtributive Juſtice*, in preferring baſe and unworthy people, and neglecting, yea puniſhing vertuous men; for *Commutative Juſtice*, they have taken againſt Law and Equity other mens Eſtates, they have neglected to pay their due debts, and what can be more unjuſt then thoſe? they may therefore do unjuſtly, nay what is more, by how much their power is greater, by ſo much they are enabled to do more injuſtice; and I may add, other mens injuſtice may prove theirs, not only out of his vain principles, becauſe all Judges in his Dominion act by his Authority, even in thoſe Cauſes where they judge wickedly: But becauſe he is the Supreme, and ſhould take care for his inferiour Officers that they do their duties, which if he knows they do not, and yet neglect to correct them for amendment, they will prove his wickedneſs. We know the Judgment upon old *Eli*, who was a vertuous and good man in himſelf, and the *Leviathan* of that Nation then, yet the Judgment of God was upon him for not uſing ſevere Juſtice to his Sons, when he knew their faults; as you may obſerve in 1 *Sam.* 2. 27. So that it is apparent, that they may do injuſtice more then others; and indeed if he cannot be unjuſt, neither can he be juſt, for contraries are belonging to the ſame ſubject; he who cannot be vicious, cannot be vertuous, and contrary acts in any man will by degrees eat out any vice or vertue, nor can men call it vertue in any who cannot do ill. But I think there is now enough ſaid to this, I will paſs to his fifth Inference, which is this.

CHAP. IX. *SECT.* I.

Mr. Hobbs *his fifth Inference. The Propoſition aſſerted. The reaſon of this Inference weak, and invalid.*

FIfthly, *and conſequently to that which was ſaid laſt, No man that hath Soveraign Power can juſtly be put to death, or otherwiſe in any manner by his Subjects be puniſhed.*] This concluſion is moſt true, becauſe he is Supreme; and to put to death, or puniſh, are acts only of Supremacy: But his reaſon, and the only means which he uſeth to obtain this excellent concluſion, is ſo falſe, that unleſs it ſhould be confuted, we may think ſo excellent a truth had a weak ſupport; his reaſon follows [*For ſeeing every Subject is Author of the actions of his Soveraign, he puniſheth another for the actions committed by himſelf.*] I have oft ſpoke of this; by this conſequence a King cannot puniſh a wicked Judge, a rebellious General, and the like, as I have often ſaid before: And if the Supreme ſhould urge to theſe inſtances, that this Judge, or this General, acted implicitly againſt the Authority granted by the Supreme, the ſame anſwer may be returned to him from his Subjects when he doth that which is contrary to their good or peace; ſo that although this concluſion is moſt neceſſary to the eſtabliſhment of peace and happineſs in any Kingdom, yet when it is urged only by ſuch fallacious Inferences, it makes the Readers imagine, that the greateſt and moſt weighty things in Polity are dubious.

SECT.

SECT. II.

He that hath right to the end, hath not right to all the means to attain that end, but only to ſuch mediums as are juſt and legal.

HE infers preſently upon the bottom of this concluſion; *And becauſe the end of this Inſtitution is the peace and defence of them all; and whoſoever has right to the end, has right to the means, it belongeth of right to him. Whatſoever man, or Aſſembly, that hath the Soveraignty to be Judge of the means of peace, and defence, to do whatſoever he ſhall think neceſſary to be done.* I ſpare putting down every word: For anſwer hereunto, know, That as I have oft obſerved he exceedingly often abuſeth this general Rule; he who hath right to the end, hath right to ſome means, but not to all: A man hath right to his houſe, in anothers poſſeſſion, right to get it peaceably by Law, and not by force: A Supreme, or under him his Judge, hath right to puniſh Felons, but he hath no right to butcher any man without a legal Tryal, no though the fact were ſeen by him; ſo that he hath right to all legal means to obtain this end, but not any other: Let us change the perſon, and this will appear moſt manifeſtly, every man hath right to the peace and good of the whole Kingdom, without which he cannot live contentedly, and happily, and he ought to uſe his endeavour for the obtaining and preſerving it, but it muſt have this little addition of *lawful means*; if he have right to procure it by illegal means, it will open a gap, and give countenance to all Rebellion; for there was never any Rebellion which had not that ſpecious pretence of the peace and good of the Publick, which otherwiſe could not be obtained; and therefore although he who hath right to the end, hath right to ſome means of obtaining it, yet not to all: And this I am confident may fully ſatisfie the following part of that Paragraph.

CHAP. X. *SECT.* I.

Mr. Hobbs *his ſixth Inference examined and cenſured. The Soveraigns Commands, in point of Religion, ſubmitted to the Commands of God.*

NOw I am come to the 91 page, where he proceeds: [*Sixthly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averſe, and what are conducing to peace, and conſequently on what occaſions, how far, and what men are to be truſted withall in ſpeaking to multitudes of people, and who ſhall examine the Doctrines of all Books before they be publiſhed.*] The drift of all this Inference is to place the Government of *Religious Doctrine* in eſtabliſhment of Doctrine in Religion, whether by preaching, or printing, to be in the Soveraign. I ſhall have opportunity to enlarge upon this concluſion hereafter, when I ſhall meddle with his Divinity, but will not let it paſs now, but ſpeak a little to make way for that. Conſider then firſt, that a hundred thouſand men meet together to inſtitute a Soveraign (for out of his former Inſtitution of a Commonwealth he deduceth theſe Inferences) theſe men are either of one Religion, or divers; (for Religion all people have) if of one Religion, it is not poſſible for men to think, that they ſhould be ſo careleſs of the greateſt and deareſt concernment in the world, as to throw it away to anothers diſpoſe, without any Covenant or promiſe to preſerve it for them. Let us in our thoughts run over the univerſal world, and conſider the various judgments in Religion, Chriſtians, Jews, Mahumetans, and the ſeveral ſorts of Gentiliſmes, with their ſeveral Subdiviſions, we ſhall find none that hold ſo mean a price upon their Worſhip of God, as to part with it upon ſuch ridiculous terms, as to ſubject themſelves ſo totally to a *Leviathan*, as not to have any engagement for their duty towards their God; and moſt of them would rather put themſelves upon their protection by his Providence,

vidence, then to offer up his good pleaſure a Sacrifice to their worldly preſervation, by an arm of fleſh. But if they are of divers Religions (which is a moſt dangerous Enemy to the peace of any Kingdom) they certainly will either agree for an abſolute tolleration, or elſe one being countenanced (which moſt ſurely muſt be the Supreme Religion) the reſt may enjoy their own upon certain conditions, and then he deals unjuſtly when he violates that condition, when he ſhall command other Opinions to be broached, or them to be puniſhed otherways then was agreed upon before. But let the Reader conſider here are divers actions intermixed, ſome of which the Soveraign may act in his own perſon, and ſome which he muſt act by Commiſſions: Of the firſt ſort are limitation of popular Orators; his meaning is our Preachers, who are the Publick Speakers to the People, of whom it is affirmed, that he muſt judge on what occaſions, how far, and what men are to be truſted withall in ſpeaking to multitudes of people, that this cannot exact an abſolute obedience, and that the Soveraign may offend in all theſe, will be evident, if we lay the Scene among *Turks*, and the *Moguls*, commanding not to preach Chriſt; and it be granted, that they puniſh all them who do ſo, will Mr. *Hobbs* ſay this is juſt? It may be he will; but I am ſure the Apoſtles were of another mind, when (*Acts* 4. 18.) they were commanded not to preach in the Name of the Lord Jeſus; they anſwered (in the nineteenth verſe) *Whether it be right in the ſight of God to hearken unto you more then unto God, judge ye.* The anſwer was of invincible force, implying thus much, That ye, be ye what you will, *Leviathan*, or what can be imagined to have Commanding Authority, ye are Gods Deputies; if when God Commands any thing, you give a croſs Command, judge which ſhould be obeyed? If when the King in expreſs terms commands one thing, and his Lieutenant commands another, which ſhould be obeyed? The caſe is ſo betwixt the greateſt King, Soveraign, or *Leviathan* in this world, and God; *judge ye then:* They could reply nothing to this anſwer of the Apoſtles, none did endeavour to do it, but immediately went to Club-Law, Threats and Menaces, and let them go; ſo that it

is

is clearly evident, that Soveraigns in ſuch Commands may do unjuſtly, and are not to be obeyed in their unjuſt Commands by vertuous men, who may, and muſt ſuffer obediently, though they ought not to act obediently. I muſt add no more at this time, hereafter will be a greater opportunity.

SECT. II.

Books juſtly examined before publiſhed. Such a Commiſſion wanting when Mr. Hobbs *his Book was printed. His reaſon of this Propoſition aſſerted.*

IN the ſecond ſort of Acts, he is in the right; they ought and have Authority to grant Commiſſions to ſome who ſhall *examine the Doctrine in all Books before they are publiſhed.*] This is moſt reaſonable, for elſe Libels, ſcandalous to the Religion, and preſent Government, would fly abroad, to the diſturbance of the Kingdom; and it is impoſſible for the Supreme to do it himſelf; and certainly had there been ſuch a Commiſſion here in *England* when this Book was to be printed, it would never have been allowed, no not in any well-governed Nation in the World. His reaſon for this is very ſtrong likewiſe, for the actions of men proceed from their Opinions: And ſurely, although he hath only inforced this in order to peace, yet it is evident, that the practicks of any vertue are beſt regulated by the Opinions of wiſe men, as all the actions of a mans life.

SECT. III.

Biſhops the moſt competent Judges of Books (eſpecially in Divinity) ſo alſo of Doctrines and Publick Orators, or Preachers to the people.

THis therefore hath uſually been allotted to ſuch men, whoſe Function requires the Study of ſuch things from them,

them, I mean Biſhops, the *Reverence* of whoſe judgments, and the honour of whoſe perſons, may gain a ſubmiſſion to their determinations. This I ſpeak for Preaching, for Books in Divinity; others have their proper ſpheres to move in according to their Profeſſions. He proceeds.

SECT. IV.

Mr. Hobbs *his Aſſertion affirmed; his expreſſions of* regulating Doctrines *by* Peace *cenſured; ſome kind of Peace among Devils.*

[*And although in matter of Doctrine nothing ought to be regarded but the truth, yet this is not repugnant to the regulating the ſame by peace; for Doctrine repugnant to peace, can be no more true, then Peace and Concord can be againſt the Law of Nature.*] I am of his mind, that in matter of Doctrine, the truth, and only truth is to be conſidered; and I am confident, that truth and peace will certainly meet together. But methinks that is not handſomely ſpoke, when he ſaith, that Doctrine ſhould be regulated by peace, without doubt peace is an excellent Box to preſerve truth when it is ſetled; it is a Child, a Daughter, and fruit of truth, for true Doctrine brings peace whereſoever it is; but it cannot ſo regulate a Doctrine, as to enforce this concluſion, That *becauſe theſe men live in peace amongſt one another, therefore they have the truth of Doctrine preſerved amongſt them:* For there may be a peace amongſt men who are Rebels, nay amongſt the Devils themſelves (for ought I know) I am ſure it appears to be the force of our Saviours argument, when they ſaid, *He caſteth out Devils through Beelzebub the Prince of Devils*, that *a Kingdom divided againſt it ſelf cannot ſtand:* Therefore their Kingdom, being a laſting Kingdom, muſt have peace in it. But yet it is a more probable argument, that becauſe truth naturally tends to peace, therefore where is peace and quiet, it is reaſonable to think there is truth.

SECT. V.

The former concluſions repugnant to Mr. Hobbs *his Doctrine; Peace not conſonant to the Law of Nature, according to his aſſertion; the true reaſon of the former concluſion.*

But the Argument by which he proves it did not become his mouth or pen; for ſaith he [*Doctrine repugnant to peace can be no more true, then peace and concord can be againſt the Law of Nature.*] This I ſay did not become him, for he hath delivered it for a Maxime in Politicks, *That by the Law of Nature every man only conſiders himſelf, and is at war with all the world beſides, and hath right to do what he will with it.*] But peace and concord are artificial things introduced by the wit of man for his greater ſecurity: So that if truth and peace agree no better, then peace, and the Law of Nature, as he hath ſtated it, it is little or not at all. But the truth is, that truth of Doctrine bring all peace, peace with God, by ſubjecting our wills to his Sacred Revelations in the regulation of our actions; peace with men by that bleſſed Doctrine of Charity, by which we are commanded, as much as in us lies, to have peace with all men, peace in our own ſouls, by ſubduing thoſe carnal, ſenſual, rebellious affections which are in man, to the obedience to reaſon. So that without doubt truth doth naturally produce peace, but is not therefore regulated by it.

SECT. VI.

The former expreſſion of regulating all Doctrines by peace *further examined and cenſured: Divine Truths and Doctrines not regulated by peace. In Politicks this expreſſion not improper.*

That properly *regulates* another, which directs and ſhews the way by which that other ſhould walk, or elſe is the Rule

Rule by which it ſhould be drawn: So we ſay, he is regulated by this Law, who is directed and commanded by it, to do this or that: And this hath the ſame ſignification in moral as in natural things. A Square which the Carpenter uſeth for the direction of his work, regulates that work, and the ſame doth a Law; but that in the indagation of any Divine Truth, as of Divine Attributes, the nature of Faith, of Prayer, and the like, that a man ſhould ſquare it out by peace, or that he ſhould regulate them by it, is a ſtrange aſſertion: Nay it is ſo in Mathematical truths, and Phyſical alſo. If a man ſhould enquire, whether the Sun be bigger than the earth, muſt he regulate his examination by the rule of peace? Or if he enquire in Nature, whether a firſt matter or Atomes be the foundation, the principle of the World, out of which it is made? muſt this be compared and guided by the conſent it hath with peace? It is true, had he confined his *truths* to politick *truths*, it might have good acceptance, becauſe the end of Politicks is the governing man in peace and happineſs; but he is ſo far from that, as he points principally at Divine truths (as will appear) in the proſecution, of which it cannot be a rule, much leſs a ſole and only rule, as he ſeems to make it.

SECT. VII.

Mr. Hobbs *his expreſsion of new truths cenſured: Truth always the ſame; the object of Truth ſometimes obſcure:* New Truths, *and* new Lights, *phraſes equally affected.*

IT is true, that in a Commonwealth whereby the negligence and unskilfulneſs of Governors and Teachers, falſe Doctrines are by time generally received, the contrary truths may be generally offenſive; yet the moſt ſudden and rough buſling in of a truth that can be, does never break the peace, but only ſometimes awake the war.] I think with him, that it is through the negligence and unskilfulneſs of Governors and Teachers, that falſe Doctrines are received: But I do not approve that phraſe

of a *New Truth*, there is no ſuch thing, but of particulars, that this fire burns is new, but that fire will burn combuſtible matter, when applyed to it, is an eternal truth, of which ſorts of truth he ſeems to write. This kind of ſpeech ſeems to concur with that lately affected language of new lights, when there is no new light, but always Divine Graces lighted Spiritual, and Humane Intellect Natural Truths: The truths are the ſame, and the lights the ſame by which we diſcern them, but the objects may lye in darkneſs, and not be diſcerned, till their proper light be brought to them.

SECT. VIII.

His Aſſertion of the buſling in of truth awakes the War, examined, and ſhewed to be repugnant to his former Concluſions.

THe next phraſe to be conſidered is, *This buſling in of Truth doth not break the Peace, but awake the War.*] It ſeems then when men live in peace, they are at war, but only lye aſleep, when I ſhould think that the unquiet diſpoſition of war could never let it ſleep, and the quiet ſweet diſpoſition of peace makes it look like ſleep: But he gives reaſon for it (for ſaith he) *Thoſe men who are ſo remiſſly governed, that they dare take up Arms to defend or introduce an Opinion, are ſtill in War, and their condition not Peace, but a ceſſation of Arms for fear of one another, and they live as it were in the Precincts of Battel continually.*] This was wittily expreſſed by him; but he did not remember, that the *Covenant* in the inſtitution put them in a ſtate of peace, when now he placeth peace only in the mannagement of that Government, which if it be, there's another reaſon from hence to be added to what went before, that the Supreme ought to Covenant with his Subjects concerning his Government, which is obſtinately denied by him.

SECT.

SECT. IX.

Doctrines among Chriſtians not to be introduced by force. Ceſſation of Arms not the height of Peace. Remiſneſs, in matter of Opinion, not the only cauſe of Mutiny or Rebellion.

Conſider thoſe that are ſo remiſly governed, as they dare take up Arms to defend or introduce an Opinion.] This ſhould not concern Chriſtians, whoſe Opinions and Doctrines muſt not be introduced by Arms of Steel and force, but of reaſon and ſufferings; and as our Great Maſter, our bleſſed Saviour, planted it with his death, ſo muſt we cheriſh and water it with our own, not others blood: It is not to be ſowed or reaped by Swords, but ſufferings, and the reaſon of thoſe ſufferings. But be it of what opinion it will, this Argument doth not become him, becauſe he makes war to be the natural ſtate of all mankind, which if it be, it will return, unleſs you take the very nature away in which it is rooted, otherwiſe it only ſuppreſſes the outward acts of violence or war, but not extinguiſheth the being of it. Again, he makes his peace obtained by the Covenant in the Soveraigns Inſtitution, to be nothing elſe but a ceſſation of Arms, for fear men ſhould not elſe enjoy their conveniencies or well being. Now then, if this be the height of any peace, they who are governed thus remiſly, as he ſpeaks, are in as good a ſtate of peace as any others are. I grant that remiſneſs of Government, is an occaſion that looſe people are incited to foſter diſcontents, and malicious people encouraged to take up Arms. But this may be imputed to all remiſneſs, as well as that of Opinions, and ought not to be bounded by it.

SECT. X.

Mr. Hobbs *his fallacies in arguing diſcovered. To be Judge, and to conſtitute Judges, are diſtinct; the latter more advantagious to the Commonwealth, in point of Doctrines.*

HE thinking that this is clear, deduceth further thus; *It belongs therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power to be Judge, or conſtitute Judges of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing neceſſary to peace, thereby to prevent diſcord and civil wars.*] Obſerve here, Reader, is a fallacy that runs throughout his whole Book, which I have often marked before, and now muſt again, which is, that he makes his concluſion deduced out of his diſcourſe, another from that which he propoſed. His Concluſion propoſed is this; *Sixthly, it is annexed to the Soveraiguty to be Judge of what Opinions are averſe, and what conduce to peace.*] Obſerve it is in his own perſon, now it is to be Judge, or conſtitute Judges. There is a great difference betwixt the performance of this act in his own perſon, and by Officers. It is not probable, that a man or men taken up with ſo many and great thoughts of politick affairs, can have leiſure to get abilities for ſuch a purpoſe, or if he had, can he attend them? Therefore as I ſaid before, ſo I ſay again, he ought to imploy in that great buſineſs, men fitted by their proper Studies and endeavours to ſuch a deſign. We will go on.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI. *SECT.* I.

The impoſsibility of the former imagined Inſtitution of a Leviathan *further diſcovered, from the power given him by Mr.* Hobbs *in the propriety of Eſtates, attained before the Inſtitution.*

SEventhly, (ſaith he) *To the Soveraignty is annexed the whole power of preſcribing the Rules, whereby every man knows what good he may enjoy, and what actions he may do without being moleſted by his fellow Subjects; and this is it men call Propriety.*] To underſtand this we muſt return back, and conſider, that this is ſpoke of a Commonwealth conſtituted, after his impoſſible imagination, by a multitude of people, of which there was never any preſident, nor is ever likely to be: The impoſſibility of which will yet appear more manifeſt, by the examination of this Paragraph. To that purpoſe let us conceive a multitude of people met together upon ſuch a deſign, as he propoſeth, of chuſing a *Leviathan*; all theſe people either had eſtates, or had none, but only their beings in the world; or elſe ſome had eſtates, ſome had none. To think that in ſuch a multitude no man ſhould have any thing of his own, were moſt unreaſonable. And again, to imagine that there were no neceſſitous men amongſt ſuch a number of men, were ridiculous, it muſt needs therefore be, that ſome had eſtates, and ſome none. Let us then proceed according to his own Rule, that the prime and principal Law of Nature is for every man to look to himſelf, and his own accommodations; and for that reaſon it is (and the ſole reaſon by him alledged) why men incorporate into a Body Politick. This being ſuppoſed (as it is by him) can any man think that ſuch men who had eſtates, would make themſelves in an equal condition with thoſe who had none, and leave them at the diſpoſal of a *Leviathan* when he is conſtituted, whereby they ſhould

ſhould be levelled with them who had no eſtate; or rather in the conſtitution of their Commonwealth, provide to have them ſecured by ſome Covenant or other, that they might not be worſe afterwards, then they were when they covenanted for it, yea looſe that which perhaps with great pains and induſtry they had acquired, which if they do in their conſtituting a Commonwealth, the Soveraign hath not right to diſpoſe, and give croſs Rules to that Covenant afterwards, he having formerly aſſented to that Covenant. For if we conſider his Politicks, we ſhall find the only end, why men imbody themſelves into a Commonwealth, to be the ſecuring themſelves to live comfortably, enjoying their own without moleſtation, or to that purpoſe. Think then how it is poſſible for a man with ſuch thoughts about him, in that way to throw himſelf, and all he hath, clearly to anothers diſpoſal, without any condition or Covenant. For although all things under the Sun are ſubject to change, and the ſtrongeſt Entails find means to be fruſtrated, yet providence, and careful men, in ſuch a conſtitution of ſo high a Nature, would foreſee that poſſibility, and have ſome forecaſt, how and by what ways that ſhould be done, which indeed muſt needs make the multitude of the people unfit men for ſuch a work, who have not wiſdome to foreſee or provide for ſuch accidents.

SECT. II.

Mr. Hobbs *his ſuppoſition of men met together without a propriety, examined. The impoſſibility of this Fiction, according to his own grounds, from the contradictions which follow upon it.*

But he ſeems to go another way, and ſettles this building of his Commonwealth upon the foundation of a ſort of men which have no propriety in any thing, or ſuppoſe a hundred thouſand (a leſs number will ſcarce make a good City) all theſe having no intereſt in the world, beſides their being (which is as unimaginable as any of the reſt) which yet

yet is affirmed by him in the following words [*For before Conſtitution of Soveraign Power, as hath already been ſhewed, all men had right to all things, which neceſſarily cauſeth war, and therefore this propriety being neceſſary to peace, and depending on Soveraign Power, is the act of that Power in order to peace.*] This is a ſtrange conceit, that men in war have right to their Enemies Country before they have conquered it, and when they have conquered it, ſhall have right to very little: both which by him are moſt true. For before the chuſing a Soveraign they are at war with all the world, and have a right to all the world, yet when they have conquered any piece, it muſt be in the Soveraigns power to give them propriety only in what he pleaſeth. I know he may object to this, that he ſaith, the Supreme may give Rules, that is, make ſuch Laws by which men may know what is their propriety, but not that he ſhall give the propriety. But for anſwer to this, let him know, that the Legiſlative Power can take away, and alter them, as well as make them; and then it amounts to as much, as if he had given the propriety its ſelf, for he can do it when he will. And let us conſider, that thoſe men who by nature have right to all the world, yet by this induſtriouſly uniting themſelves into a Commonwealth, gain but this, that whereas before they had right to every thing, now they have right only to this little pittance which is allotted them.

SECT. III.

Mr. Hobbs *his illogical deductions. Propriety in the ſtate of War. What propriety is; it may be without peace, as peace may be without propriety.*

HE proceeds [*And therefore this Propriety being neceſſary to Peace, and depending on Soveraign Power, is an act of that Power in order to the Publick Peace.*] Surely there is no manner of Logical conſequences in this, *therefore* of his; for let us conſider to what this *therefore* relates, can it look forwards to all mens rights to come? and becauſe of that,

therefore propriety ſhould be an act of the Soveraign? Theſe have no conjunction one with another, no, nor becauſe they are in war one with another; for Nations that are in war one with another, have right of ſome; and people that have right to many things, may have right likewiſe to what they have of ſome: So that this *therefore* hath nothing before to build it ſelf upon; and indeed, in Logick, it ſhould have been deduced out of the premiſes. But let us ſee if there be any thing in this new ſentence that can countenance this Propoſition, *That propriety is an act of the Soveraign.* The firſt words that may ſeem to make for it, will be theſe (That Propriety being neceſſary to peace) *therefore Propriety is an act of Soveraignty.*] This follows not. Firſt, becauſe Propriety may be where there is war, therefore it cannot be neceſſary to peace, I take Propriety for a *peculiar right and title which a man hath to any goods.*) This a man may have at that inſtant when he hath war with another. And again, he may live in peace in this Kingdom, both with his Neighbour, and all the reſt of the Nation, and have propriety in nothing, but his being in the world: So that if peace can be without propriety, and propriety without peace, it cannot truly be ſaid that propriety is neceſſary to peace. And then that Propoſition which is the foundation of an argument failing, the Argument likewiſe falls to the ground.

SECT. IV.

Propriety not depending only upon Soveraign power. The propriety of the Soveraign independent. His conſequence again redargued. Propriety the Act of Law.

THe ſecond words which may give any ſemblance of an Argument (if any) are *depending upon Soveraign power*] and ſuch a Soveraign power as he makes his to be, there is none in the world but men have propriety without it, therefore no neceſſary dependance upon this, without which it can.

can be, and is. Again consider, the Soveraign himself hath a propriety of his own, and his propriety hath no dependance upon any: but then consider that if it be so, and he will have it understood of Subjects only, or that the Soveraign hath his propriety by right of his Soveraignty, because there is a Soveraign constituted; and that the propriety of all others hath a dependance upon this Soveraign power; yet it doth not follow, that that propriety is an act of Soveraignty. It may well be supposed, that propriety may be setled by Contract before the constitution of the Commonwealth, and then the Soveraign only looks and takes care for the right observation of those Laws, which were consented unto concerning propriety; and propriety is the Act of those Laws, and he the Protector and preserver of them: So that this consequence is not deduced out of any thing which is set down by him. And these few words which are added are of no force *(in order to the publick peace)* for although he may direct, yea inforce them to the publick peace, yet propriety it self is an act of those Laws which settles it, not of him which governs.

SECT. V.

Many things good or evil in their own Nature, and therefore not alterable by Humane Laws.

HE goes on; *These Rules of* Propriety *(or* meum *and* tuum*) and of good, evil, lawful, and unlawful, in the actions of Subjects, are the Civil Laws, that is to say, the Law of each Commonwealth in particular.*] The Rules of Propriety, that is, of the particular estate, are without question the Laws of each particular Commonwealth; but for good or evil, there are many things so framed in their own Nature, that it lies not in the power of Humane Laws to make such things good or evil, contrary to their beings, as to love, fear, and worship God, no Humane Law can make it evil; or to hate or despise him, no Humane Law can make it good. And so

for lawful and unlawful things, which either by the Law of God in our hearts, or that communicated to us in his holy Book; theſe are Laws beſides the Civil Law of the Nation, which the Civil Law cannot alter, or make good or evil, otherwiſe then that goodneſs or illneſs which they received from the Law Divine. That which follows in that Paragraph, is nothing but an Expoſition of Civil Law; how it is underſtood by him, which I conceive not to be material to his deſign, or mine; and therefore I let it alone, and come to a new Inference.

CHAP. XII. *SECT.* I.

The Soveraign obliged to take care for the deciſion of Controverſies, and accomptable to God as for his own, ſo alſo for his Officers neglect.

EIghthly (ſaith he) *Is annexed to the Soveraign the Rights of Controverſies, which may ariſe concerning Law, either Civil or Natural, or concerning Fact; for without the deciſion of Controverſies, there is no protection of one Subject from the injuries of another.*] That is true which he ſpeaks, ſo that he underſtands by it not a natural immediate Agent, but a moral political act by his Deputies and inferiour Officers, as Judges; and then it is not only a right which he may, but a duty which he ought to do. And I may go further then Mr. *Hobbs* here, and ſay, that he ſhall be reſponſible to the great King of Kings, for not taking care that thoſe his Officers do his duty of Juſtice in deciding cauſes. *Jethro*, *Moſes* Father-in-law gave him good counſel, not to take that burthen (impoſſible for his ſhoulders to bear) upon himſelf alone, but divide it to others, and keep weighty cauſes only to himſelf.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Mr. Hobbs *ninth Inference affirmed*, *Soveraigns in ordinary emergencies to uſe ordinary means.* Salus Populi Suprema Lex.

NInthly, *&c.* (ſaith he) (truly Reader I am tired with tranſcribing his words diſtinctly.) The drift of this ninth Inference is to ſay, That the Soveraign hath right to the Militia of his Kingdom, and ſo of all means to maintain his Army: and he ſaith right, without this, all others are nothing. The Subjects cannot be protected either from forreign or domeſtick injuries. This is true, but yet he hath right only to uſe right means for this. I ſpeak not of caſes of neceſſity, *Salus Reipublicæ eſt ſummæ Lex*, but in the ordinary mannage of affairs, he muſt reſerve himſelf queſtionleſs to the ordinary ways.

SECT. III.

The choice of Councellors, &c. *in the Soveraign: Mr.* Hobbs *his reaſon of this Concluſion refuted.*

FOr his tenth Inference, which is his right of chuſing Councellors, Officers of his Army, and the like, I agree with him; but not for his oft confuted reaſon, becauſe he hath right to the end, he muſt have right to the means; for he cannot have right to get his right ends by crooked means, but becauſe he is Supreme, and is the Fountain of all Power in his Realm. But yet there are in many Kingdomes great Offices belonging to Families, as Generals, Chamberlains, and the like; and thoſe cannot juſtly be laid aſide out of thoſe places that they are born to, and have by Inheritances, without great and juſt cauſe of diſinheriting be produced.

SECT. IV.

The eleventh Inference affirmed, where there is no Law, there is no transgression, and consequently no punishment.

His eleventh is most true, *That to the Soveraign is committed the power of punishing, and rewarding according to Law, or if there be no Law* (I fear to joyn with him here) *to punish where is no Law, according as he shall judge meet to conduce to the deterring of men from doing disservice to the Commonwealth.*] This I like not, sin is the transgression of a Law; where no Law, no sin, therefore no punishment.

His last Inference is after a long preamble, *That it belongs to the Soveraign Power to give Titles of Honour.*] I agree with him in this clause; but observe that his twelfth, eleventh, tenth, ninth Inferences, are all page 92.

SECT. V.

Mr. Hobbs *his Objection and Answer approved. Kings more incommodated then Subjects from the burthen of their Crimes, and their account to the King of Kings.*

I Have thus briefly touched upon these particular Inferences, which he calls the right of a Soveraign; and having censured them, any man may easily look through that which follows in that *Cap.* but in the latter end of that *Cap.* page 94. he seems to answer an Objection: [*A man may here object, that the condition of Subjects is very miserable, as being obnoxious to the lusts, or other irregular passions of him or them who have so unlimited a power in their hands; and commonly they who live under a Monarch, think it the fault of Monarchy, &c. not considering (saith he) that the estate of man can never be without some*

ſome incommodity or other.] I think he ſpeaks truth in almoſt all this whole Paragraph; but as a Chriſtian man who is aſſured there is a God, a Heaven, and Hell; I may ſay that as all Subjects muſt, whilſt they are in this world, have incommodities; ſo Kings have many more, their Crowns are made of Thorns, and their Scepters too heavy almoſt for men to bear, becauſe they have a mighty accompt to make up to their King, the King of Kings, of the good or evil in their Government, with which words I end this *Cap.* and come to his next, which is *Cap.* 19. entituled thus, *Of the ſeveral kinds of Commonwealth by Inſtitution, and of Succeſſion to the Soveraign Power.*

CHAP. XIII. *SECT.* I.

Mr. Hobbs *his expreſsion of Repreſentative not proper, and diminutive of Soveraignty. Two Queſtions raiſed about the diviſions of Commonwealths, left to the judgment of others.*

HE begins this *Cap.* with an Expoſition of that ancient diviſion of a Commonwealth into *Monarchical*, *Ariſtocratical*, and *Democratical*, which he affirms to be the only *forms by which any Commonwealth is governed*; and in the bottom of this 94 page, he proves it thus [*For the Repreſentative muſt needs be one man, or more; and if more, then it is either the Aſſembly of all, or but of a part. When the Repreſentative is one man, then it is a Monarchy; when an Aſſembly of all that will come together, then it is a Democracy, or popular Commonwealth; when an Aſſembly of a part only, then it is Ariſtocracy: Other kinds of Commonwealths there can be none, for either one, or more, or all muſt have the Soveraign Power, which I have ſhewed to be indiviſible.*] I will not here contend againſt that word Repreſentative, which I have oft already ſpoke againſt, and cannot be a fit word to expreſs a Soveraign, for it makes him to be but an Image or Creature of the people, whoſe

whoſe Supreme he is. But for that diviſion of a Commonwealth, which he propoſeth, although it is ſo honoured by the univerſality of Writers in Politicks, that it were not modeſty in any particular man to deny it, yet give me leave to put a Queſtion (I will not be peremptory in it) *Why, ſince a Commonwealth is the whole Body Politick, and conſiſts in the whole Regiment, from the King to the Cottager*, why there may not be thought of ſome diviſion in reſpect of ſubordination, as well as in reſpect of the Supreme. But I will leave the anſwer to ſome younger head, who may have leiſure to examine it, and raiſe another Queſtion: Since the diviſion is made only out of the quantity or number which conſtitute a Supreme, why may not ſome things be thought upon concerning the quality of it, which may give a new and another illuſtration to that condition of a Supreme? For although this term of the quality of a Supreme is not uſually expreſſed in the notion of the thing, yet the matter and ſenſe of that word is often delivered by them, as Tyranny for Monarchy; by the firſt of which, they underſtand a Monarch governing without Law, ſo Oligarchy for Ariſtocracy, as Mr. *Hobbs* expreſſeth in the following words, page 95.

SECT. II.

Tyranny and Monarchy different forms of Government. Miſcalling alters not the nature of the thing. Oeconomical Government conſiſtent with Anarchy.

THere be other names of Government in the Hiſtories and Books of Policy, as Tyranny, and Oligarchy; but they are not the names of other forms of Government, but of the ſame forms miſliked.] Indeed in the firſt, they are divers forms to govern by Laws, or without Laws, differing forms, differing in the very eſſential acts of Government. In the ſecond you may find a great difference in the perſons, the one being enabled to his place by his vertue, the other by riches only, or ſuch like accommodations. But let us conſider what he adds

(for

(for ſaith he) *They who are diſcontented under Monarchy, call it* Tyranny, *and they who are diſpleaſed with Ariſtocracy, call it Oligarchy; they who find themſelves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy (which ſignifies a want of Government) and yet I think no man believes a want of Government to be any new kind of Government.*] I believe what he ſaith hath truth, they will miſcall them ſo; but yet this proves not, that theſe miſcallings are not founded upon a truth, A vertuous man is branded with calumny, and yet for all that a vertuous man and a vicious man differ, although the vertuous man be abuſed; ſo differ theſe Governments one from another. What he ſpeaks of Democracy and Anarchy was ingenious, but unapplicable to any the other. And although in the ſtrictneſs of that word Anarchy, it is not poſſible to allow any Government, yet if it be applied to Political Government, it may notwithſtanding (granting it there) conſiſt with Oeconomical Government. And when a Democracy is grown looſe, that the Authority in relation to the whole Commonwealth is loſt, yet Government may be found in Families. What he adds is not of great moment, when he ſaith, *Nor by the ſame reaſon ought they to believe, that the Government is of one kind when they like it, and another when they diſlike it, or are oppreſſed by the Governours.*] Where is the parity of reaſon betwixt any thing that went before, and this, to produce that ſaying of his (*for the ſame reaſon?*) and there is no reaſon for this, that the liking, or diſliking, which are extremely outward things, to the eſſence of any thing, ſhould produce a difference in the thing it ſelf.

SECT. III.

The Authors Opinion of this diviſion. The denomination of mixed bodies (as in natural, ſo in political) à principalion. *The ſtrange mixture of the Government of* Lacedæmon. *The Monarchy of* Darius *mixed with Ariſtocracy.*

AND now Reader, having paſſed ſome Notes, I will proceed to ſet down my own judgment and Opinion of this ſo much honoured diviſion, which although out of the Reverence I bear to the conſent of ſo many learned men in it, I dare not deny that it is a good diviſion; yet methinks in political ſtories I can obſerve, that take theſe in their pure and ſimple natures, there's ſcarce one of them purely ſuch, in any one Country of the whole world; and therefore I may ſay of them, as Philoſophers ſay of the Elements, they are the matter of which this great Globe of this ſublunary world is compoſed; and yet not found diſtinct in their pure nature, in any creature in the world, but are denominated ſuch *à principalion*; as when heat is in any great degree, then it is called fire; when cold and moiſture are intenſe, it is then water; or elſe (as the Mathematicians ſpeak) *Saturn* is Lord of this Houſe, becauſe he is predominant; yet the power of his influence is more or leſs, according to the aſſiſtance or detriment he receives from other Planets. So when one is chief or Lord of the Houſe, either a Monarchical chief, or Ariſtocratical, yea I may add a Democratical or popular Government, it is denominated from that which is principle, although one or both the other may be joyned in the influence, and concur in the Government over the whole. I think this appears moſt true to any man who hath peruſed ſtories; nay they are ſo conjoyned and mixed one with the other ſometimes, that it is exceeding hard to ſay which is the predominant, and diſputes amongſt learned men are raiſed, what name to give ſome Supremes. You may find a common inſtance

inſtance in *Lacedæmon*, where there was a King, a Senate, and in many things the people came in for their ſhares, learned men know not which to call it. Look if you pleaſe upon Monarchy; there is none I think ſo abſolute in the world, to which all he ſpeaks may be applied; (I mean all thoſe marks of Soveraignty which have been before touched upon) I will give the Reader one inſtance in one of the greateſt Monarchs that ever was, or is in the world, I mean *Darius* in the ſixth of *Daniel*, you ſhall find at the ſeventh verſe, that all the Preſidents of the Kingdom, the Governors, and the Princes, the Councellors, and the Captains, conſulted together to eſtabliſh a Royal Statute, and to make a firm Decree, that whoſoever ſhall ask a Petition of any God or man for thirty daies, ſave of *Darius* himſelf, ſhould be caſt into the Lyons Den. I will not deſcant upon the Decree, being the moſt abominably wicked that poſſibly could be made by a man who did acknowledge a God as *Darius* did: For how could he think that God would bleſs him, acting ſo crolly againſt his Honour, as to forbid prayers to him? Mr. *Hobbs* indeed might have concurred with him, that thinks no prayers have prevalence with God, but that all things are governed by immutable neceſſity. But *Darius* could not be of that mind, who forethought that God could, and would deliver him: Neither could *Daniel* be of that mind, who would not leave praying for all the terrors of the world. Well, the Decree is out, according to the Laws of the *Medes* and *Perſians*, which is unalterable; when the Law was out, and *Daniel* found to be a tranſgreſſor againſt it, we ſhall find in the thirteenth verſe, that theſe Princes preſented the crime to the King, and required Juſtice againſt him; in the fourteenth verſe the King is ſaid to labour until night to deliver *Daniel*, and was diſpleaſed with himſelf. Surely before he was aware he had conſented to ſuch a Law as was miſchievous to a perſon of that great integrity and excellency, as *Daniel* was; and this Law which he had made, muſt be Author of ſo great a Crime, as to ſhed not only Innocent, but vertuous blood; and therefore he laboured until Sun-ſet with thoſe men who joyned with him in the making that Law to deliver *Daniel*: But they, in the fif-

teenth verſe, being fierce againſt *Daniel*, urged the immutability of the Decree, that it was a Law confirmed by him according to the Laws of the *Medes* and *Perſians*, which may not be altered; and indeed the argument is of great force: For if Laws made by any Supreme may be violated before they are repealed, what ſecurity can any Subject have of any thing he enjoys? And ſurely in keeping and preſerving the Laws they have made, they do imitate their great Maſter the King of Kings, and Supreme of Supremes, from whom they have all their Authority, and by whom they reign, who although by his infinite power he can do what he pleaſeth, yet out of his infinite goodneſs he cannot deny himſelf, or alter the word which is gone out of his mouth, *falli non potest*, *mentiri non potest*; ſo that all his Words, and Covenants, and Promiſes, are Yea and Amen. Such ſhould Supremes be; ſuch was *Darius* that juſt King; no doubt but he could have ſent a party of Souldiers, and have taken *Daniel* out of their power; but having made the Law, which bound him to the execution, he would perform it, although it were never ſo contrary and averſe to his diſpoſition. From all which you may diſcern, that this great Potentate had his power limited by a Law which he could not juſtly violate. Now look upon him, and ſee him in the following part of his ſtory, of a moſt abſolute and unlimited power, where it was not reſtrained by Law. In the latter end of that *Cap.* you may obſerve, that when the King had perceived that God had delivered *Daniel* from the Lyons, and he had taken him out of the Den. At the 24 verſe the King commanded, and they brought thoſe men who had accuſed *Daniel*, and caſt them, and their Wives, and Children, into the Lyons Den, that is, the Preſidents and the Princes, which was the greateſt act of power exerciſed upon the greateſt perſons which were in that greateſt Kingdom, and all this meerly arbitrary.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

The reſult of the former example. No Government de facto *purely Monarchical; and therefore not ſuſceptible of all the properties of Monarchical Government required by Mr.* Hobbs. Darius *bound to the execution of thoſe Laws which himſelf had made.*

MY Collection here is, That there is no Supreme upon earth, which hath no commixion of any the other principles in all thoſe particular rights, which Mr. *Hobbs* requires as properties of Supremacy; for the Legiſlative is one, and the controul of the Execution is another. Here you ſee at the making of this Decree, there was Ariſtocracy mixed with Monarchy by the Princes, for they petitioned the King to make this Law, but the King gave life to it with his *Fiat*. That this was ſo appears, becauſe if *Darius* alone had done, and they had had no intereſt in this Legiſlation, he who had made it, might have recalled it of himſelf, when he diſcovered the miſchief which it produced; but it is ſaid that he ſtrove and laboured to have ſaved him, but thoſe Princes (who it ſeems had ſome influence in making the Law) reſiſted, and would not give way to it: Then mark the ſecond particle, which is next of moment in the Law it ſelf; that is the execution, he could not be ſpared from that. And although in many polities, the Supreme may, and hath power to diſpence with the execution of ſevere Juſtice, yet it ſeems this great King had his hand tyed in reſpect of that, and could not juſtly do it, when upon their Petition he had eſtabliſhed that Law. Let no man cenſure this concluſion until he hath read the whole, for it is not proper for me to prevent my method in any following diſcourſe, to ſatisfie every doubt which may interpoſe in the mean time, but to preſerve every particular until I come to its proper place.

SECT. V.

The general reaſons of the precedent concluſions. That Government beſt which is ſuited to the diſpoſition of the people. Some people fit only for ſubjection.

But to conceive a general reaſon for what I ſpeak, conſider with me, that the people muſt be governed as beſt ſuits with their condition; for the multitude without doubt would be too hard for any Supreme, if they knew how advantagiouſly to diſpoſe of themſelves: And it is an eaſie thing with ambiguous language to ſow diſcontents amongſt the multitude againſt any preſent Government; and therefore all Politicians, beſides Mr. *Hobbs*, do ſhew that ſome Nations are fit to be ruled with a ſevere hand, ſome with a more remiſs one, ſome fit for Monarchy, ſome for Democracy. The Eaſtern Nations beſt agree with thoſe Monarchies under which they live, which are the moſt abſolute in the world, but other Countries would not endure that Yoak. It is a moſt ancient obſervation in this difference of Countries, that ſome are ſo dull (I dare not name them for fear of offending, though others have done it) as they are only fit to obey, not to govern.

SECT. VI.

The former concluſion further aſſerted. The Ephori *amongſt the* Lacedæmonians *firſt introduced by* Theopompus.

But for this concluſion let it ſuffice what *Ariſtotle* writes of *Theopompus*, and out of him other later Writers, that he being King of the *Lacedemonians* firſt ſet up the *Ephori* there; his Wife upbraided him with it, that he ſhould leave his Kingdom with leſs power to his Succeſſors, then he had received

received it from his Anceſtors, he anſwered, that he ſhould leave it more laſting. Perhaps he was deceived in it; but yet it meant this truth, that the people being ſweetned with the imagination that they have ſome intereſt in the Government, they will put their necks more willingly under the Yoak. The ſtory is told in the fifth of his Politicks, *Cap.* 11. which ſhew that it may be, and may be profitable to receive this commixion,

SECT. VII.

No Government abſolutely pure. Mr. Hobbs *his Politicks calculated for* Utopia.

But then go further and examine the flouriſhing Commonwealths of the whole world, and you ſhall find them ſo mixed, nay that mixture ſo equally poiſed, that it will be hard to find the predominant from which it may receive its name, as was the cauſe of the *Lacedemonians* diſputed amongſt divers Authors, whether Monarchical, Ariſtocratical, or Democratical, and none ſo abſolutely pure, as that we may ſay this Element is without commixion, that Planet hath alone influence; and this he ſeems himſelf to grant in his 98. page, concerning the practiſes in the world, although he writes now an *Utopia*, a pattern which he would have all to follow. He goes on, page 95.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV. *SECT.* I.

Mr. Hobbs *his concluſions deduced from Principles founded in the Air. Abſolute liberty not actually to be found in any people. Several petite Commonwealths raiſed out of the Ruines of the Roman Empire. None of theſe without mixture, nor durable. His expoſition of* Repreſentative *again redargued, as an ill foundation of Government, Religion, and Propriety. The formerly mentioned Commonwealths preſerved by Laws.*

IT *is manifeſt* (ſaith he) *that men who are in abſolute liberty, may, if they pleaſe, give Authority to one man to repreſent them every one, as well, &c.* The firſt obſervation which I make here, is an unhappy practiſe which he uſeth in this place, and often in this Book, which is to ſuppoſe things hard to be found in practicks, and by that fallacy to lay a foundation in the Air, and then raiſe an imaginary ſtructure upon it. This ſuppoſal of his, that men are in an abſolute liberty, is very rarely to be found; for all men that are in the world, as ſoon as they are born, are Subjects, unleſs we may conceive a man born King of that Country he is in. I would fain find out ſuch a poſſibility, where ſuch a number of men fit to make a Commonwealth may be at liberty; and I have found out one where it hath been practiſed, I mean that of the Roman Empire, when it was broken and ruined, many people for fear were driven away to ſhift for themſelves, or perhaps overſeen, or neglected by the Conquerors. Theſe men, one or other, being thus left to themſelves, their lawful Emperour, and his Poſterity, to whom they ſhould obey, being deſtroyed, or altogether unable to give them any ſupport, theſe men are left to ſhift for themſelves: A Government they muſt have, or grow wild; they conſpire in that, and

and then ſet up many Common-wealths in *Italy*, and thoſe adjacent parts. But give me leave to tell Mr. *Hobbs*, that he ſhall hardly find in any of them exiſting any pure element of Politie without commixion. And I ſhall tell him more, that theſe Commonwealths having no ſupport, but that weak foundation of the peoples Conſtitution, were upon all occaſions of tumults (which were very often) diverted from their firſt ſettlement, and had new ways of Government eſtabliſht in their place. I will tell him further, that no Supreme in all theſe was ever called a Repreſentative, or a *Leviathan*: And therefore Mr. *Hobbs* did much amiſs to lay this as a foundation for all that light ſtuff which follows, yea of his whole Book, and of all Commonwealths, which can only be founded upon ſuch an extraordinary occaſion, neither then in ſuch an abſolute manner as he ſuppoſeth: For never did any of theſe ſubmit their Religion, their Eſtates or Lives, as he would injoyn, but had them preſerved by Laws.

SECT. II.

The Barbarous Murder of King Charles *the Firſt, the direct iſſue of this Doctrine of Mr.* Hobbs, viz. *That the Soveraign is but the Repreſentative of the People.*

THat which follows immediately about our Repreſentative in the Houſe of Commons, I let paſs, until I come to the middle of that page and paragraph, toward the latter end, which he begins thus: [*I know not how this ſo manifeſt a truth ſhould of late be ſo little obſerved, that in a Monarchy, he that had the Soveraignty from a deſcent of* 600 *years, was alone called Soveraign, had the title of Majeſty from every one of his Subjects, and was unqueſtionably taken by them for their King* (I can add to him, was acknowledged ſo by all the World) *was notwithſtanding never conſidered as their Repreſentative.*] He ſaith, *he knows not how*; I will tell him, becauſe a King in no Language, nor in any Country, is taken for a

Repreſentative: And further, that all thoſe injuries which are done to him (for he means King *Charles* the Firſt) had their pretence from this horrid Doctrine of his, that Kings had their power from the people: And if he will, that they made him their Repreſentative, and not liking his Repreſentation, they depoſed him, and would be repreſented by one more like themſelves. In the latter end of that paregraph, he gives moſt dangerous counſel to him who had the preſent Government in his power (to inſtruct him in the nature of that Office.) But God be praiſed the danger of that intendment is over, and I let it paſs. In the following part of that *Cap.* he very excellently well diſcourſeth of thoſe three Elements of Government, and moſt rationally gives the ſuperiority to Monarchy. Then he enters into a diſcourſe of electing Kings, and Temporary Powers, as Dictators in Ariſtocracy, and both Ariſtocracy and Democracy, which I let paſs as not ſo miſchievous as other things. And now I come to his 2c. *Cap.* page 101. at the bottom, which is thus entitled, *Of Dominion Paternal and Deſpotical.*

CHAP. XV. *SECT.* I.

Mr. Hobbs *his digreſſion cenſured. His firſt Propoſition untrue. His ſuppoſition of a General Aſſembly to conſent to the Soveraignty of the Conqueror unpracticable.*

[*A Commonwealth by acquiſition is that, where the Soveraign Power is acquired by force; as it is acquired by force, when men ſingly, or many together, by plurality of voices, for fear of death or bonds, do authorize all the actions of that man; or Aſſembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his power.*] Now I am in the 102. page. This is a ſtrange digreſſion from his Title; What hath this acquiſition to do with Dominions Paternal or Deſpotical? but let it paſs, I will examine his definition. It is not true, that all acquiſition of a Kingdom is by

by force, ſometimes it is got by craft and knavery, we know how *Abſalom* got the Kingdom. There may be other inſtances, but let that go, acquiſition by force is but one ſpecies of acquiring Kingdomes. But then ſee what follows, [*It is then acquired by force, when men ſingly, &c.*] as before expreſſed. I dare boldly ſay he can ſhew me no conſiderable Kingdom that either is or was ſo acquired. I have confuted this in my former diſcourſe, concerning the Inſtitution of a Commonwealth, and thoſe arguments will be of more force againſt this manner of acquiring. Suppoſe an Enemy ſhould conquer *France* or *Spain*, do you think he could or would aſſemble all the Nation together to ſubſcribe, or any way expreſs their intentions of this his moſt unjuſt requeſt to own all his actions, and make him their perſon? it is beyond poſſibility to imagine any ſuch thing. Look upon *David*, *Alexander*, *Pompey*, any of thoſe Conquerors in the world, did they ever act any ſuch thing? I am confident we read of none, and yet they attained Kingdomes, and got Dominions. But let us proceed to the next Paragraph.

SECT. II.

Fear not the only motive to conſent to obedience in the Inſtitution of Commonwealths. No obligation from fear, when that fear is removed. The fear of God the greateſt ſecurity of obedience.

And this kind of Dominion or Soveraignty, differeth from Soveraignty by Inſtitution, only in this, that men who chuſe their Soveraign do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they inſtitute: But in this caſe they ſubject themſelves to him they are afraid of.] Mr. *Hobbs* doth attribute very much to fear; however, in the laſt caſe, I think it not amiſs: A vanquiſht Nation ſeldome ſubjects themſelves to an Enemy, but out of fear of the Conqueror. But concerning the former, the motive is as much the love of their own happy and quiet condition, together with the hope and expectation of

many other conveniences which will accrew to them and their Families by it: But (ſaith he) *in both caſes they do it for fear; which is to be noted by them that hold all ſuch Covenants as proceed from fear of death, or violence, void; which if it were true, no man in any kind of Commonwealth could be obliged to obedience.*] Thus far he, and indeed if there were no other obligation but theſe fears he ſpeaks of, there were no obligation to bind any man when he may ſecure himſelf: For let the Reader obſerve, that the fear he ſpeaks of are fears of men, one of another in an inſtituted, and in his acquired Kingdom for fear of the Conqueror. Here is put down no fear of God, which is the obliging fear; for the reſt men may have worldly plots to eſcape, and rid themſelves of the dangers of War, but he can have none to acquit himſelf of Gods anger, which is the great weight, and the only one which preſſeth man to obedience.

SECT. III.

Mr. Hobbs *his Propoſition aſſerted. His reaſon of this Propoſition cenſured. Contracts againſt the moral Law* ipſo facto *void.*

HE proceeds [*It is true, that in a Commonwealth once inſtituted or acquired, promiſes proceeding either from fear of death, or violence, are no Covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promiſed is contrary to the Laws: But the reaſon is not, becauſe it was made upon fear, but becauſe he that promiſeth, hath no right to the thing promiſed.*] Here is a Propoſition, and the reaſon of it. The Propoſition I ſpeak to firſt, and allow it to be true, not only in a Commonwealth inſtituted or acquired, but in any eſtate of mankind: Whoſoever promiſeth an unlawful thing is not obliged to the performance; and the reaſon is, that the Moral Law of Nature being written in mens hearts, whatſoever engagement is made againſt it, is *ipſo facto* invalid, whether he did it by fear or no, being (as he rightly ſpeaks) an act without his ability to perform, and of

of that which was otherwise disposed of by the Moral Law. But consider, Reader, what this is to his purpose, the sense preceding was, *That all Commonwealths were founded upon fear, whether instituted or acquired:* From thence he spake against such as hold *Covenants made for fear of death, or violence, void.*

SECT. IV.

Of Covenants arising from fear in things lawful, but against Equity. Of mixed Contracts and Actions, of just, and lighter, or unwarrantable fears in avoidance of Contracts.

I Looked to have him prove they were not; but instead of that he affirms, *they are void in an instituted Commonwealth, when they Covenant for an unlawful thing.* But suppose they covenant to do a thing that is lawful? when it is in its self lawful, although full of many inconveniencies, as that Thieves should with oaths and imprecations make a man swear to alienate his estate from his Wife and Children, it is lawful for him to do it, but it would be a most wicked act to keep such a Covenant; not because (as his reason is) *that he had no power to do it*; for he had by all those Laws which he seems to acknowledge, which are the Laws of the Kingdomes wherein he lives; but the reason is that which he will not acknowledge, that Covenants made upon such terms are not free, but mixed actions, which are done with a reluctancy, and not *plena conſenſu.* For although he that throws his goods into the Sea, to save his Ship and his life, doth that act willingly, that is principally so, yet because it is with a reluctancy, and against his love of his riches, which weighs the ballance heavier on the other side, it is neither violent, nor willing, but a mixed action, yet willing principally, because it is chosen; and upon this reason it is, that this act done by such considerable fear, is expounded not obligatory: As if a Maid surprized by such means should promise Marriage upon terrors of death if she did not so Covenant;

nant; if she finds she should be unhappy in such a Match, without doubt she is not bound to perform it, because it was not fully a willing or rational act, but mixed; but yet if it had been a voluntary act, and with full consent, she ought to keep her Covenant: Which shews, that many times forced acts or obligations made by terrour of death, or with strong probabilities of great mischief, if refused, may when that fear or terror is removed, and upon repentance of such Covenant, be lawfully denied, and are not obligatory: But if it be for fear of some little danger, such as may not *cadere in constantem virum*, it doth excuse no body. And now I let pass the latter end of that Paragraph, and proceed to the next, in the margin of which I find.

SECT. V.

The case of a conquered and instituted Kingdom not the same. The best art of a Conquerour is to secure his Victory By what means such a Security may be obtained.

The rights and consequencies of Sovereignty the same in both. That is, both in an instituted and an acquired Soveraignty, in which his marginal note is the whole pith of that Paragraph; for he only sets down the particulars formerly treated of, and discoursed upon before by me, and offers at no one argument, but at the latter end he saith; [*The reasons whereof are the same which are alledged in the precedent Chap.*] He says they are the same, and I say they cannot be the same: For if there were such a thing as his institution of a Soveraignty, yet the case of a conquered Nation must needs differ from it, for either the Conquest is fully and compleat, (which seldome happens) or else the well-nigh-conquered Nation comes to a Treaty for their conditions, which may be to enjoy their ancient Laws sometimes, sometimes accept of new, sometimes pay a tribute to the Conquerour, who gives them leave to live under their former

former Race of Kings; sometimes have Deputies and Vice-roys set over them, impowred by the Conquerour; sometimes they accept of Garrisons to bridle them; sometimes their words are taken; and then if there be an absolute Victory, they must be ruled solely by the will of the Conquerour. And in none of these is the condition of a conquered Kingdom the same with an Instituted: And surely the more conform their conquered condition is to their former state, the more lasting it will be, and otherwise it is in danger to decay quickly; for there is no discretion more becoming a Conqueror, then to make his Victory certain and durable: Nor is that any way to be atchieved so easily, as by discerning the temper of those men which he is to deal with, nor can their temper be so well understood by any thing, as by their customes; for the commonalty of men not being able to chuse for themselves, must and will be contented with that Government which they are used to, though perhaps another may be easier in its self. So that it is evident (I think) to be apprehended, that the same rights and consequencies of Soveraignty which belongs to a Supreme by Institution, do not belong to one by Conquest.

CHAP. XVI. *SECT.* I.

Mr. Hobbs *his method censured, his contradictions noted. Of the right of Dominion from Generation. Paternal Dominion not flowing from the consent of children. Infants cannot consent. Paternal Dominion flowing from the Laws of God and Nature. Scripture vilified by Mr.* Hobbs.

IN the next Paragraph he comes to treat of *Dominion Paternal how attained*, as the Margin directs. My first note shall be upon his method. He had treated in the precedent *Cap.* of *Dominion by Institution*, then the Title of this *Cap.* was

was of *Dominion Paternal* and *Deſpotical*. In all the preceding part of this *Cap.* he hath handled only Dominion by acquiſition, and that (without conſideration of what he had writ before) he defined to be ſuch *as is got by force*. Now he confutes himſelf in the firſt words of this Paragraph; which are [*Dominion is acquired two ways, either by Generation, or by Conqueſt.*] That by Generation, I am ſure, cannot be called by force; therefore either his definition of acquired Dominion is not good, or that Dominion by Generation is not an acquired Dominion. He proceeds [*The right of Dominion by Generation, is that which the Parent hath over his Children, and is called* Paternal.] A high Myſtery expounded; that the Government of Parents ſhould be called Paternal: But his next words confute this immediately, which are [*And is not ſo derived from the Generation, as if therefore the Parent had Dominion over his Child, becauſe he begot him.*] How then can Paternal Dominion be acquired by Generation? which he immediately before affirmed, when he ſaid, Dominion is acquired two ways, by Generation, and by Conqueſt: (but, ſaith he) *from the Childs conſent, either expreſs, or by other ſufficient Arguments declared.*] Let us conſider this, and examine what conſent a Child can give in his Infancy; certainly no otherwiſe then a Pig, or any Infant Beaſt; he can wiſh for a Teat, and cry for it when he lacks it, and be ſatisfied with any that is offered. If this Doctrine of his were true, the Child did chuſe his Nurſe who gave him ſuck, not the Mother who gave him being. At the firſt in his Infancy he cannot diſtinguiſh betwixt his Parents, and therefore can have no election nor conſent (I mean rational conſent) to one more then another to be his Guardian, yet the Parent hath Dominion over that Child, and like other Governours, ſhall give an account one day of that Stewardſhip, and of his behaviour towards him. Let us go on, and obſerve the Child grown up with a ſmattering of Reaſon; Can any man think that the Parent ſhould not govern that Child, who hath not prudence enough to govern himſelf, but much paſſion to make him unruly, and therefore needs to have a Governour? Well, let us go further, and bring the Child to

one

one and twenty years of age, when he is generally thought fit to govern his estate, if he have any, yet even then, until his death, he owes obedience to his Parents, and they have Dominion over him, whether he consent or not: And whosoever denies this, denies not only Scripture (which is nothing with Mr. *Hobbs*) but even Humanity, which hath expressed her tenderness of this duty in all Ages, as will appear more fully hereafter.

SECT. II.

Mr. Hobbs *his Chain of contradictions discovered.*

But good Reader observe with me how many contradictions are crouded together in one page. First an acquired Dominion is by force, and that contradicted; because that a Dominion is acquired by Generation, which is not a forced, but a most natural act; and that is again contradicted, because not Generation, but consent gives the Dominion; and this which he calls consent, is not such a thing as belonged to an acquired Dominion, for that consent is only a consent to that Government for fear of the Conquerour; but this consent is for love of his own accommodation, or out of that reverential awe which Children have to their Parents; and this is in nothing like the other. And surely if it participated of either, it most resembled the consent which he imagines to be in an instituted Commonwealth, and therefore not to be ranked under the Acquisite.

SECT. III.

Mr. Hobbs *his conſtant abuſe of Scripture noted. The command of the Mother to be obeyed in ſubordination to the Father, in whom the obedience of children is terminated. His iterated quarrelling with Scripture. Rules of Government to be proportionable to general emergencies.*

But let us go on with him (for ſaith he) *As to the Generation, God hath ordained to man a helper, and there be always two that are equally Parents: The Dominion therefore over the Child, ſhould belong equally to them both, and he be equally ſubject to both, which is impoſſible, for no man can obey two Maſters.*] To begin where he ends. He doth abuſe Scripture whereſoever it croſſeth his way, as it doth very often: *No man can ſerve two Maſters, but in every Family a man ſerves a Maſter and a Miſtreſs: There cannot be two Supremes.*] But in an Oeconomical Dominion the Man is above the Woman, and if the Woman command contrary to the Man, the Mans command is to be obeyed, and the Woman her ſelf is to be obedient to the Man, the Mother to the Father: I but, ſaith he, they are equally principles of Generation; therefore if the right of Dominion be an appendant to Generation, it muſt equally belong to them both. I will not diſpute the nature of Generation, which Philoſophers and Phyſitians have abundantly done; but ſuppoſe that in the caſe it exacts an obedience to them both, yet with a ſubordination to the Father, which muſt clearly appear in this, becauſe the Woman her ſelf muſt be obedient to the Father, as will appear in the two firſt principles of Generation, *Adam* and *Evah*, God gave them that Law, *Thy deſire ſhall be to thy Husband, and he ſhall rule over thee, Gen.* 3.16. Now then if the man rules the woman, then in the ſubordination of Government, ſhe cannot equally ſhare in that Dominion with him, who is Governour of her: So that although the Child hath from his Generation two per-

ſons

ſons to obey; yet this obedience is terminated in one, the Father who is Supreme, to whom the Mother alſo is ſubject: He proceeds [*And whereas ſome have attributed the Dominion to the man only, as being of the more excellent Sex, they miſreckon it; for there is not always that difference of ſtrength and prudence between the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without war.*] Thus this Author hath a ſpight to Scripture, and hopes with a flaſh of wicked wit to divert men from that due obſervance which they ought to have of thoſe duties which are there required, or at the leaſt to diminiſh that rational obedience which men ſhould give to it. It may be ſome do attribute the obedience to the man only, out of this regard, that he is the Nobler Sex, and why not? He is ſo undoubtedly; for although it may happen out in particulars, that the Woman may be more prudent or ſtrong then her Huſband, yet certainly the generality is not ſo; and the rules of governing and obeying are not to be taken from a few particular inſtances, but the common condition of the Sexes. Servants may be wiſer or ſtronger then their Maſters, Subjects then their Kings, children then their Parents, yet theſe ſacred Laws of governing and obeying muſt not be varied for ſuch few particular inſtances.

SECT. IV.

The brawling of Man and Wife improperly called war. War only between Nations. VViſdom, not ſtrength, enable to Government. VVives ſubmit to their Huſbands, by the Law of God, under the firſt and ſecond Adam. *St.* Pauls *Argument from the Law of Nature explained.*

WHat he ſaith that this cauſe muſt be *determined by war*, is ill expreſſed. For firſt the contention betwixt man and wife, cannot properly be called war, but brawling or fighting at the worſt. War is betwixt Nations in the genuine ſignification. I remember *Ælian* tells a ſtory of the *Sacæ*, that

when a Man and a Maid married, they were to fight at the first, and he or she that conquered, was afterwards served by the other for the term of their lives. This was a pretty gambal, whether true or false it is not much material; I read it only in him; but surely a most unreasonable practice. Is the power of Government proper to strength or wisdom? Can any man think that a Bull or a Horse is fitter to govern a man, then he them, because they are of more strength, though he have more wisdom? But surely for us that are Christians, there is no need to fly to such poor little instances, or customs, or the accidental prudence or strength of the woman; if she have more wit, let her use it to the gaining and winning him to vertue; if she have more strength, let her use it to the assistance of her Husbands weakness: by that means her excellencies will be imployed to their right uses; she shall be a helper to him, not a Ruler over him. I need not here repeat what of late I delivered concerning this Doctrine out of *Gen.* 3. But that Gods Command is clear to this purpose, not only in *Adam*, but those that are descended from the second *Adam*, consider what S. *Paul* writes in the fifth to the *Ephesians*, v. 22. *Wives submit your selves to your own Husbands, as unto the Lord.* But methinks Mr. *Hobbs* should answer to this, that this is only a positive Law; yet I can reply to that, that it is universal, or what is equivalent, indefinite, and comprehends all wives. But then go further, and read the Apostles Argument in the following verse; *For the Husband is the Head of the Wife, even as Christ is the Head of the Church.* Thus the Apostle argues from the Law of Nature: First, that by the Law of Nature the rest of the body submits to the Head; so must Wives do to their own Husbands. Then this is exemplified from Christianity in the manner of his Headship, such a Head as Christ is over his Church; which I hope no Christian will say, but that it must submit to, and be governed by him. And I hope, both Nature, Gods Law, and Christian duty, may be sufficient to determine this controversie without war; And I may add, that since all Nations have consented to it, sure we ought not now to demur upon the case, because Mr. *Hobbs* interposeth his Authority with little or no reason.

SECT.

SECT. V.

This Paragraph contrary to Mr. Hobbs *his principles, and the supposed institution of a Commonwealth; but yet most true, not from Mr.* Hobbs *his reason, but the Law of God. Fathers of Families have the disposition of their Families. The invalidity of Mr.* Hobbs *his reasons. His example of the Amazons inconcludent.*

HE proceeds: *In Commonwealths this controversie is decided by the Civil Law; and for the most part (but not always) the sentence is in favour of the Father, because for the most part Commonwealths have been erected by the Fathers, not by the Mothers of Families.* Now I am come to page 93. but I would fain know how the Fathers, rather then the Mothers, should come to be Erectors of Commonwealths? Certainly if Commonwealths were instituted (as he feigns) by the general suffrage of all who had interest in the Government, then women as well as men, Mothers as well as Fathers, had the management of that business, for they have their interest in the publick constitution as well as men. But he hath let fall an excellent truth which is clear against the whole Body of his Politicks, which is, that the Fathers of Families, not the Rabble, were the Erectors of Commonwealths: For if they did (as I am confident with him here they did) then his former discourse which is built upon the institution of a Commonwealth by the universal consent of all who have interest in it must fail; for not the Fathers and Mothers only, but even the meanest child or servant, may challenge their shares in it. And certainly the Fathers of Families could not be the Erectors of Commonwealths, but only out of this regard, that they were the chief in their Families, and by that reason had right to dispose of himself and them. And here let the Reader consider, that Mr. *Hobbs* never remembers that great Authority given by God to *Moses*, which regulated him and his Posterity many

ny Generations; nor the confirmation that Law laid from our Saviour in the New Testament, which are obligatory to us in all Ages. He only clouds the truth with this pittiful poor reason, or rather shew of reason, only that men were the Law-makers, and they were partial to their own Sex; No, Master *Hobbs*, God was the Law-maker, who is no accepter of persons, or Sexes, but in an infinitely wise manner disposeth all things in the best and surest method that may be, according to his most just Laws, But because he said (but not always) that is, that the Fathers of Families were not always the Erectors of Commonwealths, intimating that some Commonwealths were erected by the Mothers of Families, I should thank him, or any man else, who can shew me any such in the world. It may be he will fly to that beggerly instance which he gives presently of the *Amazons*; but let it suffice for them (if there were any such) that they were Widdows, or single Women, not united in Marriage, and so not subject to Husbands, and therefore were free to dispose of themselves as they pleased, and might have made what just Laws they thought fit for their condition; but if they were joyned in marriage to Husbands, they must then submit to that yoak, and be governed in their domestick affairs according to his discipline. The dispute is here betwixt Husband and Wife, not betwixt man and woman, Wives must submit to their own Husbands, not every woman to every man.

SECT. VI.

Mr. Hobbs *his contradiction again censured. Antipodial Government introduced. His conclusions not consistent one with another. Contracts* (*with Mr.* Hobbs) *but words, and advantaged by power, may lawfully be broken. Lawful Contracts sealed in Heaven.*

HE goes on: *But the Question lieth now in the state of meer Nature, where there are supposed no Laws of Matrimony,*

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no Laws for the education of children, but the Law of Nature, and the natural inclination of the Sexes one to another, and to their children. This is inconſiſtent with what he hath formerly taught, and I have confuted; viz. *That naturally men are at war, every man with every man:* Well then, in this ſtate before they are covenanted into a Commonwealth, all things, all rights are tryed by force, and it may happen that the man who conquers this day may fall ſick and grow weak, and then the Woman may be Victor, and ſo the caſe may be altered; or both may grow old or ſick, and their children maſter them both, and ſo bring in an Antipodial Government: And then let any man think, whether the wiſe conſtitution of Nature can agree with ſuch abominable follies? and how weak, according to his Doctrine, this concluſion is: *In this condition of meer nature* (ſaith he) *either the Parents between themſelves diſpoſe of the dominion over the child by contract, or do not diſpoſe thereof at all: If they do diſpoſe thereof, the right paſſeth according to the contract.* This diſtinction cannot be denied, either they muſt, or they muſt not contract: *If they diſpoſe* (ſaith he) *the right paſſeth according to the contract.* But let him remember the ſtate and condition he ſpeaks of, is in mans nature, before any imbodying themſelves into a Commonwealth. Then let him look back to what he hath writ, *Cap.* 17. page 85. *Covenants without the Sword are but words, and of no ſtrength to ſecure a man at all.* And again in the ſame page; *Therefore notwithſtanding the Law of Nature, if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our ſecurity, every man will and may lawfully relye upon his own ſtrength, and art for caution againſt all other men.* Let us put theſe together; the right paſſeth by contract, ſaith he, in this 20. *Cap.* Contracts are but words, and have no force to bind, ſaith he, in his 17. *Cap.* unleſs a Commonwealth be erected; therefore no Covenant gives an active right to any thing, without the Sword in a Magiſtrates hand to make it good: So then the Sword rules every man in that ſtate, before a Commonwealth is inſtituted, may lawfully relye upon his own ſtrength or art for caution. So that although the word be out in that ſtate, and the Contract made, yet if the Husband or the Wife can find ſtrength

or art to avoid it, they may lawfully uſe it, and to defraud and force each other to the breach of this Covenant is lawful. So that according to *his principles*, *there is no conſiderable ſtrength in the ſtate of Nature to keep any to their promiſes*; but according to mine it is not ſo, who am aſſured that theſe lawful Contracts made on earth are ſealed in heaven; and the God of truth ſo loves truth, that he approves it in all conditions of men; and therefore theſe bargains ought to be obſerved, unleſs it may happen out, that they are contrary to the Divine Law, as that a man ſhould diveſt himſelf of all his Oeconomical right which God hath placed in him, and the woman by ſuch power ſhould uſurp a Superiority, when God hath commanded her to be ſubject: So that a man may, as I think, abſolutely conclude, where there is no Commonwealth, a veracity is exacted by God in ſuch contracts, which are not againſt ſome Divine Law; where there is a Commonwealth theſe bargains are confirmed as are not contrary to their Civil Laws.

SECT. VII.

Mr. Hobbs *his example of the Amazons, further ſhewed to be impertinent.*

HE proceeds, and gives an inſtance; *We find* (ſaith he) *in Hiſtory, that the Amazons contracted with the men of Neighbouring Countries, to whom they had recourſe for Iſſues, that the Iſſue Male ſhould be ſent back, but the Female remain with themſelves; ſo that the Dominion of the Females was in the Mother.* | Here is an inſtance from a Lawleſs Conjunction, where man and woman meet together, like beaſts, to enjoy that carnal familiarity, but not like rational creatures to cohabit together in an Oeconomical Diſcipline. Amongſt them there were only the firſt names, Man and Woman, not Husband and Wife, which began our diſcourſe. It is of Women renouncing mens ſociety, who neither themſelves, nor their children, lived in the ſame Nation, nor under the ſame Government

vernment with these whom they did converse with; and so if they had kept the Male-child, the father could no ways come to lay claim to it, or any thing in the Amazonian Country. And yet consider once more how weak and inconsistent his discourse is, which contradicteth it self in almost every page. He discoursed of men in meer nature just before, and presently after, as his words are, *which men which are without all union in a Commonwealth*; and here in the middle of his discourse he gives his instance for proof of his Conclusion from the conversation of the Amazonians with their Neighbouring Countries, both which were incorporated into several Commonwealths: For it is evident from what is written of the Amazonians in Histories, that their Commonwealth had many distinct Laws and Customes from other Nations (if there were any such.) But let us go on with him.

SECT. VIII.

His supposition of the state of Nature without Matrimony censured. His reasons refuted. The Father of the Family hath dominion of the Child born out of Matrimony.

HE enters now upon the second part of his distinction: *If there be no Contract* (saith he) *the dominion is in the Mother: For in the condition of meer nature, where there are no Matrimonial Laws, it cannot be known who is the Father, unless it be declared by the Mother; and therefore the right of dominion over the child dependeth upon the will of the Mother, and is consequently hers.*] Here you find the state of nature again, where are no Matrimonial Laws: But stay, there was never such a time or place, for God gave the Law of the Wives subjection to her Husband in Paradise, *Gen.* 3. 16. of which I have formerly treated. It was the first Law he gave after their eating the forbidden fruit; therefore there was no such time or state of men, in which there was no Law concerning Matrimony. But if he understand by this word *Law*, only Humane Politick

Laws, he receives his answer, that where no Politick Laws restrain it, there most abundantly Divine Laws are without controul. But he hath reason for what he writes (*Because no man can tell who is Father of the child, but the Mother only; therefore he is at her dispose*) I would ask whether the child was born in Marriage or no? if so, then the child is his fathers, and he is bound to maintain him; but if not, he is *Filius Populi* (unless the Woman produce the Father) and the people must father it, and provide for it. But he will answer in the meer state of nature, without Politick Sanctions, there is no Marriage. I reply there was never such a state, but there were some forms by which men accepted their Wives into that union; or if no Laws, yet custom and constant usage grew into a Law, and they were thus appropriated one to the other. But suppose the Infant (he speaks of) were born without any such conjunction, the Woman either lived in her Fathers house, or was her self alone Mistress of a family. If the first, she and the Child were at the Fathers dispose; if the second, and the Father unknown, he is hers only. But he and I might have spared the troubling a Reader with this discourse in this question; for the question was raised about man and wife in the same family, who should govern the child, not about such spurious Generations, where the man and woman live in distinct families. He urgeth further; *Again* (saith he) *seeing the Infant is first in the Mothers power, so as she may either nourish or expose it; if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the Mother, and is therefore obliged to obey her rather then any other, and by consequence the dominion over it is hers.*] Let us first examine this little Particle (*First*) that must be understood of the first instant of the childs birth, because that gives him his first being in the world: But then is not the same power in the Midwife, who may either stifle the child, or preserve it? And then an equal share of duty from this reason will be owing to her as well as the Mother. Then consider that phrase (*if she nourish it*) what is that? give it suck? But suppose she doth neither expose it, nor give it suck, by reason of some infirmity or weakness which she hath, but put it out to Nurse, shall the Nurse have any interest in the dominion over the child? I,

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but (he may answer) that this must be by the Mothers providence, and then she is Author of that childs preservation: No (say I) but the Father who must either direct, or at the least willingly permit the Mother to do it; for the Mother being under the Fathers dominion, she cannot act any considerable matter either to her self, or for her child, without the Fathers leave.

SECT. IX.

No Law impowring the woman to expose her child. The Law of Nature favourable to Infants. Power or ability cannot give the character of Justice to unjust actions. The consequences of Mr. Hobbs *his conclusions discovered, and the contrary asserted. The Mother gets no dominion over the Child by not exposing it.*

NExt let us consider what power the Mother hath to expose her child; *Id potest, quod jure potest*; she hath no power, but by some Law which gives her that power. I am confident he cannot find any National Law which gives the Woman authority to act any such thing, or if he could, what would it avail him? because he disputes of such who are not imbodied into a Commonwealth, much less can he pretend to the Law of Nature, which dictates nothing more clearly then the Love of Parents to their children. I but he will say, *she hath power, that is, she is able to do it*: If such a malicious disposition were discovered, the Husband hath power to restrain it: But suppose such a horrid wickedness may be in the Woman, and a power, yea an opportunity of acting it, doth she gain dominion, because she doth it not? by that reason Wives may have dominion over their Husbands, Children over their Parents, Servants over their Masters, Subjects over their Kings, for all these have or may have power, though no right to murder or slay the other, which is very odious to the consideration of any man who thinks upon either Oecono-

micks or Politicks; nay there is none of those more abhorring to nature, then the Mothers exposing her child. I therefore conclude against that member of his distinction, that although a Mother may be so impious as to expose her child, yet because she hath no right to do it, she gains no right of dominion by not doing it.

SECT. X.

Mr. Hobbs *his deviation from the matter proposed. Children exposed and nourished by others, owe not filial duties to them that nourish them; preservation not so great a benefit as being.* Romulus *his respect to them that nourished him, not filial duty, but gratitude and kindness.*

HE proceeds upon that supposal: [*But if she expose it, and another find and nourish it, the dominion is in him that nourisheth it.*] First (good Reader) consider with me what this is to his purpose? The question raised was betwixt the Father and Mother of a Family, who should have the dominion over their child; now it is betwixt the Mother who brought a child into the world, and a stranger who nourisheth it: If the Wife have it (as I have shewed) the Husband hath it, because he hath dominion over the Wife, therefore of whatsoever likewise is subject to her dominion. Now he produceth an instance where neither hath it: *Then* (saith he) *the dominion is in him that nourisheth it.* I shall answer it: If there be such Monsters who for fear, or for that Tyrant daughter of *fear*, *shame*, shall expose their child, as (sure there are) without doubt they do as much as in them lies put off all their Parental interest, and devest themselves of all filial duties belonging to them, and it is as undoubted a truth, that for that time which they are so nourished and relieved (yea indeed all the daies of their life) they owe and ought to pay great kindness and respect to such deliverers (though not filial) because the benefit is exceeding great which they have

have received from their Patrons, but not so great as from their Fathers; for the Parent gives him his very being, the other but his preservation. Now as the being of man, or any thing, is the fountain of all the good which can come to that man, so must the gift of that exceed all other, else his Physitian may be his Father, his Cook, or his Apothecary, which conduce to his preservation. But suppose he should be exposed not by his Parents, but by any other means, as *Romulus*, although preserved and educated by *Faustulus* and *Lupa*, and owed them a mighty kindness for that preservation, yet this kindness when he came to be a man, ceased to be filial duty towards them, such as was due if proceeding from a Paternal dominion over him, and rather became a great kindness and benignity towards them.

SECT. XI.

Mr. Hobbs *his reasons of the former assertions weighed, and refuted. Obedience, where it crosses, first due to the Parent. The weakness of Mr.* Hobbs's *inferences noted. His conclusion censured. Oeconimical Laws must be submitted to National.*

HE adds [*For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved; because preservation of life being the end for which one becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience to him in whose power it is to save or destroy him.*] I answer, preservation (as the Philosopher speaks) is *continuata creatio vel generatio*; so that the very being of any thing is the substance which is preserved, and that must needs be more excellent then such an accident as preservation It is true, a child ought to obey him who hath nourished him, but not in such a degree as to a Parental relation, when that obedience shall cross the obedience to the Parents: [*Preservation of life is the end* (saith he) *for which one man becomes subject unto another.*] But consider what preservation that is, with that which is to come; upon this ground the unvanquished man submits himself

ſelf to the Conquerour, that he may protect his future being, and preſerve him from future danger; but this ſubjection is not to him who hath preſerved him, but to him who will preſerve him; or if this ſubjection be due, yet not ſuch, nor contrary to that of his Parents. But I muſt not tire my ſelf nor my Reader with ſuch needleſs diſcourſes upon errors which fall of themſelves without any diſpute, only entreat the Reader in perufing them to conſider his inferences how they depend one upon another, and that will be light enough to ſhew him the weakneſs of them. He goes on; *If the Mother be the Fathers ſubject, the Child is in the Fathers power*, &c.] It is not worth the tranſcribing; he now runs from Parents barely under the Law of Nature, to ſuch as are in ſetled Commonwealths; to all which one anſwer will ſerve, that they muſt be according to the National and peculiar Laws belonging to that Commonwealth; for Oeconomical Laws muſt ſubmit to National. The next learned note of his is, [*He that hath dominion over the Child, hath dominion alſo over the children of that Child.*] I muſt confeſs a moſt true and excellent obſervation, and ſuch as he will hear of hereafter, and ſo I let it paſs for this preſent. The next concluſion he enters upon, is *the right of ſucceſſion to Paternal dominion, which* (he ſaith) *proceedeth in the ſame manner as doth the right of ſucceſſion to Monarchy, of which he had ſpoke in the precedent Chapter.*] I will diſpute nothing about this. The Cuſtomes and Laws of every Nation direct the Inhabitants to what they muſt obey; every condition fits not every place, yea though they may be better in themſelves, yet not to ſuch people which are accuſtomed to other.

SECT.

SECT. XII.

Mr. Hobbs *his immethodical procedure censured.* Mancipia quasi manu capta. *Servitude introduced by Conquest. The right of servitude abolished amongst Christians. After the heat of war, and a settlement made, commonly meliorated and erected into Tenures. Mr.* Hobbs *his conclusions contrary to* Aristotles *Politiques. The horrid consequence of this Doctrine discovered.*

AT the bottom of this page, and the beginning of page 104. he enters into a discourse of Dominion by Conquest: In this he seems very erroneous in his method, as well as his substance: He entitled this Chapter of Dominion Paternal and Despotical. In the first part of this Chap. he disputed about Dominion by acquisition, which he defined to be such as is got by force or conquest; and he shewed then that there is no difference betwixt Dominion by institution, and that by acquisition, but only the difference of their fears. Then he treated of Dominion Paternal, (I wonder he did not call it Maternal, for that he endeavoured to make it) now again he comes to Dominion acquired by War, which must needs appear to any man an immethodical method. But let us pass on, and come to censure divers passages in his Discourse: [*Dominion* (saith he) *acquired by Conquest or Victory in War, is that here which some Writers call Despotical, from* Δεσπότης, *which signifieth a Lord or Master, and is the dominion of the Master over his servants.*] He speaks truth when he saith, that dominion acquired by Conquest is such, if it be understood of one that is (*Mancipium*) taken in War; *Mancipium* as it were *manu captum* taken by your hand in War, surely such a person is a servant, or if you will use a more unworthy term, a Slave; the Conquerour may sell him, or do what else he will with him, which is the condition of these despotical servants.

ſervants (though this right all Civilians agree to be ceaſed amongſt Chriſtians.) But then if after a while theſe conquered men are left to themſelves to Till the ground, and live peaceably upon it, and perhaps are governed by Vice-Roys, or ſuch other means as Politiques preſcribe, they then ceaſe to be ſervants or ſlaves, and come to be Colonies, and live under a Civil Government. We may obſerve this in the Conqueſt that *David*, *Alexander*, *Pompey*, *Cæſar*, all the great Monarchs of the World; ſo that they ſhall not for ever be under a deſpotical, but at the laſt grow into a Civil Government; as *Ariſt.* and from him all learned Politicians termed it, until Mr. *Hobbs* appeared. But Reader, I muſt here beg leave to look back again upon what he writ at the beginning of this Chap. for the confuſedneſs of his method muſt needs make my diſcourſe ſomewhat ſuch, who follow him cloſely foot by foot. He there affirms, that theſe two Governments by Inſtitution and Acquiſition, differ not but in the manner of fear; that by Inſtitution is obeyed for fear of one another; that by Acquiſition is obeyed for fear of the Conqueror; then the condition of all Subjects in the moſt civil eſtate is ſlavery: The Supreme may kill, ruine, deſtroy, beggar any of them, without Law, other then his own will, nay he may do it rightly, then which never was there a more horrid Propoſition uttered in Politiques, and if theſe two Dominions be the ſame which he affirms there, and Dominion by Acquiſition have the power to do ſo as he affirms here, it muſt needs be ſo with all Subjects according to his Doctrine.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII. *SECT.* I.

Mr. Hobbs *his fictitious contracts with the Conqueror censured. Women by his conclusion obliged to prostitute themselves to the Conqueror. The horror of this Doctrine, and improbability of this contract.*

I Return now to the place where I left: [*And this Dominion* (saith he) *is then acquired to the Victor, when the vanquished to avoid the present stroak of death, covenanteth either in express words, or by other sufficient signs of the Will, that so long as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the Victor shall have the use thereof at his pleasure.*] It was well he added (*or by sufficient signs*) for I think few men in any Conquered Nation did ever express such words, nor indeed would half the people in any conquered Nation do it. But consider, Reader, that in a conquered Nation, women must do it as well as men, and then all those women must prostitute their bodies to the lust of the Conqueror by contract, which is most abominable; and indeed that is almost expressed in that sentence, where it is said, *That he shall have the use of their bodies at his pleasure.* Let us once again look back and consider that formerly repeated conclusion, *That the same must be the state of an instituted Commonwealth:* Then all their bodies, their Wives (their lives excepted) are at his dispose, yea at the dispose of his pleasure, and that justly, which is most abominable. He proceeds: *And after such Covenant made, the vanquished is a servant, and not before.*] If he is no servant before he make such expression, I think a conquered Nation will never generally be subdued to that servitude. It is true, some particular persons may stoop so low for fear of death, but the generality of any considerable Nation can never subscribe to it, or surely if they could, would they, for death is more eligible then many accidents which may happen to a man under such a Covenant.

SECT. II.

Senſe deſired in this Paragraph. A Slave more a ſlave in Fetters then upon his Parol. Mr. Hobbs *his inconſiſtencies cenſured. Conqueſt gives no right where the War is not juſt.*

But he offers at reaſon to prove this aſſertion: *For* (ſaith he) *by this word Servant, whether it be derived from* ſervire, *to ſerve, or from the word* ſervare, *to ſave (which I leave to Grammarians to diſpute) is not meant a Captive which is kept in priſon or bonds till the owner of him that took him, or bought him of one that did, ſhall conſider what to do with him.*] I ſhall cenſure this firſt for apparent nonſenſe; Can any man tell who he is that is called here the owner of him that took him? Every man knows that he who takes a Captive is owner of the Captive, but who is owner of that owner no man can tell. At the firſt I thought it falſe printed, and (of) put for (or) ſo that then it ſhould have been read, *the owner or him that took him*; and that (or) might have been an explication of that word *owner*; but this cannot be ſo, becauſe he adds this (or) immediately after, *or he that bought him of him that took him*; ſo that it ſeems to me a meer irrational Propoſition, to ſay, the owner of him that took him, &c. This I obſerved, becauſe the Reader ſhould conſider how much care is to be uſed in reading ſuch Paradoxes as this Gentleman writeth. But mark this, although this was introduced with a (*for*) yet it proves nothing; his Propoſition he was to prove was, *That the Captive was a ſervant or ſlave when he was ſet at liberty, and not before.*] How is that enforced from this diſcourſe? he may ſay that clauſe is *not before*: No, ſay I; for (whether it be derived from *ſervire* or *ſervare*) he is more a ſlave to his owner, when he is compelled to work in fetters, or bonds, then when he is left to his Parol; for I am ſure he ſerves more ſlaviſhly, and is ſaved more ſecurely in that condition than the other. He proceeds; *For ſuch men (commonly called ſlaves) have no*

obligation

obligation at all; (I believe, they are slayes not bound with any thing but fetters) *and may break their bonds or prison, and kill or carry away captive their Master justly.*] 'Tis true, because he is trusted with nothing by him, not with himself; *but one* (saith he) *that being taken hath corporal liberty allowed him, and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his Master, is trusted by him.*] This man, if secure, is a Captive by Mr. *Hobbs*, and a *servant*, but not the other. I am opposite to him, and put him in mind how little this agrees with his former discourse about the Covenant of him who is vanquisht: In this last, it is one *that covenants not to run away, and to do no violence*; but in the first it was to *resign his whole body and being to his pleasure*. These are very thwarting discourses to happen in so little distance, and this last hath much more easie terms then the other. He next enters into another Paragraph, *It is not therefore the victory that giveth the right of dominion over the vanquished, but his own covenant.*] That covenant giveth no right, when the justness of the cause did not warrant the War; for (as he elsewhere) *No man when he hath covenanted to one before, hath right to make the same covenant to another; no man can give that again which he hath first given to another.*] Covenant upon Conquest may gain possession, but not right, when the cause of War was not just, Reader, you and I may think our selves tired with these dull discourses, and therefore I let pass all the rest of that Paragraph, and that which follows, and will only drive at the fundamental, which being shaken, the building will fall of its self. At the bottom of this page he begins a new old business. [*In sum, the rights and consequences to both paternal and despotical dominion, are the very same with those of a Soveraign by Institution, and for the same reasons, which reasons are set down in the precedent Cap.*] which Chapter and reasons have been examined heretofore, and therefore I will not trouble the Reader with unnecessary repetitions.

CHAP XVIII. *SECT.* I.

Mr. Hobbs *his harsh conditions impoſed on the Conquerors ſubjects aſſiſtants in the war. Subjects newly conquered to be reſtrained with more ſeverity, then thoſe to whom cuſtom has made their yoak more pleaſant and eaſie. A difference to be made between thoſe that are of a doubtful, and others who are of a known and certain obedience. The difference between Civil and Deſpotical Government.*

HE proceeds: [*So that for a man that is a Monarch of divers Nations, whereof he hath in one the Soveraignty by inſtitution of the people aſſembled, and in another by Conqueſt that is by the ſubmiſſion of each particular, to avoid death or bonds.*] I am confident (as I have formerly writ) there was never ſuch a Soveraign, either by Inſtitution or Conqueſt, as he ſets down; he hath ſhewed none, nor I believe can ſhew any example of either, or a poſſibility how either ſhould be compoſed. But ſuppoſe thoſe now (as in his *Utopia* is imagined) why then (ſaith he) *for ſuch a Monarch who is Monarch of theſe two Nations, to demand of one more then of another by the title of Conqueſts, as being a conquered Nation, is an act of ignorance in the rights of Soveraignty.*] Now I am at the 105 page, he hath paſſed a free and liberal cenſure upon ſuch Soveraigns; but let him know (that if it were poſſible that there were two ſuch Kingdomes) it were very hard if ſuch as adventured their lives and fortunes with their King, and had a ſubordinate ſhare in the Conqueſt, ſhould after the Conqueſt be no better but in the ſame condition with thoſe whom they conquered, and by them were conquered. It is true, an eaſie yoak, and time (the Mother of Experience) may reduce them into one condition, when it ſhall be obſerved that they who are conquered, are gained to a liking of the cuſtomes and manners

manners of their Conquerors, and that mutually their good is beneficial one to the other; then it is wiſdom in a Conqueror to put them in a parity of condition, but at the firſt ſubduing any Nation *Regni novitas*, will enforce ſome ſeverity, though perhaps afterwards Tros, *Tyriuſque mihi nullo diſcrimine agetur*, they are grown one, and ought to be ſo governed: I but ſaith he, *that were ignorance of government*; I ſay no, but great wiſdom to put a difference betwixt a forced obedience, and that out of duty betwixt them who are of a known, and others of a doubtful fidelity. But he gives a reaſon for what he writes; for (ſaith he) *he is abſolutely over both alike*: Let that be granted, yet amongſt his true and natural ſubjects, he may juſtly and prudently diſpence his favours and diſpleaſures variouſly, according to their differing merits and demerits, or other prudential rules, amongſt which this is one, not too far to truſt a newly reconciled Enemy, and much leſs an Enemy newly conquered.

SECT. II.

Servitude not equally abſolute in a civil or ſetled Government, as in deſpotical. The right of ſervitude antiquated among Chriſtians.

SEcondly, that ſuppoſal may be denied, that *he is equally abſolute over both*; he governs one deſpotically as ſervants or captives which are taken in the War, and the other civilly; and this is *Ariſtotles* diſtinction, and received with applauſe by all latter Writers, till we come to Mr. *Hobbs*, the one are governed like ſlaves, the other like ſubjects; *or elſe* (ſaith he) *there is no Soveraignty at all*. Away with ſuch a hateful ſpeech, odious to all Nations; No Soveraignty but arbitrary? No ſubjection but ſlaviſh or ſervile? Certainly no ſociety of men can abide ſuch language: Look amongſt Chriſtian Kingdoms, and we ſhall find ſervitude (I think) baniſhed every where by the univerſal conſent of all Nations, who have received the Doctrine of Chriſtianity: Thoſe we

call ſervants, indeed are free, at leaſt not ſuch ſervants as he and I have diſcourſed of; yet they are ſubjects to their Maſters, and they have dominion over them, but not ſuch as a Conqueror hath over a vanquiſhed man; nay Kings themſelves, nor can any other Supreme, take away by right an innocent mans life, and yet they are Soveraigns, and have not abſolute power over them,

SECT. III.

Mr. Hobbs *his inconſequences further cenſured. The abſurdity and iniquity of his concluſion in this Paragraph, which is yet ſhewed to be other where aſſerted by him.*

IBut (ſaith he) *And every man may lawfully protect himſelf, if he can, with his own Sword, which is the condition of war*] There was never man writ ſuch disjoynted things. How can this follow, if a King cannot kill an honeſt man lawfully, *then he may protect himſelf lawfully with his own Sword?* as if it ſhould be, becauſe a Supreme may do ill unlawfully, therefore I may do ill lawfully? But I am ſure he hath ſaid more then once, *That no man can ſo diveſt himſelf of his own power and right to defend his own life and happy being in it, as that he may not deliver himſelf, if he can, by killing or doing any thing to any man.*] Againſt which Propoſitions I have already ſpoke heretofore, and ſhewed how men may and have done it; ſo that that wicked concluſion, which for the abſurdity of it, he would have to diſcountenance the difference betwixt the Government of a conquered and an inſtituted Nation, though not allowed by me, is yet approved by him elſewhere, which was a main fault in him.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

This Paragraph reserved to its proper place. Scripture honoured even by those who approve it not. Master Hobbs *his inconcludent deductions from the* 20*th of* Exodus *censured.*

HE begins the next Paragraph, *By this it appears that a great family, if it be not part of some Commonwealth, is of its self, as to the rights of Soveraignty, a little Monarchy.* I will question nothing in this Paragraph at this time; but let the Reader bear in mind, that there is such a thing for which I shall call Mr. *Hobbs* to an account hereafter. In the following Paragraph he labours to bring Scripture for what he hath taught: It is an honour to Scripture, that it is like Vertue, commended even of those that will not follow it. But it may be Mr. *Hobbs* objects it against us who do confide in it, and not produceth it to satisfie himself, that his Doctrine is consonant to Scripture. I will examine this therefore; for surely if the Scripture be for him, I am also, although to me it appears never so erroneous, according to mine own reason: He begins; *Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point: To* Moses, *the Children of Israel, say thus*, Exod. 20. 19. *Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, least we die. This is absolute obedience to Moses*] thus he. A strange deduction out of this Text, where is no one word of obedience, much less of absolute obedience as to a Supreme. But I will help what I can, *Deut.* 5. 27. there this self-same business being repeated, it is added, *We will hear it, and do it.* There obedience is mentioned implicitly: To understand this therefore consider with me, that the Children of *Israel* having the Law delivered to them by God in such a terrible manner in Mount *Sinai*, with Thunder, Lightning, Trumpets, and the like; they were terrified and afraid to have such an immediate converse with God, they thought it mortal, it being never

ver before ſeen in the world; and therefore they entreated *Moſes* to go betwixt God and them, and receive Gods Will from him, and deliver it them, and they would obey. Here is nothing of obedience to *Moſes*, but to God only; they truſted that *Moſes* would relate Gods Laws to them truly, which indeed they had great reaſon to do. If the reſt be like this, I ſhall have little trouble with it.

SECT. V.

The firſt of Sam. *the* 8. 11, 12. *explained. The difference between the right of the King, and the right of a King. Kings of ſeveral Kingdoms may have ſeveral rights in the ſame Country. Divers Kings may have different rights, as the ſame Kings may alſo at ſeveral times. The genuine ſignification of theſe words cited by Mr.* Hobbs.

FOr *the right of Kings, ſaith God himſelf, by the mouth of* Samuel, 1 Sam. 8. 11, 12. *This ſhall be the right of the King you will have to raign over you.*] I ſtop here, becauſe I have ſome things to examine in this particle before I go further. Firſt then conſider, that it is not ſaid, this ſhall be the *right of a King*, that would have made it *Jus Regale*, and being indeffinite would have conſtituted it to belong to every King; but it ſhall be the *right of your King*. Many things may be the rights of one Countries King, which are not of another; yea many things may belong to one King of a Country, which did not belong to another King of the ſame Country, yea to the ſame King at another time. I urge this only againſt him, becauſe he urges this place to prove the right of Kings, which it doth not do (if truly quoted) but only the right of a King of *Iſrael*, and it may be not that neither, but only the right of the next King; for it is ſaid, *of the King that ſhall reign over you*, in the ſingular number, not in the plural. Nay it is moſt certain, that God, by whom Kings reign, and from whom they have their Authority, may give what Authority he

he pleaſeth to one, and not to another, the Plenipotency of which Commiſſion I ſhall more fully ſhew hereafter. Well then, let it however be granted, that this Text is truly produced, yet it proves not his concluſion, that this *is the right of all Kings*. And now I muſt blame Mr. *Hobbs*, who profeſſeth *obedience to the Supreme Magiſtrate, and the Laws and Cuſtoms of this Country*; and yet here againſt the Declaration of the Supreme Magiſtrate, the Laws and Cuſtoms of this ſame Country, in the urging of this Text, which (as he interprets it) varies from that tranſlation which is approved by the *Supreme Magiſtrate, the Laws and Cuſtoms of this Nation*, and is only read in the vulgar Latin; our Tranſlation reads it, *This will be the manner of the King that ſhall reign over you*. There is a great difference betwixt this ſhall be the right, and this will be the manner.

SECT. VI.

The former Text further illuſtrated. The force of the Hebrew word compared with other places of Scripture. Cajetans *interpretation cenſured. The diſtinction of ordinary and extraordinary right improperly uſed for the clearing of this Text. The word right taken for* practiſe. *The* 17 *of* Deuteron. 14. 16, 17, 18. *verſe explained. The King to have two Copies of the Law, and obliged to keep it.* Ezek. *the* 46. 18. *explained. The former concluſion aſſerted from the whole Diſcourſe.*

THere is a great diſpute amongſt Criticks in the Hebrew Tongue, what is the true ſenſe of the word *Miſhpat*, which is rendred by Mr. *Hobbs* (Right,) and by our Tranſlators (manner, or cuſtom;) but certainly it cannot but be yielded, that it is uſed in both ſenſes. But our Tranſlators do very often render it as here, ſo *Pſalm* 119. 132. as thou uſeſt to do unto thoſe that love thy name: But it is not material to

alledge more Quotations; this Text will enforce this interpretation; for in the 18 verse it is said, *Ye shall cry out in the day because of your King which ye shall have chosen you, and the Lord will not hear you in that day.* Consider here, that men do not clamour and cry out upon Justice, when it is executed but upon injustice. I know there are other Expositions given besides his or mine, as that of *Cajetan*, that it is not said, *the right of the Kingdom*, which is a Law, but *of the King*; as if Kings would esteem this right. But this is scandalous to Kings, to many of whom, I doubt not, but Justice and Mercy are as dear as to any men in the world. There is another Exposition with a distinction, that there is an ordinary and extraordinary right: This Text sets down the extraordinary right; to which I say I allow the distinction; many things may be right and lawful for Kings to do upon extraordinary occasions, which would not be just in his ordinary Government. But how can a man conceive that these things should relate to extraordinary occasions, to make Perfumes, or to run before his Chariot, to gather in his Harvest? as if there should be exigencies of these poor trifles, or the honour of a Kings Revenue could not yield such a return as might make every man fit for such an imployment, ambitious of his entertainment. I think this may suffice for the exposition of this Text, to shew that it was spoke of the practise, not the right of their Kings: but if not, look the seventeenth of *Deut.* at the fourteenth verse, where you may see the passage foretold, *When thou art come into the Land*, &c. *and shalt say, I will set a King over me like as all the Nations that are about me.* The very language which these men used, ver. 15. Thou shalt in any wise set him King over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall chuse; and so goes on to describe the Laws for their Kings in the following part of that verse, and the 16, 17, and 18. verses: But there is none of these things reckoned there; and in the 18 and 19 verses, he is commanded to get him a Copy, or a double Copy (as some would have it) of this Book, which is *Deuteronomy*; one Copy to lye by him, and another to carry about with him, as our marginal hath it, and is most consonant (methinks) to the Text, which saith, *He shall read therein*

therein all the daies of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the words of this Law, and theſe ſtatutes to do them. So that a King ought to take care to keep the Law of the Land, which to them was *Deuteronomy.* And from thence the madneſs of their Expoſition will appear, who think that the Law which was ſpoken of, was this Law afterwards ſpoken of by *Samuel*: But alas! that needs no great ſtudy either to know or practiſe; this therefore muſt needs be the ſenſe of it. But if this will not ſerve the turn, you may read in the 46 of *Ezek.* ver. 18. ſome part of the Kings Law delivered clear oppoſite, to one clauſe delivered here; that is, *That the Prince ſhall not take of the peoples inheritance by oppreſſion, to thruſt them out of their poſſeſſion, but he ſhall give his ſons inheritance of his own poſſeſſion, that my people be not ſcattered every man out of his poſſeſſion.* Now this is clean contrary to that which is ſaid, *He will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your Olive-yards, even the beſt of them, and give them to his ſervants.* This certainly is unjuſt for a Prince to do by *Ezekiel*; and therefore theſe places muſt be reconciled, which may eaſily be done by our Tranſlation, underſtanding the word (*Miſhpot*) for a cuſtom or uſage, for ſo *Sam.* deſcribes what will be done; but the Prophet *Ezekiel*, from God commands, what is right and juſt to be done. And thus I think Mr. *Hobbs* hath got little advantage for his concluſion out of the Scripture.

SECT. VII.

The Hiſtory of Saul *quoted by Mr.* Hobbs, *improved againſt his Novel Inſtitution, and that other concluſion of his, That a man may kill any man in right of himſelf. Prayers and tears the weapons of Chriſtians.*

But I will try how I can advance this Hiſtory againſt divers deſperate and horrid Opinions of his. Firſt of his electing a King by the people, which he makes to be *the only*

alledge more Quotations; this Text will enforce this interpretation; for in the 18 verſe it is ſaid, *Ye ſhall cry out in the day becauſe of your King which ye ſhall have choſen you, and the Lord will not hear you in that day.* Conſider here, that men do not clamour and cry out upon Juſtice, when it is executed but upon injuſtice. I know there are other Expoſitions given beſides his or mine, as that of *Cajetan*, that it Is not ſaid, *the right of the Kingdom*, which is a Law, but *of the King*; as if Kings would eſteem this right. But this is ſcandalous to Kings, to many of whom, I doubt not, but Juſtice and Mercy are as dear as to any men in the world. There is another Expoſition with a diſtinction, that there is an ordinary and extraordinary right: This Text ſets down the extraordinary right; to which I ſay I allow the diſtinction; many things may be right and lawful for Kings to do upon extraordinary occaſions, which would not be juſt in his ordinary Government. But how can a man conceive that theſe things ſhould relate to extraordinary occaſions, to make Perfumes, or to run before his Chariot, to gather in his Harveſt? as if there ſhould be exigencies of theſe poor trifles, or the honour of a Kings Revenue could not yield ſuch a return as might make every man fit for ſuch an imployment, ambitious of his entertainment. I think this may ſuffice for the expoſition of this Text, to ſhew that it was ſpoke of the practiſe, not the right of their Kings: but if not, look the ſeventeenth of *Deut.* at the fourteenth verſe, where you may ſee the paſſage foretold, *When thou art come into the Land*, &c. *and ſhalt ſay, I will ſet a King over me like as all the Nations that are about me.* The very language which theſe men uſed, ver. 15. Thou ſhalt in any wiſe ſet him King over thee, whom the Lord thy God ſhall chuſe; and ſo goes on to deſcribe the Laws for their Kings in the following part of that verſe, and the 16, 17, and 18. verſes: But there is none of theſe things reckoned there; and in the 18 and 19 verſes, he is commanded to get him a Copy, or a double Copy (as ſome would have it) of this Book, which is *Deuteronomy*; one Copy to lye by him, and another to carry about with him, as our marginal hath it, and is moſt conſonant (methinks) to the Text, which ſaith, *He ſhall read therein*

therein all the daies of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the words of this Law, and theſe ſtatutes to do them. So that a King ought to take care to keep the Law of the Land, which to them was *Deuteronomy.* And from thence the madneſs of their Expoſition will appear, who think that the Law which was ſpoken of, was this Law afterwards ſpoken of by *Samuel*: But alas! that needs no great ſtudy either to know or practiſe; this therefore muſt needs be the ſenſe of it. But if this will not ſerve the turn, you may read in the 46 of *Ezek.* ver. 18. ſome part of the Kings Law delivered clear oppoſite, to one clauſe delivered here; that is, *That the Prince ſhall not take of the peoples inheritance by oppreſſion, to thruſt them out of their poſſeſſion, but he ſhall give his ſons inheritance of his own poſſeſſion, that my people be not ſcattered every man out of his poſſeſſion.* Now this is clean contrary to that which is ſaid, *He will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your Olive-yards, even the beſt of them, and give them to his ſervants.* This certainly is unjuſt for a Prince to do by *Ezekiel*; and therefore theſe places muſt be reconciled, which may eaſily be done by our Tranſlation, underſtanding the word (*Miſhpot*) for a cuſtom or uſage, for ſo *Sam.* deſcribes what will be done; but the Prophet *Ezekiel*, from God commands, what is right and juſt to be done. And thus I think Mr. *Hobbs* hath got little advantage for his concluſion out of the Scripture.

SECT. VII.

The Hiſtory of Saul *quoted by Mr.* Hobbs, *improved againſt his Novel Inſtitution, and that other concluſion of his, That a man may kill any man in right of himſelf. Prayers and tears the weapons of Chriſtians.*

But I will try how I can advance this Hiſtory againſt divers deſperate and horrid Opinions of his. Firſt of his electing a King by the people, which he makes to be *the only*

way by which *he is eſtabliſhed in his Throne*; a thing (as I have ſaid before) never done nor practicable; and here we find it otherwiſe, for God choſe that King *Saul*; and indeed it was the Law it ſhould be ſo, *Deut.* 17. 15. Nay, to come cloſer, (as I ſhall ſhew hereafter) it is impoſſible, that the people who had no power given them from God, ſhould give it to a King; none ſure but the All-powerful God can give men power one over another. And as this ſtory confutes his abominable principles which deſtroy the foundation of Government, ſo it doth that horrid and treaſonable concluſion of his which plucks down all Government, and hath been the Author of almoſt all Treaſons that ever were; that is, that in defence of a mans life, or himſelf, from ſuch hardſhip as may render his life irkſome to him, a man may take arms, or kill any man, or do any thing which may reſcue him from it. I have ſpoke to this before, how unchriſtian a ſpeech it is; but now conſider how deſtructive of peace it is in a ſetled Commonwealth. There are no Traytors but pretend their Liberties are invaded, they have no ſafety in their condition: The Tyrant (for ſo they will term any againſt whom they rebel) takes away their fields, their children illegally, and the like, he doth without Law. The next (they tell us) is their life, they will provide therefore againſt that, and kill him: No, ſaith this Hiſtory, when your King abuſeth you with ſuch oppreſſion, there is no ſuch conſequence to be drawn from the whole context, that men ſhould whet their Swords, and be avenged. There is no power above that of the Kings, much leſs is there any ſuch in his own Subjects: But men in ſuch a caſe muſt fly to the King of Kings, who according to his infinite Wiſdom, Juſtice and Mercy, will conſider and help them when he thinks fit. There is no appeal from a King, but to his King; and then when your own ſins call for his judgments (as it was here) he will not hear your cryes; which ſtrongly intimates, we muſt not fight, but cry in that day when ſuch things are done unto us; prayers and tears are the only weapons allowed Chriſtians in that caſe: Righteous men muſt not think to go to heaven with pleaſure and delight, by pride and ſtrugling againſt their Superiours, but with patience, ſuffering quietly; by Faith,

believing

believing Gods mercies and promises; by hope, that in his good time he will deliver them when he thinks fit, gently submitting our selves under the mighty hand of God, who out of his infinite wisdom suffers us justly to be so punished, that in his good time he may exalt us.

SECT. VIII.

The former conclusions illustrated from the fact of Ahab. *The condition of Subjects, according to Master* Hobbs *his Doctrine, the same with Slaves taken in War. The people transfer no power to the King besides that which God had given him.* Samuels *words not positive, but menacing. God himself concerned in the Election of* Samuels *Government. Exorbitant power, or absolute dominion, not deduceable from this Text. Mr.* Hobbs *his conclusions fitted to the Rapine of the late Rebels in* England, *whose actions he seems to approve.*

YEt consider once more, if this had been the right of Kings, what a foolish as well as a wicked King had *Ahab* been, who when by right he might have taken *Naboths* Vineyard, would mourn and afflict himself, because *Naboth* wou'd not let him have it. And indeed you may observe there, that *Naboth* conceived no such right; for else he would not have denied to yield that upon a good valuable consideration, which was due by Law. Well, this Text being thus examined, and some inferences made upon it, let us now consider his collections out of it: |*This* (saith he) *is absolute power, and summed up in the last words, you shall be his servants* | which is the last clause of the seventeenth verse. Let a man consider here what Mr. *Hobbs* hath writ of servants in the former page, (where he sets down, that men vanquished in war are servants, and what their servitude is) and he shall find all

Subjects to be in a miserable condition, such as will little differ from being in war; for what can war do? it can but subject mens estates, their wives, children, and their lives, to a Conquerors will; and that, by this Gentleman, they are in always, even in peace; yea by that very reason, that they are imbodied into a Commonwealth. But he proceeds further: [*Again; when the people heard what power their King was to have, yet they consented thereto, and say thus, We will be as all other Nations, and our King shall judge our causes, and go before us, to conduct our wars.*] I looked for these words, but find them not either in ours or other Translations; but indeed the sense is in the nineteenth and twentieth verses: And so I let it pass: His collection is [*Here is confirmed the right that Soveraigns have, both to the Militia, and to all Judicature, in which is contained as absolute power as one man can possibly transfer to another.*] But hark you Mr. *Hobbs*, what is the meaning of that phrase transfer? can it be thought, that the peoples assent transfer'd any Authority which God did not give? Certainly that is a greater Exaltation then ever man dreamt of until now. But I am confident that the people took this as a menace of *Samuel*, to deter them from having a King, agreeing to the language used in the ninth verse by God to *Samuel*, *Protest solemnly to them, or against them* (as it is in the margent of our Translations) so they thought it a menace or threat; and that you may conceive from the nineteenth verse, which begins-- Nevertheless, that is, for all that menace, or *nequaquam*, as the vulgar Latin, by no means will we be terrified, but will have a King like other Nations; they would be in this fashion; but where can they find that fashion used in the world? they had lived in *Ægypt*, and *Pharoah* oppressed them mightily, mistrusting them to be a dangerous people, and a people that lived apart from the Ægyptians, and had no communication with them. But I do not read, that they took the Land of *Goshen* from them, which had formerly been given them by the King of *Ægypt*; and those horrid oppressions were most wonderfully revenged by God upon *Pharoah* and his Ægyptians, when the *Israelites* cryed to him for help, because they were undeserved: But saith *Samuel*; *You in this*

case

eaſe ſhall cry, and not be ſaved, becauſe you provoke theſe miſchiefs, being under a moſt excellent Government, the immediate protection of God himſelf; in which regard he ſaith in the ſeventh verſe to *Samuel*, *They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I ſhould not reign over them.* And although there were ſome miſcarriages by *Samuels* Government, that his Sons did not behave themſelves well under him; yet you may find in the twelfth *Cap.* third ver. when *Samuel* reſigned up his Government to *Saul*, he could cal them to witneſs, *whether he had taken any mans Oxe or Aſs from him, or defrauded or oppreſſed any man*; and at the fourth verſe they acquit him. So that for men thus to reject the Government of God, by ſuch a pious and excellent perſon as was *Samuel*, for ſome diſcontents and rebellious humors which were in their fancies, and exchange him for they knew not whom, was ſuch an unpardonable fault, that God threatned by *Samuel*, that he would not hear their cryes when they clamoured out for theſe evils; which not their folly only, but impiety had brought upon them: So that methinks there can be no inference deduced here to ſhew the juſtneſs or right of this exorbitant power, which he pretends to in this word *abſolute*. He hath the power of *Judicature*, but that power is to determine what is right, and to whom the Vineyard belongs, but not to take it to himſelf. He hath the power of the *Militia* to fight with the Enemy; nay, he may by it force (and rightly ought to uſe that power to force) men to render to every man their own; but he cannot rightly take away any mans eſtate from him, otherwiſe then the Law directs; and he who ſaith he can do it to others, if he felt ſuch unjuſtneſs done to himſelf, would quickly learn that Leſſon, that it is excellent Juſtice, that *Artifex necis arte periret ſua*; then he would abhor his own Doctrine. This was well fitted for the ſequeſtrations and ſeiſures which were made of mens eſtates when he wrote this Book for them.

SECT. IX.

Solomon's *Prayer* (1 Kings 3. 9.) *explained.* *Master* Hobbs *his Logick desired in his deductions from this Text.* *Judges must govern or determine according to Law.*

But Mr *Hobbs* hath Scripture out of *Solomon's* Prayer, (1 *Kings* 3. 9.) *Give to thy Servant understanding to judge thy people, and to discern betwixt good and evil*; (saith he) *therefore it belongeth to the Soveraign to be Judge, and to prescribe the rules of discerning good and evil, which Rules are Laws; and therefore in him is the Legislative Power.* | I could question his place of Scripture if I were given to wrangle, for *in terminis* he cannot shew it there, but there is the sense. I let it therefore alone, but consider his Logick: He saith, *Because he is to be Judge, and to prescribe the Rules of discerning betwixt good and evil, which Rules are Laws.* | For my part I think this consequence is so far from a necessary deduction out of the premises, as I conceive the contrary is absolutely true; because he is Judge, he must take those rules which are prescribed him, but not make his rule. Consider with me, I beseech you Reader, that every Judge must be a Judge either in a constituted Commonwealth, betwixt men who live in that Polity, or else where there is no Commonwealth, and where men live only according to the dictates of Nature: In the first every Judge hath the National Laws of that Country to be his guide, and he must judge according to them, and not make Laws of his own head to judge the cause is committed to him. For the second, he hath the Law of Nature to guide him to that which shall appear most equal, according to that rule. He who draws a line by a rule, doth not make the rule, the Judge is such, his Decrees are regulated by the Laws according to which he decrees, but doth not make those Laws: So that although I think it true, that a Soveraign is the Supreme Judge, and that he hath likewise the Legislative power, yet not because

cauſe he is Judge: for theſe two are diſtinct faculties appertaining to the ſame perſon, as will appear more fully hereafter.

SECT. X.

The impertinencies of the remaining part of this Paragraph cenſured. Matth. 21. 2, 3. *not truly cited by* Mr. Hobbs. *His inferenees upon this Text retorted upon him. The true intention of theſe words miſtaken by* Mr. Hobbs, *and his argument thence invalid.*

THe reſt in that Paragraph is ſuch traſh as never was read; not fit to foul paper with, 'tis ſo impertinent. In the latter end of it he comes cloſe to his buſineſs thus; –*And that the Kings word is ſufficient to take any thing from any Subject when there is need; and that the King is Judge of that need: for he himſelf, as King of the Jews, commanded his Diſciples to take the Aſs, and the Aſſes Colt, to carry him into* Jeruſalem: *Read the Text*, Mat. 21. 2, 3. The words as he writes them are, *Go into the Village over againſt you, and you ſhall find a She-Aſs tyed, and her Colt with her, untye them, and bring them to me: And if any man ask you what you mean by it, ſay the Lord hath need of them, and ſtraightway they will let them go.*) Thus he writes that Text moſt falſe in many places. But I will conſider the matter in hand, and ſtick to his Inferences. (*They will not ask whether his neceſſity be a ſufficient title, nor whether he be Judge of that neceſſity, but acquieſce in the will of the Lord.*) Thus he. And I could wiſh he would acquieſce in the will of the Lord, for then he would never have vented ſo many abominable falſhoods as he hath. But to my buſineſs; I firſt retort this *ad hominem*, be it true or falſe; This argument is not proper from his mouth, who (page 262.) denies *that our Saviour had any Kingdom in this world whilſt he was in it*) therefore he did not now ſend for this Aſs by a Kingly right; (I mean to ſpeak to that in its proper place:)

but now he who denies his Kingdom, cannot here justly urge this for a president to Kings: I (but he will say) he spoke that of our Saviours Manhood; I reply, if he spoke this of him as God, it is no president for Kings; for undoubtedly God hath reserved cases to himself, by which he can and doth dispose of all things in this world how he pleaseth, (as will be shewed hereafter) and not only of things in Kingdoms, but of Kingdoms themselves; and therefore this instance is no president. But then let us consider the fact: Our Saviour sent for an Ass and her Colt, they were goods belonging to another man; and the up-shot of all was, when the right owner questioned why they loosed them, and they told him it was for the use of the Lord, which was the Apostles language concerning Christ, he being a person famous for many Miracles, and much Piety, as that Story will shew, the right owner let them go, and let them use them; and it is most reasonably thought, that our Saviour having made use of them in that great Solemnity he was then going about, restored them afterwards, when it was finished. But mark, the owner gave way to his use of them; he did not take *Naboths* Vineyard from him without his consent: This is a weak way of arguing, from an act by the owners consent, to prove it lawful against his will; if the right owner gives way to another to use his goods, there is no fault in it, and this proves no more.

SECT.

SECT. XI.

Mr. Hobbs *his fallacious arguing from* Gen. 3. 5. *diſcovered: The difference of the caſe ſtated in reſpect of Divine and Humane Power.* Act. 4. 19. *explained. Obedience to Humane Power commanded* in licitis & honeſtis. Mat. 23. *verſe the* 23. *illuſtrated from the former caſe of S.* Peter, *and S.* John. Mr. Hobbs *his argument from* Adams *diſcourſe in Paradiſe not concluſive.*

WE will proceed with him. *To theſe places* (ſaith he) *may be added* Gen. 3. 5. *You ſhall be like Gods, knowing good and evil.*) Let the Reader conſider this was the Devils language: Then ver. 11. *Who told thee that thou waſt naked? Haſt thou eaten of the Tree of which I commanded thee thou ſhouldeſt not eat?*) A man may juſtly wonder what he could collect from hence: His diſcourſe is unneceſſary, but the ſenſe is this, that our firſt Parents, by an ill gloſs of the Devil, miſinterpreted the command of God, which cauſed Gods diſpleaſure; *whereby* (ſaith he at the bottom of that page) *it is clearly* (*though Allegorically*) *ſignified, that the commands of them that have the right to command, are not by their Subjects to be cenſured or diſputed.*) See the fallacy of this arguing, from the infinite power of Gods Wiſdom, Juſtice and Equity, to the finite power of man; betwixt which the difference is evident, and ſo decided in the caſe of S. *Peter*, and S. *John*, Acts 4. 19. *Whether it be right in the ſight of God to hearken unto you, more then unto God, judge ye.*) The ſtory is this, (as you may read in the former part of that Chap. ver. the 5.) their Rulers and Elders, *Annas* and *Caiphas*, convented the Apoſtles before them, and after conſultation about the buſineſs, commanded them in the 18. ver. *not to ſpeak at all, nor teach in the name of the Lord Jeſus*) nay, ſay the Apoſtles) *whether it be fitter to obey God or you, judge ye.*) It is

ſo clear a caſe, that God who is your Governour more abſolutely, then you are ours, muſt be obeyed before you, that you cannot deny it. This will be oppoſed to his caſe; the difference betwixt obedience to Gods Commands, and mens, is mighty; the one from an infinite Juſtice, and known to be ſo, the other from a finite, and known alſo to be ſo; that of Gods from an infinite power, and known to be ſuch; that of mans from a finite, and known to be ſuch. It muſt not therefore follow, that becauſe Gods Commands are obeyed without examining, mans muſt. This may likewiſe give the true ſenſe of that place urged by him out of the 23. of S. *Mat.* 2,3. *The* Scribes *and* Phariſees *ſit in* Moſes *Chair; and therefore all that they ſhall bid you obſerve, that obſerve, and do.*) This he urged for unqueſtioned obedience to Superiours, and receives its anſwer from the paſſage of the Apoſtles, who denied their obedience in this point: it muſt be therefore *in licitis & honeſtis*, not in things croſſing with Gods Commands in his written word, or his Commands by the Law of Nature: A ſervant muſt not obey his Maſters Oeconomical Laws, where they are contrary to the National: A Child muſt not obey his Natural Parents, commanding contrary to his Political: A man is not to obey a Conſtable commanding againſt his King, nor a King againſt God; his argument therefore drawn from this inſtance of *Adams* miſconſtruction of Gods Commands, is not of force: That therefore we may not expound or diſcourſe upon mans commands, is not well collected out of his premiſes.

SECT. XII.

Mr. Hobbs *his concluſion not deducible from the premiſes. The former place of the* 23. *of S.* Mat. *further explained out of* Petrus Gallatinus. *Ariſtocratical Power not veſted in the* Scribes *and* Phariſees.

HE concludes that page; *So that it appeareth plainly to my underſtanding, both from Reaſon and Scripture, that the Soveraign*

Soveraign Power, whether placed in one man (that which follows is page 107.) *as in Monarchy, or in one Aſſembly of men, as in popular and Ariſtocratical Commonwealths, is as great as poſſibly men can be imagined to make it.*) My firſt obſervation is, that he hath no one place of Scripture, but only from that place of S. *Mat.* where obedience to the *Scribes* and *Phariſees* is mentioned, which can look towards Ariſtocraty or Democraty, of which I ſpake juſt now: And ſurely he doth not think that the *Scribes* and *Phariſees* had an Ariſtocratical Government over the *Jews*, for they were under the *Roman* Monarchy at that time, and could not put a man to death by their own Law (as they proteſted at our Saviours Tryal,) in that then there was no Juridical Power amongſt them, no Soveraign Authority: Nay, *Petrus Gallatinus de arcanis Catholicæ veritatis, Lib.* 4. *Cap.* 6. ſhews at large, how not only the *Jews* were captivated by the *Romans*, the Kingdom tranſlated, given from one of their own Nation to *Herod* who was an Alien, but likewiſe their *Sanhedrim* (which was until then continued from *Moſes* his time) taken away; and when he had ſlain them all but one *Baba*, he was not of Authority to erect one more rightly conſtituted by the Law of *Moſes*, and the *Jewiſh* Tradition. At the laſt he cites this place, *Mat.* 23. 2. and ſaith it ought to be read, The *Scribes* and *Phariſees have ſate* in *Moſes*'s Chair. The word in the Original is ἐκάθισαν, which being in the firſt Aoriſt, is often (I confeſs) uſed in the preſent tenſe, but the ſtory (being a matter of fact) ſeems to oppoſe it: I know therefore no reaſon why it ſhould be forced from its genuine ſenſe; yet howſoever let it go, it ſhall be taken in the preſent tenſe, and I will make all agree. He further ſhews, that after *Herod* had ſlain all but this *Baba*, and put out his eyes, he erected another *Sanhedrim* of his own, in which it was likely thoſe who were members of it, were allowed to meddle with ſome matters of ſmall conſequence: Amongſt theſe the *Scribes* and *Phariſees* were mixed, and by that Authority might, according to their proud nature, poſſibly uſurp the dignity of *ſitting in* Moſes *his Chair*; and yet (he ſhews) that forty years before the laſt deſtruction of the Temple, theſe alſo were taken

away. Well then, it appears clearly, that here was no Aristocratical Government amongst them, they were governed Monarchically by *Cæsar*, and under him by *Herod*. This inferiour Councel had no part of *Moses* his judicature of life and death; nay, that power which they had was variable, according to the will of the Monarch. But because I am in now, I will add a word or two against his urging this place, for the absolutenes of their Dominion, out of the following words,--*Whatsoever they shall bid you observe, that observe, and do it.* Now this word *whatsoever*, must have relation to the former words, *whatsoever they teach you out of* Moses; let not their vicious lives or hypocrisie make you refuse the wholesome Doctrine which they teach; but if they teach you false Doctrine (as they will) that comes not out of *Moses his Chair*, but *ex Cathedrâ pestilentiæ*, as the Psalmist phraseth it, *Psal.* 1. 2. and therefore our Saviour often forewarns them, not only of the *life*, *but doctrine of the* Pharisees, in the 16. of *Mat.* 6. take heed of the leaven of the *Pharisees*, which in the 12. verse is expounded the doctrine; and in this very Chap. verse 4. *They bind heavy burthens, and grievous to be born, and lay them upon mens shoulders*; and in the 13. verse, they were said *to shut up the Kingdom of Heaven against men*; which must be by their doctrine: In the 16th verse, *They are called blind guides*, which must also be by their ignorance in doctrine or teaching; and if the *blind lead the blind, they will both fall into the ditch*: So likewise in the same verse he reproves their false doctrine about Oaths; wherefore this (*whatsoever*) must be understood of whatsoever according to that they pretend: So out of *Moses* his Chair, what they from his Authority shall appoint to be observed, must be observed; but when they produce doctrine contrary to that, they must be disobeyed; their wicked lives shall not prejudice their godly doctrine, nor shall *Moses* his Chair countenance their wicked doctrine or commands; for if so, S. *Peter*, and S. *Paul* (before spoken of) were to blame, who disobeyed their commands; and the inhumane Murther of our Saviour might be justified, which was acted by their direction. Well, I need speak no more to this, it is apparent,

apparent, that this neither can prove Ariſtocraty, nor deliver an infallible unerring rule for them to be regulated by. And as he was to blame to found Ariſtocraty upon any of theſe places of Scripture, ſo ſurely upon this hyperbolical expreſſion, That the power of every one of theſe Supremes *is as great as poſſibly men can be imagined to make it.* For then all Supremes have a like power, (which certainly is not apparent) and at all times; for if ſuch a greatneſs belong to a Soveraign as a Soveraign, then in no Soveraign, or at any time, can it be miſſing: Then the Subject cannot have right to reſcue himſelf *from hands, or ſuch hardſhip which may render his life odious to him*, as he often perſwades; for ſuch abſolute power may be imagined to be made.

SECT. XIII.

Mr. Hobbs *his Hyperbolical Power ſcarce any where to be found, and yet no ſuch ſtate of War, as he imagines, hath followed* de facto. *His ſubſequent queſtion anſwered by another.* Mr. Hobbs *his Doctrine the foundation of Sedition. Diſputes concerning Governments dangerous, but not to be prevented.*

HE proceeds; (*And though of ſo unlimited a power men may fancy many evil conſequences, yet the conſequences of the want of it (which is perpetual war of every man againſt his Neighbour) are much worſe.*) Thus far he: What a ſtrange wild aſſeveration is this? Mr. *Hobbs* (I am perſwaded) hath lived in divers Commonwealths, yet did he never find in any this abſolute Hyperbolical Power of a Soveraign; nor did he ſee any where, that every man was at war with his Neighbour. That which follows in that Paragraph I let paſs, becauſe confuted by what hath been writ heretofore, there being no new matter in it, and paſs to the next, which he thus begins: (*The greateſt objection is that of the practiſe, when*

when men ask where and when ſuch power has by Subjects been acknowledged.) Truly a wiſe queſtion, and ſhrewdly propoſed, and to which he makes an unſatisfactory anſwer, which is; (*But one may ask them again, when and where hath there been a Kingdom long free from Sedition and Civil Wars?*) That word *long* is a word of ſo large a capacity, a man can hardly find any time which he cannot ſay is ſhort: But let that paſs; he may conſider, that Civil War and Tumults ariſe from divers occaſions; ſometimes from diverſe Titles, ſometimes from private injuries, ſometimes when people are taught, *that they may vindicate themſelves from oppreſſion by their own private force and ſtrength*; ſometimes when they ſhall be taught, that *they are the Fountain of all Power*; and therefore they may take away, as well as give: which two laſt are the Fundamental Props of his whole *Leviathan*, and naturally produce Rebellion towards Superiours. He goes on -- *And in thoſe Nations, whoſe Commonwealths have been long-lived, and not been deſtroyed but by Forreign War, the Subjects never did diſpute of Soveraign Power.*) He ſhould have done a great work if he had inſtanced in thoſe Nations, and had proved they never diſputed that point. In anſwer to this; The leſs diſpute there is about it, 'tis by ſo much the ſafer: But who can hold men that have reaſon, from diſputing the reaſon of theſe great affairs which ſo nearly concern them?

CHAP.

SECT. XIV.

Mr. Hobbs *his bold cenſure of thoſe who have written before him. His Principles deſtructive to Humane Society.*

BUt (ſaith he) *howſoever an argument from the practiſe of men, that have not ſifted to the bottom, and with exact reaſon weighed the Cauſes and Nature of Commonwealths, and ſuffer daily thoſe miſeries that proceed from the ignorance thereof, are invalid.*) A bold aſſertion, and cenſorious of all the world, in a Subject of which hundreds of learned men have diſcourſed much more ſafely and rationally then himſelf, and declared thoſe things which he calls the Cauſes and Nature of Commonwealths, much more excellently then he, (as may appear to any man who will peruſe them.) Which Writers, although they may have infirmities and errours, yet I never read one man, who maintained in Politiques, Principles ſo deſtructive to Humane Society as himſelf: But he gives an inſtance to confirm his anſwer to that argument; *For* (ſaith he) *though in all places in the world men ſhould lay the foundation of their houſes on the ſand, it could not thence be inferred, that ſo it ought to be.*) He ſaith truth; but his inſtance is like his concluſion which he would illuſtrate by it: and when he can ſhew me that all men have built their houſes upon the Sand, I will yield, that all Nations in the world have founded themſelves upon weak ſupports; but until then, he ſhall excuſe me from thinking one or the other.

SECT. XV.

The Rules in Politiques not founded upon Demonſtrations. The judgments and humours of men equally various. The Rule of Government muſt follow the preſent occurrences.

HE again: *The skill of making and maintaining Commonwealths, conſiſteth in certain Rules, as doth* Arithmetick *and* Geometry, *not (as* Tennis-play*) upon practiſe only; which Rules neither poor men have the leiſure, nor men that have had the leiſure, have hitherto had the curioſity or the method to find out.)* The firſt clauſe of this affirmation muſt be examined; firſt, where he ſaith, *the skill of making and ruling Commonwealths, conſiſts in certain Rules, as doth* Arithmetick *and* Geometry;) Rules, without doubt, all prudential actions are governed by; but to ſay like *Arithmetick* and *Geometry*, is more then can be juſtified, for their Rules are moſt certain, the demonſtrations out of them moſt undeniable; but the affairs of Politique Government moſt weak, the ſubjects (which it treats about) moſt unconſtant, which is men united: and becauſe the judgments of men, their humours, their paſſions, are all obnoxious to variation, there can be no certain Rules which can meet with all accidents at home, or abroad with other Nations, which are variable one as the other; but much and many deſigns muſt be daily changed, according to divers occaſions; and indeed they are ſo many, that no wit of man can foreſee all: Let *Achitophel* himſelf advile never ſo cunningly, yet if *Abſolon* do not follow it (which no man can foreknow, but by gueſſes) his directions can effect nothing; and therefore there is no conformity in the Rules of the Mathematicks, and theſe of Politiques; the one like the ſubject moſt immutable; the other like its ſubject moſt uncertain. The laſt clauſe of that Paragraph and Chap. is nothing but a great Rant, and expreſs contempt of all other Writers, and an implicite magnifying his own Politiques:

litiques: To which I may justly say, it would have become other mens mouths or pens better than his own; and what I think of it is this; that if his former expression be true of them, that they have built upon Sand, I may say, his building is upon Quagmire: building upon Sand will support a building until storms fall, but his will not support an Edifice, but fall of its self; the very Foundation sinks, without any other weight upon it, or violence to it. And so I have run over this Chap. and thought to have gone no further in his Politiques, but the Title of the next Chap. enticeth me on, which is, *Of the Liberty of Subjects.*

CHAP. XIX. *SECT.* I.

Mr Hobbs *his Comment upon his own Text censured.* Libertas coactionis, & necessitatis: *the second proper only to men.*

HE begins this Treatise thus: (*Liberty, or freedom, signifieth (properly) the absence of opposition (by opposition I mean external impediments of motion;) and may be applied no less to irrational and inanimate Creatures, than to rational.*) Consider, Reader, what a strange perplexed kind of writing this is, where he is forced to write a Comment upon his own Text. To begin with him: (*Liberty, or freedom*) What need of freedom here, when the subject he treats of is Liberty? Secondly, What need of that *Parenthesis* to expound *opposition?* If he had not affected a deceitful way of writing, he might in fewer words, and much more clearly, have said, *Liberty signifies (properly) the absence of external impediments of motion:* But if his contempt of such Learning had not made him neglect to read it, he might easily have known there is a liberty *à Coactione*, *from constraint*, and a liberty from *necessity.* The first is that, and that only which he defines; but the second, which is the more noble part of liberty, is left out by him, and that is peculiar to men alone a-

mongſt all ſublunary Creatures. He proceeds to illuſtrate his concluſions; (*For whatſoever is ſo tyed, or invironed, as it cannot move but within a certain ſpace, which ſpace is determined by the oppoſition of ſome external body, we ſay it hath not liberty to go further.*) This I agree to, this is liberty from *conſtraint*; and ſo I agree to his whole diſcourſe, in exemplifying that, which I would ſay is ingenious, but that it explains what no man denies; therefore I let alone what follows to the bottom of this page, and ſo come to page 108, which begins thus.

SECT. II.

M. Hobbs *his Free-man not actually to be found in the whole world. His unhandſom cenſures of thoſe who have uſed the word* Liberty *or* Freedom, *in a ſenſe different from himſelf. The activity of heat hindred by cold; neither of them bodies. Spirits hindred in their motion. Freedom uſed in a paſſive acception.*

[*And according to this proper and generally received meaning of the word, A Free-man, is he, that in thoſe things which by his ſtrength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to do what he has a will to do.*] This is freedom and great liberty; but I doubt he will not find any Subject in the world having this liberty. He might have given this Chap. another title, for there are no ſubjects which are not confined from this liberty. Well, he goes on, and I wait upon him: *But* (ſaith he) *when the words Freedom and Liberty are applied to any thing but bodies, they are abuſed.*) It was unkindly and unhandſomly ſaid, to affirm it *abuſed*, ſince it hath been the language of all men who have written of any ſpiritual things; which certainly, having no bodies to hinder them, muſt needs be free, according to his own conceit. I hope in a fuller manner to handle the nature of Spirits; therefore I will not meddle now with it, only I will mind him of that common Pro-

verb

verb amongſt us, denoting a ſpiritual freedom in that which is no body, and that is, *Thought is free*; and yet this thought is a ſpiritual thing, having no dimenſions; but becauſe no Humane Laws can reſtrain, confine, or judge of mens thoughts, they are free. But he produceth a reaſon for what he had writ (*for that which is not ſubject to motion, is not ſubject to impediment*;) What he means by *motion*, I know not; but if he means that, which according to the common acceptation of Philoſophers it importeth, that is, not only lation or changing of place, but that which makes any change in any thing, which (he knows) are commonly reduced to ſix ſpecies: then he might have obſerved, that that heat which warms a mans hand is not a body, and yet may be impeded and hindred by cold from its activity, or that motion of calefaction. Well then, ſome things beſides bodies have motion, and may have that liberty (which he ſpeaks of) confined by external things. But becauſe his Philoſophy points at a contempt of Spirits, whoſe motion is not ſo clearly diſcerned as that of bodies, eſpecially in that ſucceſſion in which bodies move; and I think he means only local motion; I dare affirm that Spitits move, in their way, from one place to another, in a ſpiritual manner, and are at one time in a place, in which they were not before; and many times have ſpiritual impediments; of which I reſerve a fuller diſcourſe hereafter. But at this preſent, my affirmation is as good as his negation, eſpecially countenanced with ſuch a general conſent of Philoſophers, as cannot be counterpoiſed by any thing that can be produced for the contrary opinion. Well then, let us examine that which follows-- *Therefore* (ſaith he) *when 'tis ſaid (for example) the way is free, no liberty of the way is ſignified, but of thoſe who walk in it without ſtop.*) This expreſſion will not ſerve his turn; that phraſe, *The way is free*, doth not mean a liberty of the *men who walk in it* without ſtop; for priſoners in bonds may walk in it without ſtop, who are far from freedom; nor is it yet uſed abuſively, but paſſively, which that word *freedom* doth bear, (though hardly that word *liberty*, which he applies to it.) So that the meaning is, the way is of an open condition, not appropriated to any

particular owner, ſo as to forbid you legally to paſs there; nor is this an abuſive ſpeech, but this word *liberty* is ſeldom uſed but (with ſuch addition as may expound it) in a paſſive ſenſe, for ſome power to act, although freedom in others.

SECT. III.

The inſtance of a Gift, not at all to Mr. Hobbs *his purpoſe. A double acceptation of the word Gift. The vulgar phraſe, of Gift is free, abuſed in either ſenſe. Metonymies the Elegancies of common Language.*

AND (ſaith he) *when we ſay a Gift is free, there is not meant any liberty of the Gift, but of the Giver, that was not bound by any Law or Covenant to give it.*) Conſider, good Reader, how this inſtance diſagrees with his undertaking; which is, firſt, that *freedom applied to any thing but bodies is abuſed*; *Secondly*, his medium by which he proves that it is, *for that which is without motion is without impediment*. Now his ſecond inſtance is, becauſe *a gift is called a free gift*. Let us conſider that a gift, is either the thing given (which is often called the gift of ſuch a man) or elſe the very act of giving it. In the firſt acceptation he cannot ſay, it was bodies, nor a body, that hath no motion, like to a high way; (of which before) it may be a horſe, a dog, or any living creature. Then ſecondly, take it for the act of giving, that is, a motion of the mouth, or hand by writing, it is a motion of a man, that therefore cannot be pertinent. But then he expounds right, when he ſays it ſignifies the *liberty of the giver, who was not bound by any Law or Covenant to give it*) It is true Mr. *Hobbs*; but yet this is no abuſive ſpeech but a Metonymie, the effect for the cauſe; which figures are ſo far from being an abuſe, as they are the Elegancy of common Language; and indeed have ſo prevailed upon every mans tongue and pen, that a man can hardly ſpeak or write ſignificantly without them, unleſs he would tye himſelf to ſtrict Logical and Metaphyſical notions and expreſſions.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

Mr. Hobbs *his third inſtance cenſured.* Freedom of Speech *diverſly accepted. His illuſtrations moſt uncertain, and deviating from his matter.*

HIs third inſtance: (*So when we ſpeak freely, it is not the liberty of voice or pronuntiation, but of the man whom no Law had obliged to ſpeak otherwiſe then he did.*) Firſt, I think he is miſtaken much in the ſenſe of this phraſe (*free ſpeech*) for we ſhall find it two ways uſed in our common converſation of men with men; ſometimes in a virtuous ſenſe, as, he did preach *freely*, deliver the truth without fear of men, for that bondage of fear is a great captivity; ſometimes in a worſe ſenſe, when we uſe to ſay, ſuch a man is one of a *free* converſation, he ſpeaks *freely*; not that he ſpeaks things *as no Law hath forbid to ſpeak otherwiſe*, but without conſideration; he gives no Law to his own tongue, one (as we otherwiſe phraſe him ſometimes) without fear or wit; and it is within an inch of ſaucineſs. Now freedom of ſpeech doth not relate only to the outward Laws, but to the ability ſometimes of Language; and yet I may add, he was to blame when he denied the uſe of it concerning the bodily pronuntiation, for we uſe to ſay, he is free from ſtammering; and for ſtammering, he hath an impediment in his ſpeech. Let the Reader forgive me for medling with ſuch trifles as theſe are, which in this place I do, becauſe he may obſerve how crude and indigeſted his diſcourſe is, and how uncertain even his illuſtrations are, which ought to be of a clearer evidence. But now I come to his *Laſtly*; which indeed I gueſs to be the work he aimed at, and this only a Preamble to the Liberty of Subjects, which indeed it concerns not.

SECT.

SECT. V.

Of freedom and liberty again; These two contrary to his former acception of the words, now diſtinguiſhed by Mr. Hobbs. *The word* will *taken in a double ſenſe, equally with underſtanding, by the Philoſophers. The common notion juſtified againſt* Mr. Hobbs. *The* ſubjectum quod, *and the* ſubjectum quo *of liberty in the will. A twofold act of the will (confounded by* Mr. Hobbs) *explained and aſſerted. God only can do what ever he has inclination to.*

LAſtly, (ſaith he) *from the uſe of the word Free-will, no liberty can be enforced of the will, deſire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which conſiſteth in this, that he finds no ſtop in doing what he has the will, deſire, or inclination to do.*) What? from the uſe of this word Free-will, no liberty can be inferred of the will, deſire, or inclination! I wonder why by his diſcourſe, becauſe it is no body, which he conceives to be the only free thing; but that hath been refuted: other things are as free as bodies, according to his conceit of freedom, becauſe other things produce alteration, and may be impeded in their operations. But perhaps he puts a difference here betwixt freedom and liberty, which before he conjoyned; and conceives that the freedom of the will, which may not be ſtopt or hindred in its operations, is a diſtinct thing from its liberty of doing, or not doing, of electing this, or refuſing that: And although he allows the firſt, that it is free, without ſtop to operate, but hath no liberty to operate, or not operate, or to refuſe one, and chuſe another; this I apprehend to be his meaning, as will appear preſently, his whole diſcourſe pointing at it. To underſtand which, let the Reader conſider with me, that this word *will* is taken two ways; for a faculty in the Soul, by which it produceth

ceth divers acts, as to will, or nill, chuſe, or refuſe. And ſecondly, for the prime act of this faculty, which is to will, for ſo Philoſophers do with the underſtanding. *Intellectus* is the faculty by which a man underſtands any thing, and the prime act of the underſtanding, or indeed the chief habit by which it underſtands any thing. The *habitus principiorum*, is called *Intellectus*: Thus ſometimes the ſame name is applied to the faculty, and the chief operation of the faculty: I ſpeak this, becauſe he more then once abuſeth this notion with ſome deriſion; but however, until we can learn more ſignificant terms to expreſs our notions by, we muſt be content with ſuch as are in uſe. Now conſider, here he takes will for the act, or the operation of the faculty, not the faculty it ſelf: that is evident, becauſe he expounds it, as if they were one by deſire and inclination. Now thoſe two, deſire, and inclination, are actual motions, or at the leaſt, tendencies to motions: Now (ſaith he) of theſe there is no liberty, but the liberty of the man. It is true, the man is the *ſubjectum quod*, or the Soul of man in which the faculty of the will is, but the will is the faculty which is the *ſubjectum quo*, the immediate ſubject by which the man is free; and by this faculty the man is enabled to work this act of willing freely. But yet conſider with me a little, that the will being the inſtrument which man uſeth to obtain his happineſs, hath a twofold act; one reſpects the end, which is happineſs, the other the means, by which this happineſs is to be obtained: The firſt is natural, and neceſſary; as natural, as for the eye to ſee colours, for the fire to burn. There cannot be a man who would not be happy, he may be miſtaken in the thing ſo as to count this or that to be happineſs, which is not, but he would be happy. The ſecond, which is converſant about the means, is Election, and that act is free for a man to chuſe, or not chuſe, to chuſe one, and refuſe another. Now concerning the ſecond there is abundance of liberty; concerning the firſt, he might confound will, deſire, and inclination; but concerning the ſecond, he may will, or rationally deſire that which he hath no inclination to, yea is averſe to in his natural inclination; and therefore in that

regard they were very ill joyned together, and it was a Gambal of him, and what follows is moſt odious to all reaſon and experience; for explaining himſelf, what he meant by the liberty of man, *which* (ſaith he) *conſiſteth in this, that he finds no ſtop in doing what he has the will, deſire, or inclination to do.* Conſider this ſtrange propoſition; Was there ever any man of ſuch a liberty, ſuch a power, that he finds no ſtop in doing what he hath a will to do. The greateſt Emperour that ever was, could never ſay ſo; they have ſtops in themſelves, their own reaſons and conſciences forbid them to do many things they would do, their ſhort and weak arms ſtop them from doing many things they are inclined to do, only God is capable of this liberty, whoſe infinite wiſdom can find out all things, and infinite goodneſs deſires nothing but what is moſt excellent, and infinite power can do all what he hath an inclination to: It was therefore a moſt ſtrange ſpeech, and I cannot but wonder how ſuch things can paſs amongſt reaſonable men for Philoſophy; and being in, I think it my duty to ſhew ſuch a thing to a heedleſs Reader.

SECT. VI.

Of mixed actions, will, deſire, and inclination, diſtinguiſhed; confounded by Mr. Hobbs. *Of goods caſt into the Sea, for the preſervation of the Ship and Paſſengers. The dictate of Reaſon often diſobeyed, and the will violently carried by the ſenſual appetite. Denominations are a* principaliori.

SO now we will paſs on to the next Paragraph; I expect more of this ſtuff: It begins (*Fear and Liberty are conſiſting*) (I believe they are in a mixture) *as* (ſaith he) *when a man throweth his goods into the Sea for fear the Ship ſhould ſink.*) This inſtance is commonly given to mixed actions, which are compounded of voluntary and involuntary; here is a part of both; he doth throw his goods into the Sea, this makes it voluntary; he doth it grudging, that makes it

it involuntary, yet it ſeems the predominancy is in the will. But now conſider with me, that theſe terms (which he handled before, and confounded together) you may now find diſtinguiſhed, they are will, deſire, and inclination: theſe three (to ſpeak properly) differ, according to a three-fold eſtate in man, Natural, Animal, and Rational: According to the firſt, he hath inclination to tarry and remain in the world, with the like; agreeing to the ſecond, he deſires meat, drink, to walk, to talk, and do all things which are pleaſant to him: According to the laſt, to act ſuch things as reaſon ſhall dictate: Nay he may have an inclination to many things which Reaſon can ſay are not fit; take the higheſt inſtance which can be given, that is, to live; when Reaſon ſhall ſhew him, that it is not fit to live upon ſuch diſhoneſt terms as are offered. So likewiſe he may have an animal deſire of pleaſure, which being found not fit by Reaſon, the rational will controuls it. Thus we ſee thoſe three Appetites; and to keep cloſe to his inſtance, man hath an inclination and a natural appetite to live, and hath a ſenſual deſire of his riches, by which he hopes to live to the ſatisfaction of his ſenſual appetite; but Reaſon preſcribes, that life is to be preferred before all the pleaſures in the world. So that here he ſaith right, one may have a will to throw his riches into the Sea, but his ſenſual deſire is againſt it, and that makes it have a degree of unwillingneſs. Conſider again, that this act of throwing his goods into the Sea, is in its own nature an unwilling act; for no man would deſire to caſt that away, which with ſo much hazard and pains he had got; but in the particular, when it comes to be yoked with that greater miſchief of looſing his life, then it is choſen before the other, and yet it is oft grieved for when it is paſſed and gone, which is a ſhrewd objection againſt the willingneſs of it; for no man is rationally grieved for doing what he will; but be it as he will, yet the rational will, the ſenſual deſire, and the natural inclination, are not the ſame; and although the rational will in that act doth command, yet in many it doth not, being violently carried away with the other; So that he ſaith

truth, when he ſaith, --caſting his goods into the Sea was a willing action, although there was an earneſt deſire to the contrary; and there was, by reaſon of that, ſome mixture of unwillingneſs in it; yet *denominatio à principaliori*, the predominant part gives the denomination invincibly: So likewiſe what follows in another inſtance, *of him who pays his debts only to avoid impriſonment*:) And what in the concluſion of that Paragraph, he ſaith, *That generally all actions which men do in Commonwealths for fear of the Law, are actions which the doers had liberty to omit*) therefore certainly they had liberty in themſelves, they might do, or not do them.

SECT. VII.

The deficiency of Mr. Hobbs *his inſtance of water paſſing in its channel.* Libertas coactionis, & neceſſitatis, *further explained. Liberty properly* ad oppoſita.

NOw I come to a new buſineſs: *Liberty* (ſaith he) *and neceſſity are conſiſtent; as in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a neceſſity of deſcending by the channel.*) This inſtance is not full; for although there is a freedom to run in the channel, yet the banks of the channel ſo confine it, that the water can run no where elſe; like a man who hath his ſhackles knocked off, yet is confined to his chamber ſtill, and is a priſoner there. But to underſtand this, conſider with me, that this liberty which he ſpeaks of concerning the water, is a true liberty, ſo far as I explained it, according to his definition, which is a liberty to run in the channel without external impediments; but abſolute liberty it is not, becauſe both it is impeded from overflowing the channel by the banks, and likewiſe becauſe it is reſtrained by its nature, ſo that it is not abſolutely liberty. There is *libertas à coactione*, a liberty from conſtraint of outward cauſes, but

but there is no liberty *à neceſſitate*, from the neceſſity of its nature, without which there is no proper liberty any otherwiſe then a priſoner hath to live in Gaol: But liberty is *ad oppoſita*, to things of divers nature, where the Internal Principle hath power to do this, or that; or at the leaſt, to do, or not to do, as he ſpeaks at the end of the laſt Paragraph; *The deer had liberty to omit.* Now the water hath freedom to do, it is not hindred from running in the channel; but not ſo much liberty as School boys take one towards another, when the weaker Boy ſhould chuſe the beſt, the ſtronger would give him the worſt, and bid him chuſe that or none; for the water hath not liberty to run, or not to run, but only liberty to run.

SECT. VIII.

Mr. Hobbs *his former inſtance to voluntary actions. His liberty to have, or not to have written and diſperſed, theſe impious Doctrines.*

HE proceeds: (*So likewiſe in the actions which men voluntarily do.*) It is not ſo in the actions which men voluntarily do; there is no neceſſity for them to do their voluntary actions; they can chuſe whether they will do them or not; that man who doth vertuouſly, can chuſe, and do vitiouſly: And ſo contrarily, he could have choſen whether he would have writ theſe wicked Doctrines which he hath taught: If not, let him confeſs it, and I will prove him not to be a Man, but a Beaſt, and fit to be uſed as a Beaſt, yea worſe then a Beaſt, to be like a ſtone which naturally deſcends, or water which neceſſarily runs down its Channel, and ſo ought to be uſed like it; for indeed there is no one thing more peculiar to man then this liberty.

SECT. IX.

Mr. Hobbs *his Reaſon of the former Aſſertion invalid. Of the firſt and ſecond cauſes. Men actively, other creatures paſſively, capable of commands, Fools and Mad-men incapable of commands.*

But he gives a reaſon for what he ſpeaks: (*And yet, becauſe every act of mans will, and every deſire and inclination proceedeth from ſome cauſes, and that from another cauſe, in a continual chain (whoſe firſt link is in the hand of God, the firſt of all cauſes) proceed from neceſſity.*) The force of this Argument is inviſible; for though this will doth proceed from a cauſe, as he expreſſeth it, yet if that immediate cauſe from which it proceeds be not neceſſary, yea, if any one Link in the Chain of Cauſes be free, and not neceſſary, the effect is not neceſſary; for the arbitrarineſs of any one will make the effect ſuch: But this liberty of the Agent (he ſpeaks of) looks only upon the immediate cauſe, which in humane actions is free, and may not be done; yea, very often the Agent may chuſe the contrary: That the firſt cauſe works with all ſecond cauſes, is as certain as any thing in the Mathematicks; for there cannot be a ſecond, or a third, or any number, but it proceeds from a firſt: And yet becauſe the firſt hath an influence upon the reſt, it follows not that they are Cyphers, but each out of that foundation hath its ſeveral operations: So in this, the firſt cauſe is *Cauſa generalis*, and works with ſecond cauſes which are derived from it: But they have their ſeveral ways and powers of working; Natural, according to their natural inclination; Animal, according to the peculiar diſpoſition of thoſe Souls which inhabit them; only man hath a free nature amongſt bodily things, in that reſembling the Great Cauſe of Cauſes, he is the Principle of thoſe actions which he doth as a man voluntarily; and therefore is capable of Commands actively to do, and the other Creatures paſſively to be done,

or

or uſed, and Man is uſed as a Maſter, or Owner under God, of them, a Steward who muſt give an account of ſuch of them as come within the ſphere of his Dominion. Let any man tell me, how a man can be capable of commands, if he were like them neceſſitated: No man commands Fools, Madmen, or Infants; we might account them Fools, or Mad, who ſhould do it; but, if he would have them act any thing, he muſt work upon their predominant paſſion, as we would do with Beaſts, becauſe there is in them a deficiency of this high Power, to be Maſter of their own actions. It cannot be then, that all thoſe Precepts, Councels, Commands of God, ſhould be given to him who hath no power to obey: And from thence we muſt needs conclude, that they have a liberty to do, or not to do. But let us follow him.

SECT. X.

Mr. Hobbs *his Suppoſition impoſſible, without a Revelation. The force of the word* See.- *His Hypotheſis granted. His Inference would not follow. Cauſes not otherwiſe to ſeem, then as they are in their own Nature.*

SO *that* (ſaith he) *to him who could ſee the connexion of thoſe Cauſes, the neceſſity of all mens voluntary actions would appear manifeſt.*) This concluſion is founded upon an impoſſible ſuppoſal; there is no poſſibility that a man in this world ſhould ſee that Chain of Cauſes, in Heaven hereafter he may, but here he cannot without a mighty ſtrange Revelation. But ſuppoſe he could? This word *See* denotes a clear apprehenſion; What would follow then, but that he ſhould ſee ſuch cauſes neceſſary which are neceſſary, and ſuch free which are free; he would ſee them as they are, not ſee them in a repreſentation falſe, and ſo not agreeing to their condition.

SECT.

SECT. XI.

Of Gods concurrence with humane actions. No man a ſinner if neceſſitated to ſin. Divine diſpoſure neceſſitates not to Evil. God not the Author of thoſe actions which are contrary to his commands. He is truly the Author of thoſe actions he adviſeth. Gods concurrence further illuſtrated, from the influx of the Sun. Liberal Agents not neceſſitated by the ordinary concurrence of God.

HE proceeds: (*And therefore God that ſeeth and diſpoſeth all things, ſeeth alſo, that the liberty of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the neceſſity of doing that which God will, and no more, nor leſs.*) Certainly, although I think very many men are too bold to diſcourſe of both Gods Knowledge and Will, as they do, which are things too high for the weak ſight of man to look clearly into, yet men may confidently ſay, as his Knowledge cannot be deceived, to judge falſly, ſo his Will cannot be deceived, in willing that which is not good; and therefore becauſe men are free Agents in what they do, and muſt give an account of their actions to him, and be judged according to them by him, it is not poſſible to conceive, that he ſhould know them other then free, which liberty was his own gift. And for his will, ſince it hath pleaſed God in his holy Word to reveal to us Rules by which we may know what is his will for us to do, in doing which we pleaſe him, and that he likes us; as alſo what is againſt his will, in doing which we ſhall anger and offend him, and he will puniſh us, although God be not only a general, but the firſt cauſe which works with and in us; yet it is not poſſible for man to think, that God doth in that concurrence determine mans actions to ſuch things which he himſelf hath declared evil, and againſt his will, and which he will puniſh; and therefore it was too bold an Aſſertion to ſay, *That man doth no more or leſs, then*

then he is neceſſitated by Gods will, which is to make no man a ſinner; for although (as he ſpake) God diſpoſeth all things, and that diſpoſure muſt needs be to infinitely good and wiſe ends, even the evils and things againſt his Rules of goodneſs, yet his diſpoſure orders ſuch men, according to their evil actions, to ſuffer, not makes them do evil that they may ſuffer. But perhaps he explains this (*For though men may do many things which God does not command, nor is therefore Author of them.*) Nay, I will tell him more, men may do, and many men do many things, not only which God hath not commanded, but which God hath forbidden, and hath commanded they ſhall not do; and ſurely then he is leſs Author of them: But if a man do an act of adviſe or counſel of Gods without a Command, yet that Gods Counſel is Author of. Now theſe actions which are againſt Gods Command, without doubt he is not Author of; if he were, he could not juſtly puniſh them: But I would fain make out his ſenſe, which is this, he doth not do it by Authority given by God, but againſt it; Well then, Gods Authority is againſt evil, but his power worketh this evil. So he ſeems to affirm in his following words; (*Yet they can have no paſſion nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods will is not the cauſe.*) True indeed, God is the firſt general cauſe, but not the ſecond and particular. The Sun is an univerſal cauſe, it ſhines upon the Earth, Trees, Plants, and is the cauſe of their fertility, but diverſly, according to the diverſity of Conſtitutions it concurs with; ſo doth God, as he is the firſt and general cauſe (meeting with ſeveral conditions) operate ſeverally, to the production of thoſe ſeveral effects which are produced by them, with things neceſſary, before he produceth neceſſary effects. But, as the Suns concourſe doth not determine this thing to this, and that to that effect; ſo doth not the general concourſe of God determine this or that appetite to this or that object, in this or that manner; but when it meets with things ſo diſpoſed, it concurs in the production of that effect to which it was ſo diſpoſed; ſo that God concurring with free Agents, makes them no more neceſſary, then his concurring with neceſſary

Agents makes them free: It is the ſame infinite Power of God which conſtituted both, and his concurrence deſtroys neither in its ordinate working: (I ſpeak not of his extraordinary operation, whereby he can and doth controul all the frame of Nature, when and how he pleaſeth, nor doth Mr. *Hobbs*): Nay, I may ſay, that God himſelf being abſolutely free, bounded with no limits, having nothing above, or about him, which can ſtop or hinder his Almighty hand from working, it is much more reaſonable to think, that his concourſe ſhould make even neceſſary Agents free, and not to be bounded by their natures which he had given them, rather then that this moſt free Agent ſhould againſt himſelf make thoſe which he had conſtituted in a free nature to be neceſſary, becauſe they are by that more like himſelf, which every Agent endeavours: Nay, in his extraordinary works, he doth often, for the preſent, ſhake off thoſe bonds which his former Donation had confined them to; ſo that by his extraordinary concourſe, he makes them ceaſe from their former operations, which by their natures they were neceſſitated to do; as the fire not to burn, the water not to run down its channel, and the like, which are apparent to every man. So then, though Gods will and concurrence is a cauſe of thoſe actions, yet not being a terminating cauſe, but concurring with that nature which he had given them, that concurrence doth not neceſſitate that operation which he had given to man, *viz.* freedom to do, or not to do. But he proves the contrary in his following words, which are theſe.

SECT.

SECT. XII.

The conſequence of this Paragraph examined. His meaning conjectured and refuted. Every deviation contradicts not the Power and Omnipotency of God. Voluntas facere & fieri *diſtinguiſhed in God. Men not juſtly puniſhed with Damnation, if neceſſitated to ſin.* Mr. Hobbs *cenſured for obtruding thoſe Doctrines in Divinity amongſt his Political Diſcourſes. The actions of the King and Subject alike neceſſitated by* Mr. Hobbs *his Chain of Cauſes.*

And did not his will aſſure the neceſſity of mans will, and conſequently of all that on mans will dependeth, the liberty of men would be a contradiction and impediment to the Omnipotency and liberty of God.) I do not obſerve how this conſequence can be deduced out of the premiſes; for if God endowed man with liberty and free power in his nature, why ſhould it follow, if God do not neceſſitate his actions, that mans will would croſs and impede the power and liberty of God? For the will of God is, that man ſhould act freely: the free actions therefore are according to his will, and the neceſſitation would be contrary to his will. But, I think, he means, that if mans *free power could ſin againſt the will of God, then man ſhould be able to contradict and ſtop his Omnipotency and Liberty.* To underſtand this therefore, conſider with me, that Gods Dominion over this World, is like that of a King in a Kingdom; he gives Laws and Rules to the Subjects, which if they obſerve, they ſhall live happily under him; but if not, he will puniſh and afflict, yea perhaps deſtroy the offending parties: It is an oppoſition to the Kings power, that when men break his Laws, and he ſhall go about to puniſh them, they ſhall then rebel againſt him, and oppoſe the power of the

County, or of the Kingdom, or that power which he muſters up to do Juſtice upon them; then indeed his power is contradicted and impeded. God, whilſt men live here with theſe natures, hath given Rules, and governs them by ſuch Laws as he hath appointed them for their good; if they obſerve thoſe Laws, happy are they, but he ſeldom puts in his Omnipotency to make men do the one or the other, never to make men break his Laws; he ordinarily doth not vary the nature of man, or any thing. Men may and may not keep his Commandments, (I do not now diſpute of the nature of Grace, or any thing of that kind) they that do not, ſhall be puniſhed, as the other bleſſed; and then comes in his Omnipotency; if man could reſiſt or impede that, that were contradicting his power; but theſe ſins only oppoſe his concourſe which inclines, but not neceſſitates a mans nature; ſo that there is Gods *voluntas facere & fieri*, his will which we ſhould do, which it is impoſſible for God to oppoſe; and there is his *voluntas facere*, to do himſelf, which it is not poſſible for man to oppoſe: The firſt appears in this life, the ſecond in the other; nor is it any contradiction to the Divine Power which hath ſo eſtabliſhed it, and without which it were impoſſible for his Power to joyn with his Juſtice in puniſhing Offenders at the laſt day; for how can a man juſtly be puniſhed for what was not in his power to do otherwiſe, yea much leſs can he puniſh him in Juſtice, who makes him commit that fault which he puniſheth, which God muſt do, if he (with his co-operation in the act) determines mans power to that evil which he puniſheth, and for which condemneth him to Hell. Certainly, this is the moſt abominable impudent Doctrine for ſinning that ever was read in any Author that ever writ of this Subject, and the moſt derogative from that infinite Eſſential Goodneſs that ſhould cauſe, or make men do evil; for no more then fire can cool or act againſt its nature, no more can God, who is eſſentially good (goodneſs it ſelf) act that which is evil. It is in vain for a man to ſay, it is not evil, God doing it; for it is an evil which God hates and puniſheth, and therefore muſt be evil

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in his eſteem. I do not now ſpeak of that Language uſed by ſome, of Gods afflictions working with ſome men, which comes not in this diſcourſe to be diſputed of; but that God doth work theſe ſins which he puniſheth, this is abhorrent to the thought of a Religious man. And now, I muſt cenſure Mr. *Hobbs*, not only for ill and falſe Doctrine, but for having ſuch a delight in it, as in this place unneceſſarily to obtrude it, where there was no reaſon for, nor uſe of it; for let any man conſider what this hath to do with liberty of the Subject, which is the Head he undertook to treat of; the liberty of the Subject is neither more or leſs for his linking of his actions to God Almighty; nay, if his diſcourſe be true, Subjects have as great liberty as Kings, for all their actions are alike neceſſitated by this Chain.

Here Reader, I thought to have ended with his Politicks, having, as I think, digged up his Foundation, and then the Building muſt fall; but meeting ſo many wicked interpretations of Scripture, and ſo many abominable concluſions in Divinity intermixed with his Political diſcourſes, I am forced to proceed with ſome of them, leſt the Reader ſhould be unhappily ſeduced, but not proſecute them word by word, as I have done; but skipping from one hill to another, leaving the leſſer work, and Mole-hills, to be cenſured by any man who hath more leiſure and ſpare time; and to that purpoſe remove with me to the next page 109. about the middle, where he begins thus.

CHAP. XX. *SECT.* I.

Mr. Hobbs *his impious Propoſition in this Paragraph, diſcovered and cenſured. Injuſtice and iniquity the ſame. The Subject not Author of the actions of his Soveraign. The Soveraign, granting the former Propoſition, cannot kill an Innocent juſtly. No man hath power to take away his own life juſtly. Neither Subjects nor Kings have right to any thing but from God, who gives not power to either to ſhed Innocent Blood. The Law of Nature, deſerted by* Mr. Hobbs, *to the murther of an Innocent. His diſapprobation of Scripture cenſured.*

NEvertheleſs *we are not to underſtand, that by ſuch liberty, the Soveraign Power of Life and Death is either abolished or limited.*) I conceive, *by Soveraign Power*, he means the power of the Soveraign, and that Authority not limited by any Law, which being violated, he ſhould do unjuſtly: (for this ſenſe the ſequel of this diſcourſe will apparently juſtifie) and then I ſay it is a wicked Propoſition, as will appear by the examination of his reaſons, which he enters upon in the following words: (*For it hath been already ſhewn, that nothing the Soveraign Repreſentative can do to a Subject, on what pretence ſoever, can properly be called injuſtice, or injury*): Yes, he hath ſhewn it with a nice and learned diſtinction, betwixt *Injuſtice* and *Iniquity*; concerning which, I may juſtly ſay they are hardly two words, but not two things, as I have ſhew'd. But what doth he mean by a *Soveraign Repreſentative here?* I think he hath delivered, that all Soveraigns are Repreſentatives of the people; What he can mean by this addition of Repreſentative, I know not; but he explains himſelf in the words following;

ing; *Becauſe* (ſaith he) *every Subject is Author of every act the Soveraign doth; ſo that he never wanteth right to any thing, otherwiſe then as he himſelf is a Subject of God, and bound thereby to obſerve the Laws of Nature.)* The firſt part I have ſpoken to heretofore, and ſhewed, that every Subject is not Author of the Soveraigns acts; where, he ſaith, he hath ſhown it: But now I ſhall go further, and prove, that if they were Authors of his acts, yet by their Authority he cannot kill an Innocent juſtly; which I do thus,-- The people cannot authorize him to act any thing, which they themſelves have not juſt power to do; but the people *conjunctim*, or *diviſim*, have no juſt power to take away an innocent mans life; therefore they cannot authorize him. The major is grounded upon that invincible Axiom, No man gives what he hath not; therefore if they have not that power, they cannot give it. The minor will be proved thus; -- Before a Commonwealth be inſtituted, no man hath juſt power to take away anothers life, as is moſt evident. I, but they may anſwer, every man hath power over his own, which every man may yield to the Soveraign. I rejoyn; No man hath juſt power to take away his own life, he may give his goods, but not his life; God is the God of life, and hath given no private man Authority to cut off his own life, and therefore undoubtedly he cannot give power to another, which he hath not himſelf. And if there were no other argument againſt his popular Conſtitution of a Supreme, this were enough for confutation of it; for there muſt be a power of life and death in a Commonwealth upon the emergency of great iniquities, it cannot ſubſiſt elſe. And ſo I paſs to the ſecond part of that concluſion, which is, *(Otherwiſe then as he himſelf is the Subject of God, and bound thereby to obſerve the Laws of Nature:)* There is much folly (*if not wickedneſs*) in theſe few words. Firſt, I ſay, neither Kings, nor any man, hath right to any thing, but as they are Gods Subjects: *The earth is the Lords, and all that is in it*; and to whom he giveth it, they have right to ſuch pieces, and none elſe: He is King of Kings, with a much greater Prerogative then they can have over their

their Subjects: They can have no power therefore or right to act any thing which is not a power delegated from him; and certainly he can never ſhew me any power given to Kings by God to ſhed innocent blood. Secondly, it is a ſtrange phraſe uſed by him (*and bound thereby to obſerve the Laws of Nature*:) Firſt, becauſe the Law of Nature, in particulars, is to preſerve, not to take away life in general; and concerning Commonwealths, to reward Virtue, and puniſh Vice; when this wicked book would have it the Law of Nature, to kill an Innocent, yea a virtuous perſon. Secondly, conſider (*that being bound, becauſe he is Gods Subject, to the Law of Nature*) and only that he ſhould not be bound to Gods poſitive Laws in Scripture, a diſtinction which he himſelf makes uſe of, and therefore may more powerfully be retorted to him; but he loves not Scripture, and this odious expreſſion of his is moſt abominable.

SECT. II.

Mr. Hobbs *his Propoſition in this Paragraph examined and cenſured. His dubious expreſſions diſcovered from his former Aſſertions, and refuted. Scripture ſeldom cited by* Mr. Hobbs, *but to give a colour and Authority to Impiety.* Jephta's *raſh Vow examined. The execution of that Vow impious.* Jephta's *Sacrifice no Preſident for others.*

HE goes on: (*And therefore it may, and doth often happen in Commonwealths, that a Subject may be put to death by the Command of the Soveraign Power, and yet neither do the other wrong.*) There is one ſhift in this Propoſition by which it may be juſtified, as thus; That a Soveraign may puniſh a Delinquent, who formally did him no wrong, or an inconſiderable one, that is, to the Prince himſelf; but for an injury to another of his Fellow Subjects, as for robbing, or burning his Neighbours houſe. But (as it ſeems) by that argumentative word *therefore*, which muſt relate to the precedent matter, he may do it, when the murthered

murthered Party hath done no wrong to any body, and then it is wickedly false, he gives instances two or three. We will examine them next [*As* (saith he) *when* Jeptha *caused his daughter to be sacrificed, in which and the like cases, he that so dyeth, had liberty to do the action, for which he is nevertheless put to death without injury*] I could wish he would let Scripture alone, for he loving it not with a due reverence, seldom names it, but to countenance some wickedness, as here. This story is recorded *Judges* the 11. And Mr. *Hobbs* I am perswaded did know how it is with sharpness disputed by Divines whether he sacrificed her, or made a Votary of her. I will embroile my self in no unnecessary controversies, but will grant all he requires in that dispute, that he did sacrifice her; what follows then? that he did it justly? certainly no, the actions of bad Kings, yea the bad actions of good Princes cannot be justifiable precedents for following ages. The world and the particular men in it are compounded of good and evil; there is not any man so bad as hath no good, but that he may be worse; nor any man so good, but he may be better; he hath some ill actions falling from him. That is it which I speak of this very gallant person, *Jephta*, he might have such an ill action out of a foolish mistaken Zeal, that that rash vow of his was to be kept; it was a foolish and a rash vow; for (for my part) I cannot guesse what he could imagine, what he could conceive, should come out of his doors which should be fit for a sacrifice to God; Domestick creatures, as dogs, servants or children, are all of them hated by God for sacrifices. Calves, Rams, Cows, Goats &c. which are the proper things for sacrifices, are not domestick inhabitants; but to shed innocent blood in offering his daughter for a sacrifice was without doubt most impious; and this is reckoned by *David* in *Psalm* 106. *verse* 38. amongst the abominations of the Israelites that they shed blood, in their offering up their Sons and Daughters to Divels. I, but it may be objected, that he had vowed it to God. A vow made to do evil is *ipso facto* void; God never confirmed it; he ought not to keep it, but to repent for making it; this was to shed

innocent blood which was a ſacrifice fit for none but the Divel, from whom the inſtigation to it proceeded; ſo that if *Jephta* did kill her for a ſacrifice, he did wickedly. There is a certain humour in many men, who will be peremptory in ſome point of religion that they may ſeem godly, who value not much the reality of it: they will keep a raſh, or (which amounts to the ſame) a not well adviſed oath, although to ſin, when they will neglect obedience to do righteouſly; this was evident in King *Saul*, you may find 1 *Sam.* 14. 24. *Saul* curſeth any man who ſhould eat any food until eventide; here was a moſt raſh curſe, and the 27. *verſe*, *Johnathan* who knew nothing of this curſe of his Fathers eats a little honey; in the 44. *verſe*, *Saul* ſwears again, that he ſhall ſurely dye: what a horrid injuſtice had this been in *Saul* to ſlay that gallant perſon, a man of ſo much honour and worth, for the ſatisfaction of his raſh oath? You ſhall find in the next *Chap.* that *Samuel* gave *Saul* a commandment from God to do execution upon *Amalek*, and then he can in the 9. *verſe* ſpare *Agag* and the beſt of their cattle; ſee the ſame humour in both, that which God had prohibited, murther, even upon his own ſon, he would have committed, although againſt Gods law, becauſe it was agreeing with that religion which he had inſtituted for God, to wit his oath; but then upon the ſame reaſon he ſpared *Agag* when God commanded his deſtruction, becauſe it ſuited better with his phancie that they ſhould make a glorious ſacrifice to God of what they had taken: and therefore in the 22. *v. Sam.* gives him this heavy reproof, Hath the Lord as great delight in burnt-offerings and ſacrifices as in obeying the voice of the Lord? behold to obey is better than ſacrifice. When God hath given laws for mens actions it is a diſobedience to invent witty ways of our own which croſs them, to ſpare what God would have us deſtroy, and deſtroy that which God would have us ſave. This was the humour of *Sauls* religion. I dare not cenſure *Jephta*, he was a perſon of as ſpotleſs integrity as any I find amongſt the *Judges*, unleſs *Samuel*; but if he did kill his daughter, I may juſtly ſay it was a moſt unjuſt act, and a ſatisfaction of his fancy in religion (which imagined what he had ſworn *in re illicita*, muſt

muſt be performed although againſt Gods law, which forbids killing (which in ſacrifice required no ſuch thing) but not a religious act; nor can this be a precedent for others, nor a juſtification of others in doing the like, although a better man than he be joyned with him, which is *David*; and ſo I come to his ſecond inſtance.

CHAP. XX.

SECT. III.

The murther of Uriah *diſcuſſed. Mr* Hobbs *his diſtinction cenſured. Killing of an innocent contrary not only to the equitable part, but the very letter of the law of nature. The law not the executioner kills a Criminal. No power given by* Uriah *to* David *to kill him being an innocent. Mr.* Hobbs *his errors multiplied from his fictitious inſtitution of Soveraignes by popular election.* Uriah *not impowered to diſpoſe of his own life.*

HIs words are, [*In which and the like caſes he that ſo dyeth, had liberty to do the action, for which he is nevertheleſs, without injury put to death.*] I have ſhewed the contrary: it is an injury to put any man to death for that which he had liberty (that is) was not bound by law, not to do, and ſuch a law which enjoyned ſuch a penalty for the breach of it. Again he [*And the ſame holdeth alſo in a Soveraign Prince, that putteth to death an innocent Subject.*] What a Tautologie is this? I thought he had diſcourſed of a Soveraign Prince all this while; if not, it is more abominable. I, but he hath reaſon for what he hath delivered, for (ſaith he) *Though the action be againſt the law of nature as being contrary to equitie (as was the killing of* Uriah *by* David*) yet it was not an injury to* Uriah; *but to* God. A very fine and delicate diſtinction, of which I

have spoke before. But now concerning this language, as it is used here, *though the action* (saith he) *be against the law of nature, as being contrary to equitie.*] First, Reader, consider, if he take equity (as many times it is) for a mitigation or a gentle exposition which moderates the extream rigor of the law, this surely may be deduced out of the law of nature, then (saith he) it is against the law of nature, because against the kind and charitable exposition of the law of nature only; but without question killing an innocent is most directly contrary to the very letter of the law of nature and the full sence of it, for although he makes nothing of the positive law of God in this discourse, yet the ten commandments being by all understood to be an illustration or explication of that law writ in our hearts (as he himself seems to allow hereafter) therefore that law being clear, Thou shalt not kill, and this killing an innocent being the most detestable of all other, it is most clearly not only against the equity but the letter, that is that sence which the law intends; for the law of nature directs and commands that vertue and vertuous men should be rewarded and incouraged, and vice punished. Thou shalt not kill for the satisfaction of thy passion, whom the law doth not direct; but if the law command killing, lest the Common-wealth be hurt by so wicked a person, lest vice may be nourished, then the law kills, not thou who art an executioner of the law. And therefore to kill an innocent is a monstrous crime, whom no law kills; he gives an instance again, *as was the killing of* Uriah *by* David, *yet it was not an injury to* Uriah, *but to God*: yes, the greatest injury could be done to him. No saith he, *not to* Uriah, *because the right to do what he pleased was given him by* Uriah *himself.* Shew that concession or gift from *Uriah* and it will go a great way to my satisfaction, nay certainly there was never such a concession from *Uriah* or any Subject, that the King shall kill him being an innocent. It is not good for the Common-wealth that any have such a power, because by such a wicked act the Commonwealth loseth a worthy member as was *Uriah*; but that abominable false foundation of the

only

only way of inſtituting a Common-wealth by the popular election, that impoſſible error leads him into many more; but ſuppoſe *Uriah* yielded ſuch a power, yea if it had been done by ſuch a conſent as he expreſſed; yet they had no power over their own lives; and therefore could not impower him over them; eſpecially when embodied into a Common-wealth; for his country hath a ſhare in every Subjects life, and good ſubjects well-being, by which it is amended and bettered; ſo that he muſt needs do an injury to others by ſuch an act; for it is wrong and again all juſtice, that man ſhould ſuffer by weldoing. This may ſuffice for the firſt piece of that ſentence, now we will examine the ſecond.

CHAP. XX.

SECT. IV.

Davids *ſin in murthering* Uriah, *a ſin againſt God, becauſe an injury to man.* *St.* Ambroſe *explained.* David *his ſoveraignty freed from the puniſhment of ſin, but not from the guilt of it.* *Rom.* 13. 4. *the firſt epiſtle of St.* Peter 2. 14. *explained. The former aſſertions proved againſt Mr.* Hobbs, *by the authority of St.* Baſil, *St.* Chryſoſtome, *St.* Hierom, *and St.* Auguſtin *The authors ſence of theſe words,* tibi ſoli peccavi. *Mr.* Hobbs *his variation from the authority and reading of* England. *The former concluſions recapitulated and aſſerted againſt Mr.* Hobbs *from the meaning of this text.*

A *And yet to God; becauſe* David *was Gods Subject, and prohibited all iniquity by the law of nature.*] Well, now let us conſider, why this was iniquity; for no other reaſon certain-

certainly but becauſe it was injuſtice done to another man. The law of nature preſcribes all, (and nothing but) in juſtice: if it be towards God it is called religion, which payes to God the duty which we owe him, and is ſet down in the four firſt commandements of the Decalogue; but all the juſtice which is due to man, is ſet down in the ſix latter. I muſt then tell him, that that act of Murther in *David* was not a ſin againſt God, but only out of regard that it was an injury to man; for, therefore the law of nature written in mens hearts, and the poſitive law of God was againſt it, becauſe it was unjuſt for man to do it; ſo that the reaſon why it was an offence againſt God, being only, becauſe it was an injury to man, it muſt follow that it cannot be an injury to God, but it muſt likewiſe be an injury to man. I, but (ſaith he) *it was againſt God, becauſe King* David *was Gods ſubject.* Yet give me leave, although King *David* was Gods ſubject, yet it doth not follow that in murthering his fellow ſubjects he did no injury to them, no more than the Kings ſubjects, officers or Judges under him may be ſaid in condemning innocent blood to injure only the King, and not the perſon whom he ſo murthered: it is moſt evident therefore, that that ſin was againſt both God and man. But he brings ſcripture for what he writes: *which diſtinction,* David *himſelf when he repented the fact, evidently confirmed, ſaying, To thee only have I ſinned.* Which text you may read *Pſalm.* 51. 4. and to underſtand the ſence of it, let us reflect upon the ſtory of this *Pſalm,* as it is recorded, with 2 *Sam.* 12. where we may obſerve, that after he had committed theſe hainous ſins of adultery and murther, God ſent *Nathan* the *Prophet* to him, and he told *David* his own ſtory, under a Parable of a Rich man, who took a poor mans lamb from him to entertain his friend with it. This was a picture of *Davids* crime; was not this injuſtice? Conſider then in the 9. *verſe,* where he acquaints the King with Gods ſentence againſt him, he doth not lay to his charge only that he had offended God, but that he had killed *Uriah* the *Hittite* with the ſword, and had taken his wife to be his wife, and had ſlain him with the ſword of the Children of *Ammon*: ſo that the

ſins

ſins of *David* were againſt men; for though all ſin is againſt God, even the treſpaſs againſt men is therefore a ſin, becauſe againſt Gods law; yet it is a ſin againſt men, and therefore prohibited by Gods law becauſe unjuſt to men. I ſpeak of all ſuch ſins, which are *ſuâ naturâ* in their own nature ſins, of which kind murther is; then let us look to the 14. *verſe* of this *Pſalm*. Deliver me from blood-guiltineſs O God. Blood-guiltineſs, what is that? Nothing but the guilt of that ſin which he had committed by that murtherous act of killing *Uriah*, and therefore as a murtherer is guilty of the crime, untill he is abſolved of his Judge, and his only Judge God Almighty had acquitted him; he untill then was guilty of blood, of murthering *Uriah*. Well then undoubtedly that was an unjuſt act, let Mr. *Hobbs* ſay what he will or can. But I will do him right, he goes not alone in this opinion; but hath St. *Ambroſe*, a perſon of great honour both for judgment and integrity, along with him; and becauſe I will urge this argument to the full, I will ſay he was no Court paraſite; one who would flatter Kings into ſin, as was evident in that conteſt he had with the Emperour *Theodoſius*, in which was apparent both an incomparable *Emperour*, and a pious and zealous Prelate. This St. *Ambroſe* utters ſome things in his book called *Apologia David* like Mr. *Hobbs*, where in his tenth Chap. at the beginning he expounds theſe words [*tibi ſoli peccavi*] *Rex utique erat, nullis ipſe legibus tenebatur*, I have ſinned only to thee, for he was a King, he was held or confined by no laws; becauſe (ſaith he) Kings are free from the bonds of laws, neither by any laws are they called to puniſhment, being ſafe by the power of Empire. This a man would think abundantly full, but yet he never uſed Mr. *Hobbs* his Phraſe, to ſay he did not unjuſtly. But his firſt ſpeech muſt be underſtood that he was not with held by any humane laws: for Mr. *Hobbs* confeſſeth that he is reſponſable for the breach of divine laws, by the law of nature. Secondly, that ſpeech of his, that Kings are freed from the bonds of their faults; that muſt be underſtood of ſuch bonds, as impriſonments, or ſuch puniſhments which by humane laws are injoyned offenders; and that is clearly expounded

pounded by his laſt ſentence, that they are by no laws called to puniſhment, being ſafe in the power of Empire, that is, ſafe from the queſtioning of their ſubjects; ſo that his whole ſence is this, That *David* as a King was not reſponſable for his ſubjects to any man, nor lyable to any puniſhment for them. I could ſpeak more to this, and ſhew how that S. *Ambroſe* produced another expoſition preſently after: but certainly neither he nor any man but Mr. *Hobbs* will ſay it was not injuſtice; it is *ſuâ naturâ* unjuſt, to puniſh with the greateſt puniſhment, death, an innocent perſon. Nor doth his being a King, make it leſs injuſtice, but rather aggravate it; becauſe his chief office under God, and for which he is conſtituted by God, is, to diſtribute juſtice equally, and reward the vertuous, and puniſh the evil, as St. *Paul* excellently and clearly ſpeaks, *Rom.* 13. 4. He is the miniſter of God to thee for Good (that is, to thee who doſt that which is good, as he ſpeaks in the 3. *verſe*) but if thou doſt evil be afraid, for he beareth not the ſword in vain, for he is the miniſter of God; a Revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. So likewiſe St. *Peter* 1. *Epiſt.* 2. 14. makes it their buſineſs to puniſh evil doers, and the praiſe of them who do well. Now if theſe be the contents of the commiſſion from God to theſe his Deputies, they muſt needs be guilty of injuſtice who puniſh *citra condignum*, where there was no deſert of it; and they who are Kings, ſo much the more, by how much it is their particular duty to take care of the contrary. I have now cleared the ſence of S. *Ambroſe* as I gueſs, but leſt any ſtruple might remain from his authority, with any man, who might miſtake his ſence, I will therefore weigh down the Scales with the weights of others, his near contemporaries, of no leſs honour in Chriſtendom than himſelf. And the firſt I ſhall preſent you with, is St. *Baſil*, the great, (ſo he is called) in his *ſcholia* upon this verſe of this *Pſalm*: *Tibi ſoli peccavi cùm multis & magnis donis tuis ſum poſitus*: Since I enjoy many and great gifts of thine, but have returned contrary things: he doth not ſay here that he had not ſinned againſt *Uriah*; he had indeed offended againſt him, and againſt his wife, but the greateſt prevarication was committed

mitted againſt God himſelf, who had choſen him, and conſtituted him King, and therefore he rightly added, and done this evil in thy ſight; thus far St. *Baſil*. The next which I ſhall produce, ſhall be St. *Chryſoſtom* upon this *Pſalm*, and this verſe, and he agrees very much with St. *Baſil*. To thee only have I ſinned, Many (ſaith he) and great benefits have I received from thee, but I have returned them with contrary things, for theſe things which by thy law are interdicted, I have not doubted to commit: neither doth he ſay, that I have not hurt *Uriah*, for he had both hurt him and his wife, but the greateſt iniquity was againſt God. Thus far St. *chryſoſtum*. Next conſider St. *Hierom*; *Tibi ſolùm peccavi*, to thee only have I ſinned, for to thee every man ſins when he ſins, becauſe thou art only without ſin, as the Apoſtle ſpeaks, *Rom*. 3. 4. God is true but every man a lyar; or elſe *David* ſaith, I have ſinned and thou only art without ſin, as ſaith the Prophet *Iſaiah* 53. Who did no ſin nor was guile found in his mouth. St. *Auguſtin* likewiſe harps upon the ſame ſtring. To thee only have I ſinned, and done this evil in thy ſight, what is this, ſaith that heavenly man? Had not he adulterated anothers wife and ſlain her husband? Did not all men know what *David* had done? What is that he ſaith then, to thee only have I ſinned, and done this evil in thy ſight? (He anſwers) becauſe thou only art without ſin; he is a juſt puniſher who hath nothing in himſelf to be puniſhed; he is a juſt reprehender who hath nothing in himſelf to be reprehended. Here you may ſee how holy and learned men (living near together about one time with St. *Ambroſe*, men famous in their generations, and to whom the Church of Chriſt owes exceeding much for the propagation of the Goſpel) gave their ſenſe of this text of ſcripture as well as he; and St. *Auguſtin* was one who honoured St. *Ambroſe* living and dead: yet you ſee varies from him in his judgment in this point. Give me leave to ſhew my ſenſe of theſe words and then conclude. And firſt I will allow *Mr. Hobbs* his reading, *to thee*, which is not according to our tranſlation, which is *againſt thee*; and certainly by men learned in the *Hebrew* both amongſt the ancient and modern writers, with

a great content it is acknowledged to be true; yet it profits his cause nothing to read it as he doth; insomuch that *Bellarmine* in his Comment upon this *Psalm*, saith, To thee only have I sinned; he doth not say, against thee only; he had offended against *Uriah*, against *Bathsheba*, he had scandalized the people; but to thee only, as Judge, and none else can judge and condemn me, as he illustrates it. So that although Mr. *Hobbs* varies from his own rule of scripture, yet he gets nothing to his cause by it. But to proceed in expounding; I ask leave and beg pardon of such eminent men from whom I may seem to differ; for my part, I do not think that *David* here acts the part of a King, or so much as thinks of his great Regality (if he did, it was to aggravate not to extenuate his sin) but of a penitent; and in his penitence is a pattern to other men, as well as Kings, how they should demean themselves; even Kings in those duties are reconciling themselves to their King, in respect of whom they are poor and mean people; and if they should consider themselves Kings, they should by this increase their humility, considering that he who owes so much to God should be so ungrateful and unmindful of him, The Prophet therefore now considering his offence to God cryes out. To thee only have I sinned; before, *Nathan* the Prophet had visited him, and told him of his faults, he thought he had sinned only to man, and therefore to hide his first sin with *Bathsheba*, he added another of murther, by which he thought his shame of the other might be hid from men, which was possible; but now clean contrary when he is acquainted with the wrath of God for his sin, now he cares not for his sin to men, so he may be right with God, and to that end penned this *Psalm*, to be sung in Churches; and to God utters those lamentable complaints; that he is besmeared with blood; that his bones are broken; that he hath need of Gods great and many mercies; that his heart is broke, yea contrite; that he is all unclean and must be washed, and washed again; that he begs God to purge and make him clean, although with hyssop and sharp medicines. Here is the perfect character of a true penitent; many a man is sorry for his sin, because it breeds him shame and world-

wordly evil; but this doth him no good: but King *David* is grieved for sin because sin; because against Gods law which he hath transgressed; he cares not what this world thinks of him, so God be appeased and reconciled to him; and therefore that this may be done, he only begs his pardon and thinks only of him, To thee only &c. do thou acquit me, I care for nothing else. And surely, this is the most certain test of a true repentance, when a man grieves that he hath offended God, and values nothing but that offence; not that *Bathsheba* was a woman which he injured, but that he took the members of God and made them the members of an harlot; not that *Uriah* was a man, and that a gallant person, but that he was the Image of God, which he destroyed: those and the like meditations are the issues of true and hearty repentance; but yet consider, (as I have said before) these things were sins to God, and God is therefore offended with them because they are breaches of his laws concerning man with man in particular; you may find this most emphatically expressed by *Nathan* in the pronouncing Gods sentence against *David*, where the punishment is proportioned to the offence, 2 *Sam.* 12. 10. Now therefore because thou hast killed *Uriah* the *Hittite* with the sword of the *Ammonites*, as it was expressed in the 9. *verse*, therefore the sword shall never depart from thy house: then for his sin with *Bathsheba*, *verse* 11. and 12. I will take thy wives before thine eyes and give them to thy neighbour, and he shall lye with them in the sight of the sun, for thou didst it secretly, but I will do this thing before all Israel, and before the sun. Then, because by this deed he had given great occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme, his child by her was adjudged to death, as it is in the 14. *verse*. So that it is evident by his punishments that he sinned against men; and it is a most vain thing to collect from hence that a King can do no injustice to his subjects, for certainly it is injustice in a King to butcher barbarously any man, which without danger he may save, how much more his own subjects which he is bound to preserve, and his vertuous subjects whom he ought to reward. I have been long in this: Mr. *Hobbs* hath another in-

ſtance for the lawfulneſs of ſupremes to do any thing without injuſtice.

CHAP. XX.

SECT. V.

Mr. Hobbs *his inſtance of the Common-wealth of* Athens *examined.*

IN the ſame manner the people of Athens, when they baniſhed the moſt potent of their Common-wealth for ten years, thought they committed no injuſtice. The Athenians thought ſo; but doth Mr. *Hobbs* think ſo? For although he brings this for an argument to prove the arbitrary power which Supremes have over their Subjects lives, yet the ſcorn he puts upon it within few lines (which I ſhall ſpeedily mention) ſhews his contempt of it; and no doubt, but the Athenians themſelves, although in the doing of it were delighted with ſuch acts of power, yet when it was done, and the lack of ſuch a worthy perſon to aſſiſt at the helme of the State, did make them ſenſible of the unhappineſs of that act; they would repent of it and deteſt it, and find it is moſt unjuſt and imprudent; unjuſt, becauſe diſtributive juſtice ought with all careſſes and politick bleſſings to reward vertuous men; but to baniſh them is a heavy puniſhment due to evil doers; and it is imprudent to baniſh ſuch, for by that means the Common-wealth loſeth his aſſiſtance and perhaps finds that man an unhappy enemy, who would have been a ſtedfaſt friend. He goes on. *And yet they never queſtioned what crime he had done, but what hurt he would do,* No, they never queſtioned what he had done, or what he would do; for how could *Ariſtides* (whoſe glory conſiſted in juſtice not in armes) be miſtruſted to endeavour hurt to the ſtate? for that vertue (which he was ſo honoured for,) is ſo far from deſtroying, that it is the very ſoul and life of a Common-wealth, or rather I may term it, the ſpirits, which under the ſoul act with every part in the performance of their ſeveral

veral duties, and where that is lacking, the inhabitants of a Common-wealth will be like walls built with loose stones without mortar, which with ordinary storms will fall asunder and perish. I will not trouble my self with the words which follow; briefly he instanceth in Ostracism which was used there, by which sometimes an *Aristides* was banished for his vertue and justice; sometimes a scurrilous Jester as *Hyperbolus*. Let us consider this Ostracism, that is a legal act proper to that government, not a meer arbitrary, but a legal priviledge granted the people, that when there was an occasion of any such danger, they had their votes in it. Now the proposition by him to be proved was that such *an act as this might justly be done by the supreme only by his will*, which can never by any Logick be inforced hence; and yet I can say further, that even the laws of forraign nations may be censured by such as are not subject to them, and have been in all ages without breach of duty or civility. I joyn this therefore with that other *Grecian* city famous for its politie, that of *Lacedæmon*, in which it was one of the *arcana imperii*, that when their country tenants grew too numerous, that they feared they might endanger the City, they would in a night go out, and slay thousands of them; this was a most barbarous thing, for subjects lives should be tender to Magistrates, and the lives of vertuous subjects pretious; and therefore I fear this *Athenian* custom of Ostracism is the worse, because an *Aristides* was worth thousands of common people, and therefore think such a law was most unworthy a wise state, and not fit to be acted in any where there is no law for it.

CHAP.

CHAP. XX.

SECT. VI.

This paragraph, giving liberty to a person justly condemned, to resist the execution of the sentence given against him, the grand incitement to rebellion; contrary to the dictate of St. Paul, *and practice of eminent Martyrs.*

I Pass from this to page (111.) In the midst of that page having discoursed of the liberty of subjects, how that they have right to any such thing which they have not passed away by covenant, he at the end of that page seems to give instances thus. *If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned) to kill, wound, or maim himself; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the liberty to disobey.* Truly in my judgement some pieces of this are great encouragements to Treason; as that particle, *to resist them who assault him.* Certainly if a man may do it for his own defence, he may do it for others, who are men of a like condition in their humanitie, and it may be, in their sin; and then it must follow where are many guilty persons they may lawfully combine and stand to each other in their defence; and in order to that, do what mischief they can for their safety. Now St. *Paul* seemed to be of another mind when *Act.* 25. 11. he told *Festus*, if I have committed any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to dye; it is a sign of a rebellious spirit to resist authority, to which he should be subject; and for ought I know, the pretence of most rebellions in the world, is their own defence, against imagined personal dangers. Had his doctrine be true, the Crown of Martyrdom had lost those thousands who filled the *Roman Army*, and could by this pretence have defended themselves; they

they chose rather to water and fructifie the seed of Gods word by their blood; they thought it an injust war, to defend their just lives; how much more in an unjust cause should men less dare to do it?

CHAP. XX.

SECT. VII.

Mr. Hobbs *his institution of a Common-wealth again examined and censured. The absurdity and evil consequences of his doctrine.*

WE pass now to his page 112. in the 7. line. *Again, the consent of a Subject to Soveraign power, is contained in these words, I authorise, or take upon me, all his actions.* I have already and I think fully treated of the follies, weakness and wickedness of this imagination of his heretofore, which he makes the foundation of his whole Politiques. He proceeds; *in which there is no restriction at all of his own former natural liberty.* What an impious proposition is this? that he who had before affirmed, that man by nature had right to any goods, any life, any thing which conduced to his own contented life before a Common-wealth was instituted, hath now, by these words which institute and give form and being to his doctrine of a Common-wealth; these, not liberties only, but licenses, but abominations must not be abridged or restrained. But mark his reason---*for* (saith he) *by allowing him to kill me, I am not bound to kill my self when he commands me.* So that it seems, the authorizing he speaks of is of the supremes actions, not his commands; and then surely his former proposition is not good, *men are restrained by nothing of the Soveraign commands, where his own interest is personally opposed to it.* If this be not insufferable doctrine in any well governed Common-wealth, I know not what is; for by this any man may act any thing which may conduce to his contented living; nay,

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what is more, he hath right to do it; and if ſo, what a condition would a Common-wealth be in? a King according to his doctrine may without injuſtice kill any man which he thinks fit, and a ſubject hath right to kill him when he thinks it conduceth to his good; for naturally every man hath this right by his doctrine, and ſo cannot be ſuppoſed by any contract to part from his natural right; all this is evident out of the beginning of the 14. Chap. where he defines the right of nature thus, *The right of nature, which writers commonly call* jus naturale, *is the liberty each man hath to uſe his own power, as he will himſelf, for the preſervation of his own nature, that is to ſay of his own life, and conſequantly of doing any thing which in his own judgement, and reaſon, he ſhall conceive to be the apteſt means to conduce thereto.* And there is much more to this purpoſe, of which I have already treated in my notes upon that Chap. So that it is clear by his doctrine, That the conſtitution of a Common-wealth enables the Soveraign to act nothing by right, more than another man, becauſe that conſtitution doth not reſtrain the right of nature, and the right of nature impowers every man to act any thing which ſhall appear to him for his particular advantage, by his Book: I ſhall treat no more of this now.

CHAP.

CHAP. XX.

SECT. VIII.

Mr. Hobbs *his contradictions discovered and censured. His conclusions tending to disloyalty.*

I Will step to the next paragraph; but first consider that in the beginning of this I last discourſed about, he saith, *The consent of a subject to soveraigne power is contained in these words, [I authorise, and take upon me all his actions.* Now in this he saith, *No man is bound by the words themselves either to kill himself, or any other man*; and consequently the obligation a man may sometimes have, (upon the command of the Soveraign) to execute any dangerous or dishonourable affair, dependeth not upon the words of our submission, but on the intention, which is to be understood by the end thereof. Mark, Reader, how immediately he contradicts himself, first his *consent is contained in these words* &c. Secondly it is not contained in the words but *in the intention which is to be understood by the end thereof.* He indeed put them both together in the preceding page towards the bottom of that page, and there you may find him telling what the end is, *Namely the peace of the subjects within themselves and their defence against a common enemy.* Now then since he gives the subject this latitude of interpreting the commands of his soveraign, it is not credible that he will judge his own ruine or hurt, or that of his Father, Wife, Children, dear Friends shall conduce to the peace of the subjects within themselves; so that there then he hath safe refuge for mischiefe by right, and he may refuse to obey upon such grounds as he speaks, and do it rightly.

CHAP. XXI.

Liberty given to criminals to assist one another against the sword of justice, the greatest incentive to the late rebellion. The murther of Charles *the first legitimated by Mr.* Hobbs *his conclusions.*

I Wish my self at an end of this, but his gross errors make me stop at more particulars than I intended. Look down towards the conclusion of this page you shall find that at the beginning of that paragraph he concluded it unjust in the defence of another man to resist the sword of the Common-wealth. But (saith he) *in case a great many men together have already resisted the soveraign power unjustly, or committed some capital crime, for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the libertie then to joyne together and assist and defend one another? Certainly they have; for they but defend their lives, which the guilty may as well do, as the innocent.* Let the Reader consider here what a justification this was of those men who bore unjust armes at that time when he writ this book in English. It is true he allows the first rising to be unjust, but all that damnable prosecution of that war, even that act which I never think upon but with horror, the murther of king *Charles* the first was lawful by him, for when they had drawn their swords in rebellion, their lives were forfeited, and then all the future prosecution was just because in defence of their lives. I but page. 113. (where I am at the bottom of that paragraph) he gives a fair pretence for what he speaks: which is, *The offer of pardon taketh from them to whom it is offered, the plea of self defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting, or defending the rest, unlawful.* A goodly piece of nicetie! if a soveraign do not give his subjects pardon for their rebellion

bellion, they may continue on; and only the first act is unjust; all other murthers, rapines, iniquities of men are not to be reckoned in the catalogue of unjust actions; as if one sin preceding, which causeth the following, might also justifie them: and for offering pardon, he knows they have answered, that that cannot serve them, as long as there is power in the offended partie to make his revenge, and justifie his proceeding against them; and unless they take away that, there is no security for them. These things I thought to have passed by; but being so abominable, it was necessary to lay hold upon them, at the least with this animadversion. And now I pass over twenty more, and leap to his 26. Chap. 148.

CHAP. XXII.

SECT. I.

Mr. Hobs *his endeavour to render the Christian religion suspected. Of the assurance we have of revelations. The difference of assurance from the object, from the acts. Assurance from science, from opinion, from faith. The assurance of faith greater than that of science. The assurance we have of the truth of Christian religion by divine revelation, from the things themselves revealed, from the manner of their delivery, and the persons who delivered them to us. The particulars of the creation described by* Moses, *not possible to be known without divine revelation. An argument from reason to confirm the former assertion.*

WHich Chap. is entitled of Civil laws, but treats of all laws, and divers distinctions of them, but in this page about the middle of the page he enters into a discourse of divine positive laws, which he distinguisheth

from natural laws, *that the one are eternal* (I will cavil at nothing) *that is, he means, always consisting with men to whom they are given; the other had a beginning; the one are universal to all men that have humane nature;* but (he saith) the positive *are instituted in time, and to particular persons or nations, and declared for such by those, whom God hath authorised to declare them. But* (saith he) *this authority of man to declare what be these positive laws of God how can it be known? God may command a man by a supernatural way, to deliver laws to other men. But because it is of the essence of laws, that he who is to be obliged, be assured of the authority of him that declareth it, which we cannot naturally take notice to be from God.* I transcribe all this, because the reader by it should understand from what ground he raiseth two questions, which he answering unchristianly, will require a better satisfaction from my pen. The questions are these. *How can a man without supernatural revelation be assured of the revelation received by the declarer? and how can he be bound to obey them?* Two noble questions to be disputed against heathens, and because upon all occasions he takes advantage to make himself seem such, (*whether he be or no, God knows*) I shall endeavour to refute him; But withall give the reader this caution that throughout his Book he violently forceth himself to such disputes as may render Christian religion suspected, as if he had an ambition to make this, Bable shall I say, or impious treatise of his, to be authentick; for what necessity had he here to raise those doubts? It had been enough for him and his whole design to shew that the holy Bible had manifested those positive laws to us, and never to have raised such scruples whereby a man may doubt (as it seems he doth) whether these laws are divine or not. Consider therefore his answer for the first question, *how a man can be assured of the revelation of another, without a revelation particularly to himself, it is evidently impossible*; and I answer it is possible; we will try it out; and first let us consider this leading term for this discourse, which is [*assured*] *how a man can be assured*; the power of that word must be explained. There is a diversity of assurances, Mathematical,

thematical, physical, moral, all which have their several force, and differ only by degrees. In the first kind we are assured that two and two make four; and the like; in the second that fire will burn, whose nature doth (if not hindred) break out into that act; in the third that when I see a debauched man stay with a company of drunkards a long time at a Tavern I can be assured that they will be inflamed with drink; so likewise when a pious man hears the bell toll to prayers, he will go to Church. Thus our assurance is varied, according to the object which it is busied about. But there is another diversity drawn from the difference of this act, which produceth assurance; as thus, there is an assurance from science, from opinion, from faith. The certainty of science is drawn from the certainty of the medium by which it is proved, and is exceeding great; by some esteemed greater than that of faith; at the least of a greater evidence; although for my part I am not of that mind; for it being a most clear and absolute truth that God is infinitely *verax* as well as *verus*, true speaking, as well as true being, and faith (I mean divine faith) being an adhesion to what God speaks, it is not possible to be a falsehood, & then there is the greatest argumentative evidence that can be of the truth of such a proposition which God hath delivered: but I will not involve my self in niceties. That which is proper to my immediate discourse is, that science is, from natural operations, of natural causes; faith (divine faith) from supernatural, from God; which must be more certain in it self, & by faith made more certain to us; opinion is only probable, which may be other; and this probability either relates to science, as it is probable such causes will produce such effects, or such effects proceed; from such causes or else it relates to faith, and it is then, when a good honest man speaks any thing, it is by faith probable to be true; but yet it may be otherwise; only divine faith admitts of no falsehood in its self, and requires no doubting or hesitation in us. Now although this assurance of opinion and probability be the least, yet it yields us such an assurance, as we build the greatest moral and politick actions (which are practised amongst us) upon it. As when a man is dead, his hand

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and ſeale paſſeth away his eſtate; witneſſes are dead likewiſe; theſe are probable arguments only; but being the greateſt that the ſubject queſtion can yield, the greateſt matters muſt be regulated by ſuch probable arguments. I can ſay the like of oathes, they have neither a Phyſical certainty, nor do they produce a divine faith; but yet when we have hand and ſeal, and Oath, Mr. *Hobbs* will not ſay I think, that we have no aſſurance. How then can he ſay that we have no aſſurance that theſe are divine revelations, which are delivered in the Bible? (for that is the ſence of the queſtion which he propoſeth) but that we have great aſſurance is that which I affirm. I ſhall not here meddle with School niceties, nor with any thing about infuſed faith, but only the acquired faith, which we have of theſe truths. Many learned men have debated this queſtion with great variety of Learning, which may be peruſed in their Comments upon the 3. of the ſentences *Diſt.* 24. as likewiſe many times in *Prolog.* and 22. of *Aquinas*, queſtion, 1. as alſo in 1ma. *ſecundæ*, with many particular treatiſes to that purpoſe. I turn the reader to theſe places which with eaſe he may peruſe, and find amongſt them, what he reads not with me, who intend to deliver ſuch things here, as they have ſcarce touched upon. My arguments ſhall be drawn, firſt from the things delivered in this book; Then from the manner of the delivery, and Thirdly from the perſons who delivered theſe things; in all which I ſhall not meddle with thoſe particular Books, or Chapters of Books which are controverted betwixt us and the Church of *Rome*; I think it incomparably handled by my much honoured and truly Reverend Brother *Iohn Lord* Biſhop of *Durham*; but my deſign is to ſhew that the bulke of Chriſtianity and our faith is delivered in ſuch a manner, in reſpect of the things delivered, of the manner of the delivery, and of the perſons who delivered them, that it is moſt rational for a man to aſſure himſelf that theſe were divine revelations, if it be not abſolutely impoſſible that they ſhould be other. I will begin with the things delivered; and firſt with the beginning of the Bible, the firſt book of *Moſes*, the 1. Chap. of *Geneſis*, where we find the Creation ſo delivered,

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as it was not possible for man to do it without revelation. Men might, and men have by reason (even Philosophers) guessed and proved that the world was created; but to say when, and set it down in such a method, as that a man may find the year in which it was done, this was never undertaken by any, nor could any man do it, but by divine revelation. Yet you may think, that *Adam* being made a perfect man, might know the instant when he first appeared in the world, and communicate that to *Seth*, and he downward: but could *Adam*, without revelation, know, that he was made of earth? Nay could *Adam*, without revelation, know, how *Evah* was taken out of him, or all the works of God which were wrought in the 6. dayes before he was made? this could not be, this story of the Creation must need be a revelation, no man of himself could search it out. But I am afraid Mr. *Hobbs* will say, it is false; no Christian ever said it was so, but I suppose my self to have to do with an heathen, not an *Atheist* but a *Theist* at the best. Well then, it is most reasonable for any man to think, this story to be true; because it is rational for a man to think, that since God will and must be worshipped by men, and it is impossible for men to know, what worship is proper to be given him, unless he tells them; It is then most reasonable for a man to think, that God will prescribe how that worship is to be performed, and therefore caused this whole book to be writ for mens instruction; and in it sets down this work of his creation, to shew man the foundation of all his duty, from whence it is derived, that he owes God his being, soul, and Body; that he should be humble, who was taken out of the dust, and to dust he must return, that he that made him can destroy him, and the like; which God being pretended to do no where else, it is most reasonable to think it is done here.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

SECT. II.

The doctrine of the new Teſtament, and particularly the incarnation of our bleſſed Saviour, and the manner of it not poſſible to be known without a revelation. The truth of the incarnation evicted from the miraculous Life and Actions of our bleſſed Saviour, and the prophecies of the Old Teſtament, and eſpecially of Ilaias. *The Jewes witneſſes of the truth of the Books of the Old Teſtament.*

SO then this being a truth fit for a man to know, it being impoſſible for man to know it without a revelation, a man may juſtly be aſſured that it was revealed by God, and ſo I will paſs to the New Teſtament where we will conſider the conception of the bleſſed Virgin as related there, and ſo not poſſible to be recorded, but from a divine revelation. Men might be aſſured from the Prophets who writ before of it, that there ſhould be ſuch a thing, and that it ſhould be about that time; but that it ſhould happen now, and that this ſhould be the Virgin which ſhould be the mother of our Saviour, that none could tell but by revelation, no not ſhe her ſelf. It is true, when ſhe found her ſelf with child, ſhe might wonder how that ſhould come about, ſince ſhe knew not man; as ſhe anſwered the Angel who foretold it to her *Luke the* 1. *and the* 24. but that it ſhould be ſo contrived and perfected as it was by the overſhadowing of the Higheſt, this ſhe could not have known, but by a revelation. But I doubt Mr. *Hobbs* will anſwer this was not ſo, his wicked wit ſeems to imagine ſuch a thing, I will prove it therefore by the glorious fruit of her womb, which ſhewed it ſelf to ariſe from ſuch a ſtock, and living and dying as he did, he could not be leſs than deſcended from ſuch a ſupernatural generation.

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Well then, he was so conceived as is taught; and this could not be taught but by divine revelation, therefore he who taught it had divine revelation. I must not spend time in particulars; look upon all the Prophecies in the whole Book of God, so many, as their time is expired, we find them all fulfilled; the Prophecies made to *Abraham*, of the children of *Israels* long captivity in *Egypt*, and their extraction thence, and plantation in the land of *Canaan*, of all the great transactions of the highest affairs of the world; The erection and destruction of all the great Monarchies which were punctually foretold and accomplished, and foretold long before; could these be foretold by any other way than by divine revelation? Certainly it could not be; nor can the wit of man think how it should be done. *Jaddus* the high Priest shewed *Alexander* his own story foretold by *Daniel*. Let us consider how the Prophets long before prophesied of Christ, how the Prophet *Isaiah* writ like an antedated Evangelist, differing only in these words [shall and did] only in the time. Let us consider, how not only those great and remarkable passages, of his birth, his miracles, his death, his resurrection, (but even such little things as the piercing of his side, the parting of his garment, & casting lots for his vesture, his burial, were foretold hundreds of yeares before. Let Mr. *Hobbs* or any other heathen tell me how these could be foretold without divine revelation. But perhaps he will say, as before, these were not true books nor prophecies, but fained since Christianity. No, even the Jewes themselves yet remaining in the world do consent unto them, and are preserved by God, a glorious witness of these truths, who are the greatest enemies of Christianity.

X CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

SECT. III.

The former assertion further proved from the piety of the doctrines taught in the scriptures, and excellency of the matter contained in them. The power of the word of God, and efficacy of Scripture above the reach of Philosophie.

But then consider the doctrines taught here, they are so full of religious piety to God, so full of such excellent moral conversation betwixt men, that the wit of man could not invent them, there must needs be divine revelation in them; there was never any thing delivered by men, meer men, without divine revelation, that had not imperfections in it; he who reads the Philosophers may find it. I do not love to rake their Dunghills, and shew their filth; but the duties taught in this book are so divine, and so like God, from whence they came, that they are able to make a man absolutely good if practised. Wherefore as a tree may be known by its fruits, as the heart of man by his language; so these Books may be known to be Gods by the heavenliness of the matters delivered in them; which have such a power of sanctity in them, as is able to make such as receive them of a more Godly disposition than other men; yea than themselves, at other times, before they received these doctrines. I could treat of a strange Metamorphosis in *Saul* to *Paul*, who was a persecutor, a destroyer, and when converted with this doctrine accounted it joy to suffer and be persecuted for this cause. As also of King *David*, who to hide the shame of his adultery, committed Murther, and slept securely in his sin; yet when awakened from that stupidity he was in, and taught his state by the Prophet *Nathan*, he cares for no shame of this world, so God be pleased, cares for nothing but the shame of his sin, and made his penitence for it to be chaunted out in all ages, for all Churches in the 51. *Psalm*. So that there is a strange power and force in the word of God

to turn men to godliness, which no other hath; And the great and mighty effects wrought by this scripture, do fully evince it to be divine, having divine power annexed to them. Thus having shewed that the doctrines contained in scripture are fit for a man to believe they are divine, and by divine revelation, yea that they could not proceed from a pen which was not guided and assisted by the holy spirit, we therefore may have assurance that they were such. I shall come next to shew how we may be further assured from the manner of their delivery.

CHAP. XXII.

SECT. IV.

The second Argument from the difference of the Style of the Scriptures from the books of Philosophers. The propositions and conclusions in Scripture not so much deduced from reason, as asserted from the Majesty of God, not disputing or endeavouring to perswade, but commanding to do. The rewards and punishments proposed in scripture of eternal truth, impossible to be propounded, or given but by God himself.

LEt a man look upon all the doctrines of the Philosophers concerning God, his essence, his attributes, concerning the Creation, we shall find that they laboured still to prove what they spoke, and by reason to convince mans understanding. Only I must confess, *Trismegistus* in his Pomander makes his discourse which is most divine to be revelation (and four ought I know it may be so, much of it) but otherwise they all go upon ratiocination; and the reason is, because such things ought not to be assented to which are not either proved or revealed by God, which is the most invincible evidence that any truth can have. But now *Moses* and those holy writers inspired by God in their compiling those holy Books only affirm this, and this with-

out arguing the reasons of it, because they were divine, not humane words; likewise in all those moral duties, which concern men, they are writ with the majesty of the King of Kings and Lord of Lords, Do this or this, not disputing, as *Plato* and *Aristotle*, how it conduceth to the present happiness, but exacting obedience. It is true when the Prophets disputed with the Gentiles, or Apostles with Jewes or Gentiles who believed not their report, they confuted the one by reason, or out of their own authors, and the other out of the former Scriptures; because all proofs must be made *ex concessis*, and out of such premisses they would confirm these Conclusions. God exacted a belief, and this he doth with the greatest arguments and most forcing that are possible, by *Præmium* and *Pœna* reward and punishment; but such as never King or Emperour either did or was able so propose, by eternal happiness or misery; which nothing can doe but God alone. And this is done to those who will receive, or not receive his word. Well, the words contained here are delivered with such an exaction as never man proposed the same truths in; and required with such promises, as never man did meet with nor could perform; we must needs therefore be assured they are divine.

CHAP. XXII.

SECT. V.

The third Argument from the sanctity and integrity of the persons who delivered these truths. The miraculous conduct of the Children of Israel *by* Moses. *The objection of his assertation, of dominion, answered. The predictions of the Prophets not possible without a divine revelation. The truth and certainty of their predictions objected.*

AND so I come to the persons who delivered these truths to us, who will give us as full assurance as any thing else of the

the certainty. The persons were of most eminent integrity, and affirmed that these writings were delivered them from God. I will begin with the first. *Moses* a man who approved his conversation with God, and Gods approbation of him by most certain signs; first by those mighty wonders which he wrought in *Ægypt* before *Pharaoh*, & upon him and his in their journey; afterwards by his wonderful conduct of the Children of *Israel* through the wilderness, the like of which was never known; The bringing water out of the rock, feeding that mighty Host with bread and flesh; the miraculous stopping the mouths of *Korah*, &c. why should we imagine that this man should lye, and say, he received this law from God, when he did not? Yes, to make himself King among them. Indeed the rebells (last spoke of) did object that, but God confuted it by a miraculous destroying them, and we see although whilst he lived he went betwixt God and them, delivering prayers to God for them, and bringing Gods will to them, yet we find not that he acquired any high matters for himself; the Priesthood which was to be a perpetual dignity he put *Aaron* into; the Politique government he bequeathed to *Josuah*; and we do not find him contriving more than an ordinary proportion for his Children, which shews that he had no self end in any thing he did. Nay we may read in the 32. of *Exodus*, 10. when *Moses* interceded with God for favour to the Children of *Israel*, God made him answer, *let me alone that my wrath may wax hot against them, and that I may consume them, and I will make of thee a great Nation*; Nevertheless *Moses* was not bribed with this for his own interest to forsake Gods glory: but presently after presseth God for his own honour to have pitty upon the *Israelites*, as you may read *vers.* 11. &c. where methinks he did like *Abraham* offer his whole posterity to Gods glory and honour; which sheweth that *Moses* had no *siniſter* ends in his actions, but only the glory of God; which certainly could not rise out of such a proud lye, as to take upon him divine revelations, where there were none.

Next let us consider the Prophets, they were men that adventured their lives and suffered miseries for those truths they foretold and taught; yea they were sure of it; and they

they who followed their counſels according to theſe revelations which God made to them, it was well with them; and miſchief followed them who did otherwiſe. Thoſe things which they foretold did come to paſs accordingly, both concerning the Jewes and all other nations, yea the whole world; why ſhould not we be aſſured that theſe things came from God, which they ſay were revealed by him, ſince we ſee them true in all thoſe works which they foreſpoke of?

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SECT. VI.

Of the doctrine of the Apoſtles, the efficacy of their preaching; The power of Tongues, their ſufferings and patience, not poſſible but from divine inſpiration. A further aſſertion of the ſame argument à poſteriori, *ſuch effect not producible but from a divine law.*

IF we deſcend to the Apoſtles we ſhall find they were a ſort of men of mean extraction and education; how could it be poſſible that they unleſs by revelation, ſhould attain to ſuch an efficacy of preaching, as to be able to convince the whole world, and preach this divine Philoſophy? How came they by the power of Tongues to be able to travel through the world, and preach to every man in his own language, but by the ſupernatural aſſiſtance of the Holy Ghoſt? Why would they undertake the work through ſuch cruel perſecutions foretold them, that they ſhould be as ſheep amongſt wolves, but that it was a duty enjoyned them from the Holy Ghoſt? and they were ſure that he who promiſed it, would make good their reward in heaven hereafter, for here they were to have miſeries. Truly I know not what can be oppoſed againſt this, but that both from the matters delivered, rom the manner that they are delivered by, and from the perſons who delivered them, we have as great an aſſurance that theſe truths were revealed

revealed to them by God, as can be wrought by humane faith. Yea but let us consider further, and it is scientifical *à posteriori*, from the effect to the cause; for if it be not possible that these effects should come from any cause but God, as indeed I think it not possible, then it is demonstrated that these must be revelations, and we have a mighty assurance of them.

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SECT. VII.

Another argument, ad hominem, *Mr.* Hobbs *his assurance of his being born at* Malmsbury, *not comparable to this of the verity of the holy scriptures. Some doubts of the place of Mr.* Hobbs *his birth, from the erring of his doctrines from Christianity. The attestation of the Gospel from the sufferings of the Saints and Martyrs. The encrease and continuance of it in despite of persecution. The Scriptures not possible to be written by bad men, in regard their design is to destroy the Kingdom of Satan. Good men would not obtrude a Lye upon the world. Faith resolved into divine revelation. The rest is a preparation to this faith, and conclusion of this point.*

LEt Mr. *Hobbs* tell me, what assurance he hath of any thing? He saith in the beginning of this Book that he is *Thomas Hobbs* of *Malmsbury*; I think he is as sure of this as of any thing; but I am much surer, and so may any man be, that this Scripture was writ by divine revelation, than he can be of that; first for his place, that he was of *Malmsbury* which is a town in *Wiltshire*, where Christianity is professed, where men are assured of the Scriptures that they are by divine revelation, How should it breed such a monster, who would bring all their hopes of heaven, their faith in Gods promises to be dubious? as if they were not promised. But he is *Thomas Hobbs*, how knows he that? perhaps his mother told him so, and the midwife; I know not whether

whether after he came to the years of diſcretion, he ever talked with them; but if he did, it is but a weak Teſtimony in reſpect of ours which was and is affirmed by ſuch divine and incomparable perſons as the Apoſtles and Prophets were. His Mother, and the Midwife, although true perſons, yet were apt to be deceived, and it may be he was a ſuppoſititious Child; how oft have ſuch things been done? when contrariwiſe theſe men who have delivered infalible truths many ages before they came to paſs, cannot be conceived to have any Error. I, but perhaps, he will ſay, he is like his father in his countenance, in his ſpeech; certainly not ſo like, as theſe truths are to that incomparable eſſence, which we call God; than which nothing more fully expreſſed theſe divine perfections, unleſs it was his perſonal word. I, but his Chriſtening is regiſtred in the Church Book of *Malmsbury*, a good legal evidence; and perhaps he enjoyed his fathers eſtate by this; I know not, but certainly there is a poſſibility of Error in it, becauſe the Church Book may be counterfeited, and many a man hath intruded into other mens eſtates by unjuſt means; but our evidence is recorded (may I ſay) or ingraven in theſe volumes which have been atteſted in every age ſince the firſt writing with the Blood of many martyrs; which can be affirmed of no Church Book in the world; worms and Cankers may eat them, and thieves may break through and ſteal them and counterfeit them, but theſe are ſubject to no corruption, but by the providence of God have been, and will be preſerved ſo long as the world ſtands, and endures. So I think evidently that it appears that we have as full an aſſurance that theſe Scriptures are *Divine*, as men can have of any thing in this world which they receive by hear-ſay. Nay let us go further, & examine whether we have not a Demonſtration from the effect to the cauſe, we know ſuch a man was our friend by his voice when he ſpeaks, another by his ſtyle, as the report is of Sr. *Thomas Moore* with *Eraſmus, aut Eraſmus aut Diabolus*. Yea Critiques every where diſcerne Authors by their Styles; may not we, think you, diſcern God by theſe heavenly writings, which are more than humane? When we hear a man diſcourſing of high points in Philoſophy learnedly, we know ſuch an effect cannot proceed from a Country-education at the Cart and Plough, it requires another ſtudy and induſtry. When the Scripture teacheth us things

things higher than the natural wit of man can reach to, as I have shewed it must needs come from a higher strain than our natural Condition could deliver to us. I will conclude with one word; The Scriptures must be writ by good or ill men; ill men could not do it, it teacheth those doctrines which destroy the Devil, and his Kingdom, all evil; if good men writ it, they would not lye to say they were inspired by God when they were not; they would not deliver such things for assured truths which none could know but God, if God did not teach it them. Upon these invincible Grounds I think I may say that we have a mighty assurance that these are divine revelations, which he wickedly affirms we have no assurance of. But it may be objected, if the demonstration be so evident, why do not all men receive it? for the understanding is made after such a manner, as the Eye, when you shew it colours, the Eye must see them; so shew by demonstration a truth to the understanding, it must needs assent. For my part I do not apprehend that man hath liberty in his understanding to accept or refuse truths which are laid open to it, neither do I think that which is called *liberum arbitrium* is only a freedom of the will but a result out of them both; however it is not in the understanding alone, nor is this belief of ours that these things are revealed only an act of the understanding, but of the will, which refuseth to heare the voice of the Charmer charme he never so wisely. Sometimes a malitious Will will not permit a man to study, and think of these arguments, which the more he studyeth, the more he will approve; sometimes when he hath studyed them it will make him seek further, and being not delighted with that reason which is proposed, it will not be satisfied with it; so that there is a submission to these reasons offered, which is necessary to our assent to them. And certainly that is much by such arguments as shew the happiness men have in being under Gods Government; for then men will seek what and wherein he will bless them, and when he finds that these Scriptures, and these only, are rational for a man to think are his own dictates, he will willingly submit

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ſubmit to them. But contrariwiſe when a proud man ſhall think, that he and he only is *faber* not *fortuna* only but of his own happineſs, and that he need not ſeek to God for aſſiſtance, then he ſlighs all theſe diſcourſes and liſtens not to them. But ſtill a man may ſay, it ſeems that reſolution of our faith is into this way of arguing. I anſwer noe, our faith is reſolved into the divine revelations, that God hath ſaid this, or that; this is but a preparation for that foundation; when a wiſe and vertuous man tells me any thing, I believe it for the eſteem of him, and that is my laſt reſolution of that faith becauſe ſuch a man ſpeaks it: but before this I muſt be prepared for this, with an acquaintance that this is ſuch a man and I muſt know he ſpeaketh it. Theſe preparatoy Acts are neceſſary for the introduction of that Act of faith in him; but faith in him is the foundation of my belief in that ſentence, it is evidently ſo in this Caſe, we believe theſe divine truths abſolutely, and the laſt reſolution of them is into this, that God hath revealed them; but yet it may be enquired, whether theſe Arguments be neceſſary to our aſſent to theſe divine principles, or not. Certainly to a man who ſhould be converted from Paganiſme, *vt prudenter credat*, that he be not carryed about with winds of Doctrine, it is fit, he ſhould have theſe or ſome other equivalent Arguments to induce him to them: But to a man born in the Church, and bred up in the Chriſtian religion, it is comfortable to his faith when he finds it attended with ſuch invincible reaſons, and he is able to underſtand them; But if not, ſimplicity of faith and obedience to God will be bleſſed by him. It will not be expected that I ſhould engage in more niceties of this kind. I hope it appears that we have aſſurance of theſe divine revelations. It was therefore not only a bold, but impious and wicked affirmation of him to ſay it is *evidently impoſſible for a man to be aſſured of the revelation to another without a revelation particularly made to himſelf.* But he proceeds to anſwer ſome ſeeming prooſes brought to affirm the aſſurance of theſe revelations, I will put them down in order and examine his anſwer. The firſt is drawn from miracles and is thus ſet down in the place laſt cited.

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SECT. VIII.

Mr. Hobbs *his answer to the first proof retorted: Miracles defined.*

FOR *though a man may be induced to believe such revelation, from the Miracles they see him do*,] that is the first Objection) he answers [*Miracles are marvellous works: but that which is marvellous to one, may not be so to another*] This answer of his (to speak *ad hominem*) doth not become him, as I shewed in my first piece page 19. He had said that *Concerning the worlds magnitude and beginning he was content with that doctrine which the Scripture perswaded and the fame of these miracles which confirm them, the Countreys custom and the due reverence to the Laws.* There you will allow Miracles to confirm them, that is the Scriptures, why now should you not be content with hem? They are now, when you writ this, as good, as famous, as evident, as they were then, when you writ the other. Well, we will examine the force of Miracles, and see what content they can give a a rational man; and before I go further, we will consider what we understand by this word *Miracle.* We do conceive a *Miracle* to be a work above the reach and power of nature, and extraordinary; not only a strange and wonderful thing to the common observation of men, but above the power of all those things which God hath made produceable by natural causes, so that it is not only strange that nature should do it, but impossible it should produce this effect, which is *miraculous.* And when I say This *miraculous effect*, I mean by it, not the work only, as

to cure a lame man; (such a man perhaps may be cured by natural means physically applied) but to cure him at a distance, with a word speaking, *is miraculous*; and is a work beyond natures power: So that then we understand by a Miracle, what is either in its self or in the manner of doing beyond Nature. The last term is *extraordinary*, there are many works beyond the power of Nature, which are ordinarily wrought by God in a most ordinate way, in an infallibly settled course, as they relate to Heaven; which are the giving his Graces to such as are penitent, or pray, or which observe their duties in the use of the Sacraments, with the like, which being ordinate by his sacred Covenants are most certain; and being so, although above Nature, yet are no *Miracles* because certain and ordinate.

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SECT. IX.

Miracles produced to confirm an untruth are a Lye, and blasphemy against God: This Proposition confirmed. Mr. Hobbs *his confederacy with the Devil.* Matth. 4. 3. *explained. Our blessed Saviours use of Miracles, for the confirmation of his Gospel. Mr.* Hobbs *his Logick desired, The apprehensions of men alter not the nature of Miracles.*

THus the Nature of Miracles being explained, I think it appears clearly, that because nothing but the God of Nature who made this nature, and could have made another, can act beyond or beside that order which he hath settled things in; therefore he must needs be the Author of these effects which are above the reach of Nature, of which kind *Miracles* are. And thus if he should produce them for the confirmation of falshood, it would be as apparent a Lye, as any false Proposition delivered by words; which certainly were abominable blasphemy in any man to affirm.

The force of this Argument will appear from the Devil, who was and is as able a Logician as Mr *Hobbs*; and although he dissemble and labours to make men believe there is no such thing; yet I doubt they two do underhand confederate too much together. However let us consider an Argument of the Devils, by which he required an assurance of our Saviour's being the Son of God, and consequently God, *Matth.* 4. 3. where the Devil tempting him, said, *If thou be the Son of God command that these stones be made bread.*

bread. A man might have objected, ſuppoſe he ſhould command, and the effect follow, how would this prove him the Son of God? An Angel, or a meer man aſſiſted by God might have done this. But conſider now if he had done it upon the Queſtion, and had not been the Son of God, becauſe it muſt be done by the extraordinary power of God, not by his ordinary power, therefore God in doing it muſt have confirmed a lye, which it is not poſſible for God to do, and upon the ſtrength of this Argument of the Devils, we may be aſſured, that Miracles uſed to prove any Concluſion are an invincible Argument; for the Devil is abundantly able to diſpute. And therefore in the laſt verſe of Saint Mark's Goſpel, it is reported that after Chriſt had given Commiſſion to the Eleven, *they went forth and preached every where, the Lord working with them, and confirming the word with ſigns following*; where we may obſerve as the Devil urged it for an Argument, ſo our Saviour uſed it for an Argument in the planting of the Church; which is enough for proof of this Concluſion, that the Miracles wrought by our Saviour and his Apoſtles here, were ſuch Arguments as did enforce belief of what they ſpake. I could expatiate in this noble Theme of Miracles, and fall upon divers moſt Scholaſtick diſcourſes; but I rather chuſe to apply my ſelf cloſe to him who anſwers, [*that what is wonderful to one may not be ſo to another.*] The force of which anſwer lies in this, (That there may be many counterfeit Miracles, which may appear true to one and may be found falſe by another; and therefore becauſe men may be deceived they have no aſſurance from them. To this I can ſay that Mr. *Hobbs* is not ſo good a Logician here, as the Devil, for the Devil diſputed from the real force of the Argument, but Mr. *Hobbs* draws his Anſwer from the apprehenſion of the Hearer or Spectator; when it thunders many a man is buſie & hears it not, Doth it not therefore thunder, becauſe he doth not hear it? The Sun ariſeth and ſhineth out in the morning when I am in bed and ſee it not, Doth it therefore not ſhine becauſe I diſcern it not? When a man who hath weak Eyes or troubled with the Jaundice comes into a Room, many colours are there which he perceives

not;

not; or if he do, they appear yellow to his Eyes, Are they therefore yellow? But this and no other is his consequence against Miracles, because some apprehend them not, therefore they are not, or do not send out that proof which naturally flows from them. Many fallacious Arguments are used; (He hath used many,) and because they are fallacies, Are therefore perfect Demonstrations not good? His Answer therefore is not Logical in saying that these things appear marvellous to one, which do not to another. Let a man consider the possibility, or rather impossibility which Nature hath to do such a work, and if he be not learned enough to discuss with a Cause, let him consult with Learned men who are able to judge of it, and he shall by that find whether God hath in an extraordinary manner any hand in it or no; but the Answer which he makes may be returned to all Arguments, whatsoever one understands another doth not therefore they are not good, nor give assurance. And so I have finished the first Argument which he framed against himself and answered weakly.

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SECT. X.

Mr. Hobbs *his second Argument examined; The truth of Divine revelation to the Apostles, asserted from the gift of Tongues.*

AND I pass to his second Argument and Answer, which is at the bottom of that page; and the Argument is drawn to prove that these were Divine revelations from the Sanctity of the Persons who delivered it. He answers that [*that may be feigned.*] I reply, It is improbable, which were enough: but I think I may go further and say it is impossible: for the first clause, that it is improbable, we may discern Reason for it. First, in the Persons the Apostles who delivered these Revelations, and affirmed they were such, it is not probable they should be counterfeited; all counterfeiting is for some end, some worldly end (for a man cannot think to get Heaven by counterfeiting and lying) but the Apostles could have no worldly end in what they did, the asserting of these Revelations being the ready way to miseries and unhappiness, which was foretold by their great Master, our most blessed Saviour. We have seen in this distracted world in which we have lived, now and then a man proud with an imagined Enthusiasme, persevere in an abominable lye even to death: but for so many to do it, and suffer for the relation of the same story, it cannot be imagined. And then consider that they were men blessed by God, in having these Revelations, and the relating them: I say *relating them:* for because the Doctrine was to be divulged to all Nations by them, God assisted them with the gift of Tongues, by which they were able suddenly to relate in their own Language to every Nation the wonderful things which concerned their salvation; And from hence I will draw the impossibility of their feigning their sanctity in the delivery of these Revelations; for as the Revelation was from God, so the very delivery of them by

by the power of Tongues, was from God, who cannot countenance and make good a lye; But yet certainly although their might be a possibility of being other, (I grant that for Arguments sake which I allow not) yet when there is no probability of the contrary, we have great assurance of that truth, and his answer is most wicked, as well as weak drawn from a possibility of feigning and counterfeiting in the Apostles.

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SECT. XI.

Mr. Hobbs *his third Argument from the wisdom of the Apostles confirmed: The miraculous consent of men to the revelations published by them; An Argument from the propagation of Christianity against the opposition of the whole world: A serious application and vow for Mr.* Hobbs *his conversion.*

A Third Argument which he endeavours to put off, is drawn, from the *extraordinary wisdome, or extraordinary felicity of his actions, all which (saith he) are marks of Gods extraordinary favour.* His answer to this is at the bottom of that page thus, *The visible felicities of this world are most often the work of God by natural and ordinary causes. And therefore no man can infallibly know by natural reason, that another has had a supernatural revelation of Gods will but only a belief, every one (as the signs thereof shall appear greater or lesser) a firmer or weaker belief.* Thus far he. I now answer to the first, which concerns their wisdome; I do not remember that I have read the wisdome of these men to be produced for proof of their revelations; yet because he has put it down and given one answer to it, I will urge something for it, that it was and is a great convincing argument, that such poor ignorant illiterate fishermen should attain, or rather be endued from above with such wisdome, as to be able to confute the greatest and best studied Philosophers, and reduce them to

conſent to their revelations; this muſt need prove that theſe men were aſſiſted by ſome knowledg above Nature. But let that paſs ſince he makes no anſwer: but for the other, the ſucceſs of Chriſtianity, that is a moſt rational argument; and his anſwer confutes himſelf, for whereas he ſaith [*the viſible felicities of this World are moſt often the work of God by natural & ordinate cauſes* I retort it to him, that the felicities of this world happning to theſe men were nothing but that general propagation of the Goſpel, which was wrought againſt the force and power of all natural cauſes; all the Emperours, Kings, and Princes of this World fighting againſt, and ſuppreſſing it, with all the force and tyranny which they were able to uſe, ſo that their ſtrength grew by oppreſſion, & *Sanguis Martyrum* was *Semen Eccleſiæ*. And M. *Hobbs* cannot think, that that was a natural ſeed. And ſo I will conclude this diſcourſe for this time, hoping that God will ſo aſſiſt him that he may ſee his own error, and with his own hand blot out all theſe unworthy doubts which he hath caſt upon Chriſtianity.

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SECT. XII.

Mr. Hobbs *his ſecond Queſtion propounded, and diſcuſſed; his aſſumption not clear; the Argument changed and the Reader eluded by him. His manifeſt declenſion of the divine poſitive Law, and impoſure of humane Laws in oppoſition to them, cenſured. The Law of Nature commands obedience to the poſitive law of God. The pretenſions of all Nations to divine inſtitution, obſerved.*

AND here I thought to have knocked off with the ſatisfaction of the firſt Quærie; but as I ſaid before he made two enquiries, the firſt concerning the aſſurance of theſe revelations; I have ſpoke to that. The ſecond is [*how a*

man can be bound to obey the Laws ſo revealed] *This* (he ſaith,) *is not ſo hard, for if the Laws declared be not againſt the Law of Nature, which is undoubtedly Gods Law, and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by his own act.* Thus far Mr. *Hobbs*: but indeed he utters (in my judgment) a moſt obſcure doctrine, r if clear, he ſpeaks very weakly. 'Tis obſcure, for although the Law of Nature do oblige, yet it is not apparent to every man, what this Law of Nature is; no not to learned men; for in many caſes it is diſputed, vvhether ſuch or ſuch actions are according to the Lavv of Nature or no; And therefore although the major propoſition be unqueſtionably true, that the Lavv of Nature is inſtituted by God, yet the aſſuming of a Minor to it, [this is the Lavv of Nature] may be full of diſpute, and from thence it vvill be hard to conclude. Again conſider, that vvhen the queſtion vvas put in the former page, it vvas concerning the obedience to the revealed lavvs of God, hovv a man may be bound to obey them, of vvhich he affirmed that vve could have no aſſurance, and that I have immediately before refuted: but novv his vvhole diſcourſe runs upon mans obedience to humane Lavvs. Thus the Notion and Conceipt ſhuffled and changed, a Reader is diſtracted, and vvhilſt he finds ſomething ſeemingly proved, he thinks the undertaken propoſition is cleat: for vvhere hath he ſatisfied, yea but ſeemingly, this Queſtion, *How a man can be bound to obey the Revelations? But* (ſaith he) *if he undertake to obey a Law which is not againſt the Law of Nature, he is bound by his own Act.* That is, that Act by vvhich (he ſaith rather than thinks) he inſtituted a ſupreme, and that Act only reflects upon humane Lavvs eſtabliſhed by the ſupreme vvhich he inſtituted. But I do not finde this expreſſed there in that latitude he novv formes it, but rather I thought that he vvould have ſuppoſed that the ſupreme ſhould be obeyed in ſuch things as croſs not the Lavv of God vvhatſoever, either natural or poſitive, but it ſeems novv he muſt be obeyed in all vvhich is not againſt the Lavv of Nature onely; he vvould have the Scriptures and poſitive Lavvs laid aſide. By this if a King ſhall command us not to be baptized, not to

receive the Communion, or, like *Darius* not to pray to God, for a certain time, not to repent *&c.* (vvhich are not acts of the Lavv of Nature, but poſitive Lavvs) vve ſhould not doe them, vvhich muſt needs be moſt odious to any Chriſtian man. But indeed had not Mr. *Hobbs* diſtinguiſhed theſe tvvo the poſitive, and natural Lavvs of God before in the former page, and raiſed theſe doubts, to diſgrace the poſitive laws of God, I could have anſwered that there is no Law more Natural, than that we ſhould obey the poſitive Laws of God; for he being the ſupreme power, muſt needs have that authority to make Laws for the government of men; and this is univerſally received. All Nations in the World pretend to have divine Laws for their direction, I mean, poſitive divine Laws; onely Mr. *Hobbs* denyeth it clearly in this place. Let us examine what follows.

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SECT. XIII.

Obedience founded upon the belief, or acknowledgment of his power that commands. Mr. Hobbs *his complacency in quarrelling with Religion. The want of reaſon in his proofs diſcovered, and cenſured. Faith commanded by God, urged by promiſſory and penal Laws. The dreadful puniſhment of ſuch as believe not, or diſturb other mens belief with frivolous arguments. God the ſearcher of hearts and puniſher of evil thoughts contrary to* Mr. Hobbs *his Doctrine.*

HE *is bound*, ſaith he, *to obey it but not bound to believe it.* A ſtrange propoſition: for take his particle [*i*] how you pleaſe, for obedience to divine or humane Laws, he can be bound to obey none, when he hath no belief: for he cannot have an obligation to divine Laws, unleſs he believe they are given by God, nor can he perform obedience to humane

Laws,

Laws, unleſs he have a belief that they are made by the ſupreme power. So that obedience in all kinds ſuppoſeth a belief of that authority which commands. But again conſider, what he means by this word, belief, *He is bound to obey, but not to believe.* Certainly (as I ſaid,) he muſt believe the authority that commands, and 'tis as true, that he muſt believe that that authority commands this Act, or elſe he can have no ground for his obedience. This man had a mind to be quarrelling at Religion, but could not find expreſſions to do it. But he proves his concluſion, for (ſaith he) *Mens belief, and interiour cogitations, are not ſubject to the commands, but only to the operation of God ordinary, or extraordinary.* The vaineſt and weakeſt Argument that ever was urged. Firſt, in Logick it cannot follow; becauſe they are ſubject to the operations of God, they therefore are not ſubject to commands, as Charity, and all the reſtraint of exorbitant luſts are ſubject to his operations, are they not therefore ſubject to commands? This is a pitiful inference, but then conſider further; that faith, and the cogitations of men are commanded by God, that faith is commanded firſt. *Heb.* 11. 6. *Without faith it is impoſſible to pleaſe God; for he that cometh to God muſt believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them who diligently ſeek him.* Now it is neceſſary that he who requires us to come, muſt in that exaction require ſuch things as are neceſſary to obtain it; and therefore faith without which Heaven cannot be attained. And God hath given a bleſſed promiſſory Law that he will bleſs ſuch as do believe; and penal alſo, that he will puniſh ſuch as do not believe. For the firſt, *John* 3. 15, 16. *Whoſoever believeth in him*, (that is in Chriſt) *ſhould not periſh, but have eternal life.* The ſame is added in *the* 16 *verſe. God ſo loved the World, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whoſoever believeth on him ſhould not periſh but have everlaſting life.* Here is a Law made concerning happineſs, an eternal Law concerning an eternal life, all terms indefinite. The ſame is repeated in the 18 *verſe* of the ſame Chap. but with the addition of the penal Law, *He that believeth not is condemned already.* As likewſe our Saviour,

Saviour, *Mark* 16. 16. *He that believeth and is baptized ſhall be ſaved: but he that believeth not, ſhall be damned*; and this is no more but a promiſe performed by God, which was made *Deut.* 18. 15. urged by St. *Peter* Acts 3. 22. *A Prophet ſhall the Lord your God raiſe up unto you of your Brethren, like unto me, him ſhall you hear in all things whatſoever he ſhall ſay unto you.* (v 23.) *And it ſhall come to paſs that every Soul which will not hear that Prophet ſhall be deſtroyed from among the People.* Let Mr. *Hobbs* and his Followers read theſe three words and tremble, *Condemned, Damned, Deſtroyed* who believes not, *&c.* What ſhall ſuch be who have not only this privative infidelilty, but a poſitive, which oppoſeth and diſturbs the faith of ſuch as do believe, with fooliſh and unneceſſary Arguments? Faith is commanded and exacted by God, upon a dreadful penalty. So likewiſe *John* 3. 23. *This is his commandement that we ſhould believe on the name of his Son Jeſus Chriſt.* There in expreſs terms, this belief is commanded: and as I have ſhewed, obedience could not be given to other Laws, if faith did not preceed, which is the firſt ſtep towards Heaven. I need not ſpeak of other cogitations of the Heart, as Pride, Self-conceitedneſs, Covetous, deſiring others goods, *&c.* are all prohibited by God, and he will puniſh them. Mr. *Hobbs* was therefore to blame very much in ſaying that faith and the interiour cogitations are not ſubject to Gods commands; had they been humane Laws of which he ſpoke it had been ſomewhat to the purpoſe: men cannot know, and therefore cannot puniſh the interiour cogitations, and ſo not make Laws for them; but God knows and ſearcheth the heart and reins, and will puniſh them, and therefore it is fit for him to give commands concerning them.

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CHAP. XXII.

SECT. XIV.

External and inferiour Acts subject to divine regulation. Faith, the fulfilling of that Law which commanded it. Vain-glory and fear equally impeding practical Faith.

BUt it seems there is more in this argument of his, where he saith, *but only to the operation of God, ordinary, or extraordinary.* I have spoken somewhat to this a little before, where I shewed that other vertues which cannot be denyed to be commanded, are subject to the operations of God, who worketh both to will and to doe; who creates and preserves: and although he gives the will, yet if he goe not on in the operation, it will never come to perfection; so that by this consequence God can command nothing because he cooperates in the performance. He proceeds with the same proposition, in other terms, and I will follow him. *Faith of supernatural Law* (saith he) *is not a fulfilling, but only an assenting to the same.* Faith of that supernatural Law (which concerns Faith) must needs be a fulfilling of it, (if it be such as is according to the Law of Faith, as St. *Paul* phraseth it *Rom.* 3. 27) *But only* (saith he) *an assenting to it.* What if it be but only an assenting to it, (yet I can shew other operations of faith besides that) yet if that assenting be the act which God requires in his command of faith, faith is the fulfilling of that Law which exacts it. And yet give me leave to add one note more, Although faith were a meer act of the understanding, an assent (as he terms it) yet because this assent is impeded by many vices in the Soul, which untill they are mastered, the Soul cannot break out into a full and compleat assent unto the divine propositions, it comes in regard of

of them under this notion of a command. You may obſerve, *John* 12. 42, 43. *Nevertheleſs among the chief Rulers many believed, but becauſe of the Phariſees they did not confeſs him, leſt they ſhould be put out of the Synagogue; for they loved the praiſe of men, more than the praiſe of God.* Mark, in this they are ſaid to believe, being convinced in their underſtandings of the truth of the doctrine, they had a credulity of the things, but vain-glory hindred them from practiſing accordingly, *the praiſe of men*; as likewiſe a wicked love of it, and I may add another paſſion, *fear*, out of that Phraſe *becauſe of the Phariſees, i. e.* becauſe they feared them; and it is the ſame which he ſpeaks of the Parents to him who was cured of the blindneſs, *John* 9. 22. *Theſe words ſpoke his Parents becauſe they feared the Jewes. Theſe words*, that is, that ſhifting of the confeſſion of Chriſt; ſo that unworthy fear, love, pride, are impediments to faith. I know it may be objected here, that it is ſpoke of the confeſſion of faith, not the act or habit of faith; and theſe other things may hinder theſe outward acts of faith which do not choak its being, and nature. I anſwer, it is true; but withall it cannot be a true and right faith which is aſhamed, or afraid to expreſs it ſelf; for a true faith of divine perfections, is ſuch as muſt believe the divine perfections infinitely excellent, and his veracity ſo likewiſe; and therefore he muſt needs be confident that when he honours him, God will bleſs him, and ſo cannot fear any thing in this world. This I hope may ſuffice for the ſatisfaction of the Reader in this.

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SECT. XV.

Faith a duty to God against Mr. Hobbs *his assertion; his constant endeavours to asperse the duties of Christianity. Miracles the ordinate means of faith. The use of the means necessary to the attaining of the end.*

HE *goes on, and saith, And not a duty that we exhibite to God, but a gift which God freely giveth to whom he pleaseth.* Faith is not a duty which we exhibite to God! such a language as was never heard from a Christian, no not from a Jew, a Turk, or an Heathen if he were not an Atheist. If he thought there were a God, he must needs think that faith is due to him. Who would fear him, trust in him, if he doth not believe his promises and threats? If he think he is the chief good, he must think him true in all his sayings; that they are according to his intentions; and that he is able to make good what he intends. Who can honour him, but he that believes he is, or would honour him but he that believes he is a rewarder of them who seek him? It is the duty which he who hath, cannot lack the rest; and he who hath not, doth nothing upright. But it seems he utters his mind clearly in this sentence which he did more obscurely otherwhere, labouring throughout this discourse to weaken our faith. Well let us go on, *but*, saith he, *it is a gift which God freely giveth to whom he pleaseth*: what therefore no command concerning it? he may say the same of Hope and Charity; and indeed of all the things of this World; the Earth is the Lords, and all that is in it, and to whom he pleaseth he giveth it, but is there therefore no command concerning these things? Consider, Reader, that although faith be Gods gift, yet God gives it according to those rules which he

hath ſet down: faith is introduced by hearing, by ſuch ſetled wayes as God hath appointed to produce it: and therefore I do think that no man living can ſhew me faith, where that faith was not wrought by God in his ordinary way of working: and therefore one part of his diſtinction which he uſed before, either by Gods operation ordinary or extraordinary, might have been ſpared, if applyed to the immediate operation. I know the converſion of St. *Paul* may be objected, and the like, where God wrought his faith by a miraculous manifeſtation of himſelf to him: yet conſider that the converſion of St. *Paul* was produced immediatly by that miracle which was in a moſt ſetled courſe of Gods working b hearing and ſeeing; for hearing the word, or reading it, ſeeing ſome viſion, or miracle, are moſt ordinate means by which God beſtoweth that bleſſing upon his ſervants, by preaching, by viſions, by miracles. And I do not believe that any man in the world can perſwade me that he hath a right and religious faith, who never heard or ſaw any thing which did perſwade him to it. Again, conſider that there are three things, which make a gift profitable beſides; the giving, the receiving and the right uſe of it: the firſt only concerns God, the two latter men. Now ſuppoſe that the Sun (which alone can do it) ſhould ſhine, if men will remain in their priſon, keeping the doors and windows ſhut, they ſhall not be able to ſee by that gift of light; yea if he open the windows of his houſe, and ſhut thoſe of his body, he ſhall not ſee. Out of theſe ariſeth the faultineſs of infidelity, that men ſhut out that means which God gives them to believe; they will not hear or read the word of God, they ſcorn his miracles, and all thoſe glorious revelations which have been made to his ſervants When the hands of God are open to give, and the hands of men not ſo to receive, and when he ſows his ſeed of righteouſneſs, and the pleaſures and the cares of the World choak it, then the duty of faith is ſubject to a command although given by God.

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SECT. XVI.

Unbelief the greatest breach of Gods Law. St. John 3. 18, *and* 19. *explained. The justice of God in the condemnation of men for want of faith. The case of* Abraham, *Genesis* 17. 10. *elucidated. The power of Parents asserted.*

HE proceeds, *As also unbelief is not a breach of any of his Laws, but a rejection of them all.* This was witty, and a good way of arguing; *contrariorum eadem est ratio,* contraries do illustrate one the other. But consider Reader, is not the rejection of a Law, a breach of a Law? Suppose a man should think (as some have) that no supreme hath power to make Laws for life and death; he steals, and by the Law concerning Thievery, is to be executed; doth his rejection of that Law make his felony no breach of that law, which is against it? Certainly it is the greatest breach, it tears the Law in pieces; and is the greatest violation of it that may be. To this purpose our Saviour most clearly, *John* 3. 18. *He who believeth not, is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the Name of the only begotten Son of God.* So that according to Mr. *Hobbs* his Tenent here is a condemnation, but no just one, because, not for the breach of some Law. There must be therefore some divine Law exacting faith, which this infidelity doth break. But then Mr. *Hobbs* would reply to our Saviour, that faith is a gift, and why dost thou punish me for the want of that which is only a gift? Read the 19 *verse,* and our Saviour doth answer him, And this is the condemnation that light is come into the World, and men love darkness rather than light; the light is the light of faith, and Gods graces which he gives to men, by which they may apprehend divine truths: which yet they do not, because they love darkness rather than light; love not this light of faith, which

diſcovers to them the obliquity of their ſinful worldly deſires. So that it is apparent that although God gives this light, his grace; yet men preferring the world before it, it is unprofitable. This was the caſe of theſe Jews which our Saviour ſpoke to, *Iohn* 5. 44 *How can ye believe which receive honour from one another, and ſeek not the honour which cometh from God?* So that mens preferring worldly things before the things of God, cauſeth them not to receive or make uſe of Gods revelations. But Mr. *Hobbs* hath Scripture for what he writes, *Gen.* 17. 10. *This is the Covenant which thou ſhalt obſerve between me and thee, and thy ſeed after thee Now* (ſaith he) *Abrahams ſeed had not this revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party to the covenant, and bound to obey what Abraham ſhould declare to them for Gods Law.* It is true (what he ſaith) that *Abrahams* ſeed had not the revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party in this Covenant. But what can be deduced further from this, than that which is the ordinary condition of contracts? A man gives his eſtate to another, and to his poſterity for ever, upon a condition that they ſhall pay ſuch and ſuch acknowledgments, which if they perform that eſtate ſhall be theirs; but if not, the contract ſhall be void. Yes, ſaith Mr. *Hobbs*, there is more, *they are bound to obey whatſoever* Abraham *ſhould declare for Gods Law* I ſee nothing in theſe words which enforce any ſuch thing: but only the obſervation of circumciſion: this God calls his Covenant, being a ſign thereof, and this Covenant conſiſteth in this, that God would be *Abrahams* God, and his ſeeds after him, and that he would give them the Land of *Canaan* for an everlaſting poſſeſſion. The meaning of all which, was, that he would in near and dear reſpects favour and protect them, as you may read in the *7 and* 8 *verſes* of that Chapter. So that here in this is no more implyed, but that if they obſerve circumciſion God would bleſs them; there is no mention of accepting for Gods Laws whatſoever *Abraham* ſhould deliver; and therefore he might have ſpared his following diſcourſe [*which* (ſaith he) *they could not be but in virtue of the obedience they owed to their Parents; who* (*if*

(if they be subject to no other earthly power, as here in the case of Abraham *) have soveraign power over their (children and servants* This I say might have been spared, for if the Covenant went no further than I have expre'ed, (as without doubt it did not) there needs no soveraign power to be forced to it. But I am of his mind that they who are Parents, (where is no other established soveraignty) have that supreme power over their children and servants; which one conclusion will confute the whole body of his Politiques, as I intend to shew hereafter.

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SECT. XVII.

The obedience of Abrahams *Family to Gods Laws, depended upon that to him, as Father of the Family. Mr.* Hobbs *his consequences drawn from this proposition not rightly deduced. His constant varying from the English translation observed, and censured. Reason against former deductions. The intire obedience of the* Israelites *to the dictates of* Moses, *rather from the conference of his divine inspiration, as a Prophet, than his soveraign power. The Authority of scripture depends not upon the declaration of the soveraign. The worshippers of* Baal *not excused from the command of the King of* Israel. *The reasons of Mr.* Hobbs *his former assertion disproved. The commands of the soveraign justly opposed, when contrary to the Christian faith. Mr.* Hobbs *his Atheistical conclusions censured.*

BUt he hath another piece of Scripture which you may read, *Gen* 18. 18, 19. *Again where God saith to* Abraham, *In thee shall all Nations of the Earth be blessed: for*

I know thou wilt command thy Children, and thy house after thee to keep the way of the Lord, and to observe righteousness and judgment; It is manifest the obedience of his family, who had no revelation, depended on their former obligation to obey their Soveraign. Thus far Mr. *Hobbs.* I answer, 'tis true that this obedience of *Abrahams* family to himself, depends upon their filial obedience to him as their Father, and his commanding them depends upon his soveraign power over them as their Father But what? can it be collected hence, that if *Abraham* had commanded dishoneſt things, *i. e.* such actions as were against any will of God, revealed any other way to them, that they should have obeyed him? Certainly no; nay, the contrary is here intimated, for therefore God promised to bless him and his posterity, because he did know that *Abraham* would command them vertuous things, *to keep the way of the Lord.* But mark here, Mr. *Hobbs* still varyes from the English lection, and that to the worse; for it is not what he writes, to keep, but, *he will command them, and they shall keep the way of the Lord.* So that the sense is; because God foresaw his fatherly care, and their filial duty in these righteous actions, he would bless them. He prosecutes this conclusion with another Scripture thus; *At mount* Sinai, Moses *only went up to God, the people were forbidden to approach on pain of death; yet were they bound to obey all that* Moses *declared unto them for Gods Law.* Upon what ground, *but on this submission of their own,* Exod. 20. *Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us lest we die?* *By which two places,* (saith he) *it sufficiently appears that in a Common-wealth a Subject that has no certain and assured revelation, particularly to himself concerning the will of God, is to obey for such the command of the Common-wealth.* (That is, by his Logick, the soveraign of the Common-wealth.) How this conclusion can be drawn out of these two places of Scripture, I cannot imagine. Why it should not, I shall give these reasons. First, that although these two particular cases were to be understood, as he conceits; yet they are but particular cases, which concerned those only affairs which were under their proper management

management; and there is no one word which points at them, to make them presidents for others, or to give an universal rule for all others. Secondly, whereas he saith that in a Common-wealth a Subject should do thus (as he sets down in one of his instances,) to wit, that of *Abraham*, there was no Common-wealth; setled, but only a noble family; many things may be proper to a family, which are not for a Common-wealth nay indeed the government of the *Israelites* under *Moses* was, as yet, not a pefect established Common-wealth, but only *in fieri*, the Common-wealth was in moulding, the Laws for the government were in making. Then consider, in *Moses* his case (for I have writ enough concerning the other) the People said they would hear *Moses*; and good reason for it because they discerned that he had conversation with God; that Gods terrour was so great that no man durst injure him by doubting his Laws, who had such near converse with God, as he had, when called up to the top of the Mount; and therefore might be trusted on his relation. And therefore it seems their promise of hearkning to whatsoever *Moses* should deliver for Gods Law, was to him, as a Prophet, rather than as a King; which indeed was (in that regard) more to be considered. And certainly those dictates of the holy Scripture for our practices which are delivered by King *David* or *Solomon*, have not that great obligation upon us as they were Kings, but Prophets; nor are the books which are Scripture and commanded to be so received amongst us, therefore of divine authourity, because Kings declare them to be such; but contrariwise, Kings declare them to be such, because they are such. And, (good Reader) consider further, that this reason of Mr. *Hobbs* might have excused all the worshippers of *Baal*: all the idolatries and abominations committed in the reign of *Jeroboam*, and the rest of those wicked Kings over *Israel*. For if the People were to receive that, and that only for the word of God, which their supremes authorized, then they authorizing those, and only those commands which were directed to those impieties, were so to be accepted and obeyed, unless they had particular revelation (which in

in general, the common people never had) and then how could God juſtly puniſh them for violating thoſe Laws which he had given them (as he did often) when their Kings exacted otherwayes? But he gives reaſon for what he hath delivered; *for* (ſaith he) *if men were at liberty, to take for Gods commandements, their own dreams, and fancies, or the dreams, and fancies of private men; ſcarce two men would agree upon what is Gods commandements; and yet in reſpect of them, every man would deſpiſe the commandement of the Common wealth.* Alas poor man, what a dream and fancy hath he vainly uttered! this is like to what he affirmed before, *that we have no aſſurance of revelations, unleſs we had particular revelations our ſelves.* And what I oppoſed to that will ſerve for this; Were all thoſe Councils, all thoſe Fathers, all the conſent of the Chriſtian Church, nothing but dreams? all the blood of holy Martyrs nothing but fancies? yea the blood of Chriſt whereby he hath ſubdued all the Kings of this Chriſtian World, nothing but dreams and fancyes? which yet are thoſe Medium's by which men oppoſe Kings, (and ought to do it) when they command contrary to our Chriſtian Faith. Certainly Mr. *Hobos* ſaid right when he affirmed, *That private men muſt not oppoſe their dreams or fancies to the Laws of the Land wherein they live.* But under that Notion, he doth amiſs, when he terms our aſſent to the revealed vvill of God (clearly and intelligently apprehended) a dream or fancy. But becauſe he terms it the Lavv of the Common-vvealth, vvhich hath ſome ſenſe according to his impoſſible principles, *viz.* That the ſupreme repreſents the vvhole, I vvill tell him it is a phraſe of ſpeech never uſed by any Author before: for a Common-vvealth conſiſts in the ordination of all the members of it, ſupreme and inferiour; the ſupreme is ſoveraign, the inferiour are ſubjects; but by a common vvealth here he only underſtands the ſoveraign. But let us proceed vvith him; out of the former confuted premiſſes he dravvs this concluſion: *I conclude therefore, that in all things not contrary to the Moral Law, (that is to ſay, to the Law of Nature) all ſubjects are bound to obey that for divine Law, which is declared to be ſo, by the Laws of the Common-*

wealth.

wealth. Certainly the Moral Law, or the Law of Nature, doth not bid us be baptized, or receive the holy Communion, nay it doth not command us to make a profession of our faith in Jesus Christ. The Law of Nature did not command *Daniel*, *Shedrack*, *Meshack*, and *Abednego*, to refuse the voluptuous meat which *Nebuchadnezar* allowed them, and fed upon pulse and water; but the fear that they should break the Law of God by obeying the King; I mean, the positive Law which God had not writ in their Natures, but in Tables; so that this conclusion of his was most Heathenish.

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SECT. XVIII.

Mr. Hobbs *his further reasons to prove the former assertions examined and censured. His diminution of the authority of the divine positive Law, and constant vilifying of scripture censured. The Law of Nature restrained by the divine positive Law. Obedience in Religious dutyes not founded in the command of the soveraign, but of God. The perswasion of the* Turks, *that the* Alcoran *contains the Law of God, not the command of the Grand* Signiour *causes their conformity to it. The difference between the commands and acts of Christian Princes, and their subjects, from those of other Religions. All other Societies, as that of Theeves, illegitimate combinations. Mr.* Hobbs *his doctrine abhorrent to Christianity.*

BUT he labours further to prove it. *Which also* (saith he) *is evident to any mans reason; for whatsoever is not against the Law of Nature, may be made Law in the Name of them that have the Soveraign power; and there is no*

reaſon men ſhould be the leſs obliged by it, when it is propounded in the Name of God. I anſwer, that whatſoever is not againſt the Law of Nature, may be made Law by God, *i. e.* his poſitive Law; but many Laws are limited, not only by Gods Laws of Nature, but his poſitive Laws likewiſe, which have as great force as the other to whomſoever they are revealed. (Now I am in the 150 page) let the Reader conſider again, how he takes occaſion to leſſen the authority of Scripture. I am perſwaded he can produce no Chriſtian writer from our Saviours time downward, that ever delivered ſo unworthy a conceipt of the poſitive Law of God: it is as if he ſhould ſay, we ſhould obey a Conſtables command againſt the Kings command by Statute; for the difference is much leſs betwixt the King and a Conſtable, than betwixt the greateſt King in the World and God. The common Law which I conceive to be an unwritten tradition, is like the Law of Nature, the Statute Law like the poſitive Laws: It is lawful (not conſidering a ſtatute) for a man to act any thing not againſt the common Law, but if a poſitive, *i e.* a ſtatute Law intervene, it is no longer lawful by any private power to act that, which otherwiſe had been lawful. Thus until a poſitive Law of God interpoſe, whatſoever is not againſt the Law of Nature is lawful; but when that poſitive Law is manifeſt, it is neceſſary that that likewiſe be obeyed; and no humane Law of mans making can have right to diſpenſe with it. He proceeds [*beſides, there is no place in the world, where men are permitted to pretend other commandements of God, than are declared for ſuch by the Common-wealth. Chriſtian States puniſh thoſe that revolt from Chriſtian Religion, and all other States, thoſe that ſet up any religion by them forbidden. For in whatſoever is not regulated by the Common-wealth 'tis equity (which is the Law of Nature, and therefore an eternal Law of God, that every man equally enjoy his Liberty.*] Here is an Argument drawn *à facto ad jus*; Becauſe this is done, therefore it is rightly done; and an equal weight put upon the acts of Heathens, and worſhippers of the Sun, Moon, &c. with that of Chriſtians who only worſhip the true God. As if becauſe Kings juſtly puniſh thoſe who violate

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the Laws of thoſe Kingdomes which they are intruſted with, therefore Thieves juſtly may deſtroy ſuch as break the Laws of their Combination, when indeed the firſt are juſt, but the other moſt unjuſt The caſe ſeems to be the ſame here; for all thoſe are combinations of Thieves, who rob God of his due honour required by him, & the Chriſtians only act by the Law of God. So that here we may diſcern a great difference in the right of the two actings of the Chriſtian and the Heathen; but then conſider what is the ground of them both, we ſhall find it different from what Mr. *Hobbs* delivers. He conceiveth the reaſon to be this, why delinquents are puniſhed, becauſe they ſwerve from the Law of the ſupreme; but it is clearly otherwiſe; The Chriſtian doth not therefore receive the holy Communion, or repent of his ſin, or do ſuch like heavenly duties, becauſe the ſupreme Magiſtrate requires them, but becauſe he finds thoſe duties exacted by God in his poſitive Laws; and if the Magiſtrate ſhall controulit, he knows God muſt be obeyed before man, when he requires contrary to God. And the ſame reaſon perſvvades the *Turk* concerning his *Alcoran*, vvhich he vainly imagineth to be the divine Lavv; and if the Grand *Signior* himſelf do contradict that Lavv they vvill not obey him, upon that reaſon. And ſurely the ſame Argument prevails vvith all other Nations vvho have their Religion by tradition; it is not the Lavv of man, but the imagined Lavv of God vvhich they ſubject themſelves unto in divine performances. And therefore though ſoveraigns puniſh ſuch tranſgreſſions vvhich are againſt thoſe Lavvs vvhich they have eſtabliſhed for divine; yet it is therefore becauſe they are eſteemed divine. Therefore they made ſuch Lavvs, not that they could think that they ought to be eſteemed divine becauſe they eſtabliſhed them. I vvill add but one obſervation more, vvhich is this; That although he ſaith, that all Nations practiſe this, that is, that they allovv only ſuch divine Lavvs, vvhich they have eſtabliſhed to be ſuch; yet I believe no Nation in the World, (no Chriſtian I am aſſured) would have allowed this doctrine to be publiſhed, but only ſuch as were in that diſtracted condition as our poor Nation

was when he publiſhed it. For ſince every Chriſtian Kingdome profeſſeth a conformity to divine Law, it cannot be imagined that they durſt obtrude ſuch an impoſſible thing to be credited as that they could make divine Laws, but only confirm and exact an obedience to them. Nay, I can think the ſame of all, even Heathen Nations. So that it is a concluſion abhorring to Chriſtianity, yea humane Nature whereſoever it is planted with any Religion. For ſince all do conceive God to be an infinite able and wiſe Governour even of Kings, ſupremes, and kingdomes, how can they think it ſafe for them out of humane obedience to ſubject his rules to the controul of his ſubjects, which all Kings and Potentates are? I have handled this Paragraph *verbatim*, and although there are many more expreſſions (in this caſe) which may deſerve cenſure, yet I paſs them over, and indeed did think here to have concluded his Politiques, and ſo not to have paſſed any further cenſure upon them in this place. But there are ſome egregious errors hereafter which muſt not be paſſed over with ſilence. I will alſo skip over his twenty ſeventh and twenty eighth Chapters, as containing things in general leſs malitious, and I will enter upon his twenty ninth Chapter which he intitles

Of

Of those things which weaken or tend to the dissolution of a Common-wealth.

CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. I.

Mr. Hobbs *his second Paragraph purged. The signification of the word, Judge. Inferiour Judges apply the determinations of Laws concerning good and evil to particular persons and facts. Private men have* judicium rationis, *and therefore may determine upon their own ratiocination. No man to intrude upon the office of a judge, but by deputation from the Soveraign.*

The first of these I let pass, as having spoken something of it already materially, and begin with his second which he enters upon page 168. towards the bottom of that Page which begins thus. *In the second place, I observe the diseases of a Common-wealth, that proceed from the poyson of seditious doctrines; whereof one is, that every private man is judge of good and evil actions.* To purge this doctrine from all poyson, observe first; that this word, *Judge*, sounds like a legal Officer, and truly (to speak properly) I think the supreme legislative power is the Judge of politick good and evil; the other subordinate Judges are only Judges of the application of the supreme to particular cases; for instance thus. The legislative power commands that no man shall steal; if he do he shall be thus and thus punished; the Judge applyes this sentence of this evil to *Titius*, who is brought before him, and accused of this crime; the legislative

giſlative determins and judgeth, that it is evil in general; but the Judge upon his Bench determines, that this perſon is guilty of this evil; in neither of which a private man hath right to paſs a concluſive ſentence concerning other men. But yet give me leave to tell the Reader, that in both theſe he hath *judicium rationis*, a rational ſentence in his own thoughts, as thus; before a Law is made, he judgeth that this would be fit to be made, and ſo may diſcretely interpoſe with the legiſlative power to adviſe them to act according to thoſe reaſons which appear to him as perſwaſive, for elſe the Legiſlator will lack that great aſſiſtance which he may receive from the premonitions of prudent men, who, many times, (although they are not lifted up to the dignity of ſuch as ſit at the Helm) yet have either by ſtudy or experience equal abilities with them.

And in the ſecond (*viz.*) the application, when a private man ſhall ſtand by at the pleading or hearing a cauſe, he perceiving that the Judge carries himſelf partially to one ſide, and doth paſs his ſentence accordingly, this private man cannot chuſe but judge in his Soul, that this was a wicked ſentence; As contrarily when it is juſtly carried with indifference, he may judge with himſelf that this was a righteous judgment. But the intruding into the Office of a Judg is altogether unfit without a ſpecial deputation to it But ſince God hath pleaſed to give man that moſt excellent faculty of ratiocination both in Natural and Political affairs, he ſhall deſert humanity who ſhould deny himſelf the exerciſe of that ability. Nay he may indeavour (if he can) to avert that execution of that ſentence, when it is wickedly pronounced; as was the caſe of *Daniel*, in the unrighteous ſentence decreed upon *Suſanna*; but ſtill not to uſurp a judicatory power without lawful authority. But, even in theſe caſes, there muſt be left *judicium rationis* and *diſcretionis*, a power of reaſon and judicial diſcretion to think upon and conſider, what is right: but he ſeems to deny that truth concerning the private actions of that particular man whether it ſhall be good to do this or that; for ſo he proceeds.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. II.

The former assertion of private ratiocination further cleared in Acts commanded against the Law of Nature, or the positive Laws of God. Mr. Hobbs *his argument retorted against himself.*

THis is true, saith he, *in the condition of meer Nature, where there are no civil Laws; and also under civil government, in such cases as are not determined by the Law.* Consider now, Reader, that by the Law, he understands here the civil Law. Consider then that the Laws of any Nation may be against the Law of Nature; in which case he himself hath limited the power of civil Laws. A man is commanded by the National Law to act against the Law of Nature, shall not this private man judge it unfit for him to do that? And without question, in many particulars, the positive Law of God in Scripture is as clear to many men, as that Law written in mens hearts; and therefore in such cases there is no doubt but as God hath imparted to men the power of reasoning, so he hath given men Laws by which they should regulate themselves according to his directions, & they must and ought to use that reason in the guidance of their actions by his rules. But then, concerning the civil Laws themselves, a man may judge in private of them, whether they are prudential or no; yea, every man who is versed in Politicks, will judg and think so of them, and sometimes judge they are not prudent, and yet give no disturbance to the peace of the Kingdome: but think it more prudent to be subject to an imprudent Law, than for it to hinder the end of all Laws, which is the peace aud quiet of the Kingdom. But now consider further, *Turpe est doctori cum culpa redarguit ipsum.* He hath writ a book of Politie, he hath censured all the civil Laws in the World, he is a private man, and hath

hath (I believe) no legiſlative power; why ſhould he take upon him to forbid others to act that which he himſelf doth in that very place where he forbids them? And yet give me leave to add one Note more; this judging he ſpeaks of muſt be about his Actions in the future, whether, what he is about to do will be a good or an evil action. Is it poſſible for a man to live honeſtly and not to judge of ſuch actions wherein there is any ſcruple whether they are good or evil? Suppoſe the civil law (as he would have it) were the only rule to walk by; yet every private man muſt judge whether this or that act which he is about to undertake, be according to that rule or no. And perhaps he may, in many caſes, find work enough for all the wit he hath to regulate himſelf according to that rule: and although he calls this the poyſon of a Common-wealth; yet I dare boldly ſay it is that bread which doth moſt wholeſomly nouriſh, ſupport and maintain a Common-wealth, (*viz.*) that every man ſhould conſider and judge what is legal, and fit for him to do. Let us go on with him.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. III.

Of the rule of Actions. The Law of Nature, the measure of humane Actions, in opposition to the Civil Laws, where the case is contradistinct. Instances of Civil Laws commanding unjust things; If the Civil Law command any thing against the Divine Law, or the principles of Faith and Reason. Mr. Hobbs *his arrogancy in venting principles contrary to the received opinion of the whole World noted and censured. The case stated and determined. Good Men obedient to bad Laws, not in acting according to them, but by suffering the penalties inflicted by them.*

BUt (saith he) *otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of good and evil actions, is the Civil Law; and the Judge the Legislator, who is always representative of the Common-wealth.* Here are two Propositions, I shall handle them apart, they are both indiscreet, and very impertinent to the Question. The first is, that the Civil Law is the measure of our Actions the measure is indefinite without any limitation: what not the Law of Nature? shall not that be a measure? How shall a man be able to commit Treason then *se defendendo* against the Civil Law? (which is one of his popular Aphorisms delivered in many places of this Book:) for if the Civil Law be the measure of his actions, he must not violate that for the pretence of the Law of Nature: I urge this *ad hominem*, as an invincible argument against his wicked doctrine, but see it overthrown out of most received principles; It is possible that the Civil Laws may be wicked

and diſhoneſt, and ſo againſt the Law of God; as even in this Nation, they have made ſacrilegious Laws; ſhall not I judge in my ſelf whether it be fit for me to act according to theſe Laws? The Law made in Queen *Maries* days which ſhed ſo much innocent blood, it was fit for every man in that time to ſuffer rather than to conſpire with them. And therefore he muſt be judge himſelf what is vertuous for him to do; and that Law is not a rule to guide him ſafely by. Let this ſuffice for the firſt propoſition. The ſecond is, *And the Judge is the legiſlator, who is always repreſentative of the Common-wealth.* What an impoſſible Judge for ſuch doubts is here delivered? Make the legiſlator what you will, King, or Senate or what you pleaſe; The queſtion to be determined may be whether it is fit for *Titius*, at this hour or inſtant, to act according to this Civil law concerning which the ſcruple ariſeth? whether it be not againſt the Divine law? the duty is inſtant, now required; It is not poſſible for this man to obtain leave to enquire of the legiſlator; or if he could, is it not probable that the legiſlator may not be at leiſure to anſwer ſuch doubts? It cannot be therefore that the legiſlator can be a proper Judge of ſuch queſtions; *Titius* alone muſt do it himſelf; neither indeed is it poſſible for any legiſlator to foreſee all ſuch particular ſcruples which may ariſe out of general rules; and therefore there is a neceſſity for every man to be judge of good and evil, concerning his own particular actions what he ſhould do. But he reduceth great miſhaps and ill conſequences which follow upon this doctrine, which muſt be examined. *From this falſe doctrine* (ſaith he) *men are diſpoſed to debate with themſelves, and diſpute the commands of the Common wealth.* And why not, good Reader? There is no man that hath reaſon with him when he ſtudyeth a Law-book, or indeed any other (beſides the holy Scripture) but he conſiders whether that law or diſcourſe be agreeing to the principles of Faith and Reaſon, whether it be conſonant with equity: if a man have not his judgement free to himſelf, how comes it about that Mr. *Hobbs* hopes to prevail

vail with his discourse against all the laws in the Christian World, but that he himself thinks there is a freedome of judgement left amongst men to determine by their reason what is good or evil; But then he adds, [*And afterwards to obey, or disobey them as in their private judgment they shall think fit, whereby the Common-wealth is distracted and weakned.*] Certainly every man living will obey or disobey as he thinks fit; and this is done by vertuous and good men without distracting or weakning the Common-wealth. For if a vertuous man find the Civil law contradicting Gods law either in Nature or Scripture, he cannot think it good *moraliter* for him to act according to its direction. But his opposing of an established law shall be with submission to the penalty, not contending martially against it, for the accommodation of this present contented being, which is his doctrine; and by this means the Common-wealth will suffer no distraction, but rather confirmation and establishment; when a mans private evil shall be patiently endured, rather than the peace of a kingdom shall be disquieted. I speak no more of this because the sence is much the same with that doctrine which he censured next and condemns.

CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. IV.

Mr. Hobbs *his proposition everted. Conscience defined and distinguished. Of conclusions secondarily or remotely deduced from the first principles. No conscience properly and strictly erroneous, but being such (according to the vulgar acception of the phrase) however obliges. The case put upon the misinterpretation of Scripture, supposed to prohibite swearing, though for the confirmation of a truth, and the error asserted to be obliging. Two objections answered and the proposition fully cleared; our Saviours command of not swearing at all, examined, and elucidated. Of promissory or assertory Oaths. The paragraph and question concluded.*

ANother *Doctrine repugnant to Civil Society, is, That whatsoever a man doth against his Conscience is sin, and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself Judge of good and evil.* Certainly the proposition is true, whatsoever a man doth against his Conscience is sin; for Conscience includes in its Name and Nature Science, so that there can be no Conscience, without there be a knowledg of the condition and circumstances to which his Conscience is applyed. I would be loth to involve my self into many intricate Questions. But intreat the Reader to consider, that Conscience is the conclusion of a practical Syllogisme, in which the Major is either the Fact of a principal law of Nature, or some general rule equivalent to it. To understand this, observe, that there are two innate qualities in man, which the Philosophers call, *Habitus Principiorum*, habits of principles which do so evidence themselves that

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no rational man doth hear such truths clearly delivered, but he presently assents to them: that which is about speculative things they term *intellectus*, because it is in the prime operation of the understanding; of which Nature are these, That the whole is greater than a part; two and two make four: There is no man that heareth such propositions clearly delivered who doth not presently assent to them. There is another quality which is called by them *Synteresis*, which is the habit by which we readily assent to practical things, as in the other to speculative, of which Nature are these; That good is desirable, evil to be eschewed; God is to be obeyed in his commands, and the like. Now there is no man, who, as soon as he hears these Axiomes clearly delivered, but doth without ambiguity presently yield an assent to them. Out of these principles when a man makes true collections and deductions, that conclusion is Conscience, as thus:

All evil is to be eschewed;

Adultery is evil;

Therefore Adultery is to be eschewed.

Such a man who thus argues, acts against his Conscience when he commits Adultery. But not only so when a conclusion is immediately deduced out of *Synteresis*; but that which is more remotely deduced out of it; as take the conclusion of the former syllogisme;

Adultery is to be eschewed:

This particular Act, with this forbidden Woman, is Adultery.

Therefore this is to be eschewed.

Sure he who commits that sin acts against his Conscience, and so as far as any man can go, with right arguing, so far his Conscience obligeth him Now if we would argue from strong reason, a man may say, there is no such thing as an erroneous Conscience, because if it be not Science, it cannot be Conscience, which supposeth Science and a right drawing out the Conclusion, which proceeds from these evident principles; and then most certainly Mr. *Hobbs* must be in the wrong, who affirms that it is

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not ſin to act againſt his Conſcience. But let us take Conſcience as in the uſual way it is taken, not for the concluſion of a direct and certain arguing, from theſe known and evident principles, (of which before:) but for that concluſion which any man, according to his ability, draws out of theſe principles although miſtaken, and not logically or truly done. (I underſtand not by this word [logically] the art of logick, but that natural ratiocination, of which the artificial is an aſſiſtant only.) Well then, the queſtion is, whether that a man who acts againſt that light which he hath, that ſhews him this particular is unlawful, is ſin in him who ſo acts, although this light be not a true but a bare ſhew of Conſcience; and not true Science, or deduction which muſt be drawn from the principles of *Synteresis* by true ratiocination? And certainly the opinion is moſt right and true, and founded upon the ſtrongeſt principles of reaſon that can be. For it is a moſt undoubted Axiom which he hath delivered, that laws bind only by the force of their ſufficient promulgation. So that if they are made only, they exact no obedience until they be proclaimed; nor then, unleſs the Proclamation be ſuch as the obliged party may take notice of it; for no man can be bound to that which he cannot know; he cannot obey, unleſs he know what to obey; nor can he know, unleſs he have a Revelation to ſhew it him; ſo that, without queſtion, the very law of Nature could not bind, but that there is a *Synteresis* that enlightens mans Soul, and makes the goodneſs of that law manifeſt. Well then, this man muſt needs ſin who acts againſt that light he hath: put that caſe which is common amongſt us, A man by miſunderſtanding the Scriptures thinks that they command him, not to ſwear: therefore when he is convented before a Judge to atteſt a truth by that moſt religious act, of calling God to witneſs what he ſaith to be true, or to puniſh him, if it be falſe; if this man ſo conceive theſe places of Scripture, as if they ſhould render his ſwearing in any caſe unlawful, if he do ſwear, he ſins againſt that light he hath, and it may moſt juſtly be imputed to him for ſin: for he who thinks, and believes it is the law of God which prohibits it, and

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yet will do otherwise, prefers men before God, this world before the other, which is the fountain from whence all iniquity proceeds.

I know but two objections of any moment, which can be made against this conclusion, which I shall satisfie presently. The first is, if a man doth sin in acting against his erroneous Conscience, then a man may sin in acting according to Gods commandements; because that he may mistake Gods command, and in doing so when he acts according to the true meaning of Gods command he must sin: which may seem most strange at the first view.

For answer I will consider this Phrase, *Act according to Gods command.* To understand this know that he who obeys *Gods commands*, must do it as a man *scienter* knowingly. A man cannot pretend to obedience in any act which is done by chance, or ignorantly. Such acts therefore which are done when a man thinks otherwise of the Law of God or the principles of the Law of Nature, than the truth is, though he do the Acts materially directed by them; yet erring in the principles which God hath given him for his guide (I mean the light of his understanding which should shew him the vvay) he doth not act them formally vvell; he doth *bonum*, but not *bene*, a good act but not well, *according to Gods law formally.* As for a man to do a good act vvell, requires a completion of all circumstances, he must do it for a right end. In which first qualification the erroneous man who acts against the light of his *Synteresis*, must needs miscarry, because he cannot think he acts for the glory of God, vvhen he thinks contrary to the revealed will of God: and indeed it might be shevved hovv he erres in every circumstance, *Quis, Quid, Cui, Cur, Quomodo, Quando*, (*Quis.*) What? the Creature go against the revealed will of the Creator? *&c.* But I desist, the rest are obvious. Well then, I answer this objection, that he who acts the thing commanded against his erroneous Conscience, although he do that vvhich is materially good, yet in not doing it vvell he sins.

The second objection is, that if he vvho hath an erro-

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neous Conſcience muſt not act againſt it, ſuch a man is neceſſitated to ſin; for he muſt either act according to his Conſcience or againſt it; in either of which he ſins, as in the inſtance before given; A man whoſe Conſcience tells him that he may not ſwear, this man is brought before a Judge to give evidence in a Cauſe of moment, if he do it, or not do it, he ſins: but ſurely the Nature of ſin is ſuch, that it is impoſſible to ſin in any act which he cannot chooſe but doe; for ſin ſuppoſeth a poſſibility not to ſin.

For anſwer to this I ſhall ſay, that there is no impoſſibility in the caſe propoſed, for that man may lay aſide his errour and conſider that God hath given a command to ſwear by his Name, *Deut.* 6. 13. and elſewhere; the words there are, *thou ſhalt fear the Lord thy God and ſerve him and ſwear by his Name.* Not that he commands us to ſwear, but ſuppoſing ſwearing to be neceſſary in all politiques for the deciding controverſies, he commands that when we ſwear, we ſhould ſwear by his Name, becauſe it is a religious act, and ought to be referred to none but himſelf only; yea God himſelf hath ſworn, *Gen.* 22. 16. *By my ſelf I have ſworn, ſaith the Lord,* ſo like wiſe *Pſalm* 100. 4. *The Lord hath ſworn,* and many like places. It cannot therefore be ill in it ſelf to ſwear, nor can we think it a priviledge or prerogative of Gods to ſwear: Holy men in all ages have done it: for you may find *Abraham* divers times, as *Gen* 21. 22. *He ſware in the Covenant with Abimelech.* So likewiſe *Iſaac,* either with the ſame or another *Abimeleeh, Gen.* 26. 31. I need not name more places of the ſame Nature. But to whatſoever may be objected of this kind out of the Old Teſtament, theſe may reply, that our Saviour hath inſtituted a New Law (*Mat.* 5. 33.) where in the 34 *verſe* he ſaith, *But I ſay unto you, ſwear not at all*; It is true he ſo requires them. But let us conſider that St. *Paul* (whoſe life and actions after his converſion are ſo eminently excellent, and without blame) diverſe time ſwears, yea in his Epiſtles, which were a greater fault than in ordinary diſcourſe, becauſe 'twas done upon con-

conſideration. Nay, in thoſe Epiſtles which he was directed by the Holy Ghoſt to write, for the good of the Church of Chriſt. So you may obſerve *Rom.* 1. 9. God is my witneſs: ſo likewiſe, 2. *Cor.* 1. 23. I call God for record upon my Soul. *Phil* 1. 8. God is my record. And now it is not poſſible for any man to think, that ſo vertuous a man in a premeditated act, as an Epiſtle writ for a publick good, and in that act, guided by the holy Ghoſt, ſhould commit a ſin againſt that Chriſt, whoſe Goſpel and Laws he preached and taught every where, with hazard of his life, if that Law were to be underſtood in that latitude and extent in which it is taken. Any man who conſiders this, muſt needs caſt about to ſee, if learned men, (who throughout the whole Chriſtian World have practiſed with St. *Paul*) have given any ſuch expoſition upon theſe words of our Saviour as may conſiſt with the univerſal practice of mankind, and doing that he may find this fully explained ſo, as fit to ſhew our Saviours deſign, which was not in this to controul the practice of his ſervants. The difficulty will lye in theſe two Phraſes, the Negative in the (34) *verſe*, and the Affirmative in the (37) *verſe*. Firſt for the Negative, *ſweare not at all*; to apprehend this conſider, that theſe univerſal, as alſo indefinite terms are with much caution to be extended, and to be expounded in Scripture according to that conſent they have with other places, and the Analogie of Faith. In the 21 *verſe* of this 5 *Chap.* of St. *Matthew*, it is ſaid, *thou ſhalt not kill*, and leſt ſome ſhould ſay, there is no univerſal ſign preceding as in my Text, conſider the following words which make it as large as this in my Text, *whoſoever killeth ſhall be in danger of the judgement*. And yet ſurely it is lawful for an Executioner to hang according to the Law of the Land, and ſo to kill any man who is condemned, when he hath received a command to do it. So likewiſe it is lawful for a Souldier in defence of his Country, and for any private man to kill any private man in defence of himſelf. So likewiſe the ſame we may ſay of our Saviours words, *John* 10. and the 8. All that ever came before me, were

Thieves and Robbers. Here are as full and large words as possibly can be; but a man may say, what were the Patriarchs, the Prophets, and St. *John* the Baptist Thieves and Robbers? Certainly no; it is easie to observe many more of the like Nature, and I think one answer will serve them all; thou shalt not kill voluntarily, but upon necessity, or command, (that is) a Natural or Moral necessity, for a command from lawful Superiours introduceth a Moral necessitie of obeying. And so for that in St. *John*, all that came of themselves, unsent by God, were Thieves and Robbers. But *John* the Baptist, the Patriarchs, and the Prophets were men sent from God. And so for those Swearers, swear not all, that is, of your selves, unless you are commanded by Superiour Powers, unless to confirm some great and considerable truth; which way all vertuous and holy men have ever understood this Text, as their practice assures us; and so that place in St *James* the 5. must abide the same exposition. And although much more may be said for the exposition of thi Negative command of our Saviours; yet I conceive that this is sufficient, and so pass to the Affirmative precept in the (37) *verse*, *But let your communication be yea, yea, nay, nay, for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.* Here it seems that as our Saviour before forbad swearing by his Negative, *swear not at all*, so here he insinuates the same by his Affirmative, *but let your communication be yea, yea, and nay, nay*; and he gives a reason for it, for what is more than these cometh of evil. Thus the Argument being enforced, I answer clearly, that in the Translation of the English there is a full gloss upon the Text which expounds it clearly; for so it is read [*let your communication*] which intimates that their common conversation should not be powdred with Oathes, which is far distant from those just occasions where oathes are exacted by the commands of Superiours, or the urgency of some great and weighty business which needs a strong affirmation to assure the credulity of it; and the Original which is (λόγος) enforceth no more but let your Speech be yea, &c. And the reason which is added in the

Text makes this interpretation good (for what is more than theſe cometh of evil;) it is not ſin, *it is not Evil, but cometh of Evil*; which is evident, for no man ſwears in converſation, but either becauſe he doubts his own reputation, if he do not ſwear, or becauſe other men are diſtruſtful, both which ariſe out of the evil of humane falſhood, which makes him apt to lye. This Text being thu opened let us conſider what will reſult out of it, in the Negative firſt, and then out of the Affirmative precept; in the Negative we may find that it is oppoſed to a practice of the Jews, who (by ſome tradition or other) imagined that it was no ſin to ſwear, but to ſwear falſly only. So that if a man performed his promiſe which he ſwore he would do, it was no ſin; and it ſeems therefore to be ſpoken only of promiſſory Oaths, not of ſuch which were made to give Teſtimony of matters of fact; if ſo, then there is no prohibition of ſuch Oaths which are for the deciſion of controverſies, commonly called Aſſertory Oaths; and then again, it may juſtly be conceived, that they (that is the Jews) thought (out of ſome tradition or other) that it was only unlawful to ſwear by God, but not by the Creature, for our Saviours inſtances are only in them, *Thou ſhalt not ſwear by Heaven, by Earth, by Jeruſalem, by the Gold of the Altar, or thy Head.* Which he ſheweth relatively to reach even the Creator himſelf: ſo that for theſe conſiderations it muſt be underſtood that it excludes not aſſertory Oaths vvhich decide controverſies, that it extends not to ſuch Oaths vvhere God is religiouſly called to witneſs any thing. And then for the ſecond the affirmative precept, it reacheth to our Communication and common conference one with another, that Gods moſt Sacred Name be not ſlightly or in vain taken by us; but that either ſome great buſineſs more than ordinary, or elſe ſome ſupreme power muſt exact it from us. So then this being thus expounded, it muſt needs appear that in this caſe, a man may juſtly depoſe his errour, and he cannot be neceſſitated to ſin, when he hath an errour in his Conſcience. And truly it is an excellent rule

for the practice of a mans life, when he ſhall find a general practice of good and holy men in all Ages to practiſe any thing which he is offended at, to ſuppreſs that averſeneſs in himſelf, and with ſtudy and pains to caſt about which way he may reconcile himſelf to that common practice, and not without ſtrong and evident grounds (which will hardly be poſſible) oppoſe that which the univerſal practice makes us know, that the univerſal Church underſtood as they practiſed; for if there be an Error in ſuch a practice, a man may find ſomething to excuſe himſelf with *erravimus cum patribus*; but in the other, nothing but pride and ſelf conceipt, which makes him oppoſe theſe practices: and ſurely in theſe caſes it is a ſafe rule for any man when he finds a place of Scripture which ſeemingly oppoſeth the univerſal doctrine of the Church, which is and hath been ſo heretofore, to look about how that Scripture may be expounded according to the Analogy of faith and good manners or uſage of the Catholick Church, which then muſt be the ſenſe, and the other (though more apparent at the firſt) not the true meaning; and by this means he ſhall not act contrary to his Conſcience, but if he do, he muſt ſin.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. V.

Every man Judge of his own Actions, whether according to the positive Divine Laws, or the Law of Nature. Mr. Hobbs *his consequencies observed and censured. His absurd expression of a publick Conscience rejected. Opinion and Conscience distinguished. Thoughts not possibly to be regulated by humane Laws. The external manage of Opinion. The proper subject of Regulation. The necessity of distraction from diversity of Opinions unless obtruded upon others. This Argument retorted* ad hominem.

HE proceeds, *And it dependeth on the presumption of making himself Judge of good and evil.* It doth (say I) for so every man will be, in what concerns his own practice; and must needs be so, for else how can he judge that he doth right or no unless he may judge it? and if there were no Law but what he speaks of, the Civil, he must judge whether his actions be according to that or no when he acts: But Mr. *Hobbs* acknowledgeth a superiour Law to that, to wit, the Law of Nature, and I have shewed another the positive Law of God, and he must in both these use *judicium privatum*, his private judgement, whether his actions accord or no with these superiour Laws. Now in all these he must judge and be responsible for that judgement, whether he judge by such rules as ought to guide a prudent man: but he gives a reason for what he speaks, *for a mans Conscience and his Judgement is the same thing: and as the judgement, so also the Conscience may be erroneous.*

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This doth not follow, because he may erre therefore he should not be guided by it. A man may have a false light shewed, or his eyes may be weak, as our eyes, who are old men, are; must he therefore not make use of that light and sight which he hath? Nay rather he must be more careful in the diligent using of his eyes, and more seriously examining the light which is offered to them. But in all these offers of reason which he makes in this Case, they may be applyed to that judgement which he must make concerning the Law of Nature, or the Civil Law (which he allows a man must judge) whether his actions be according to them, and what is the meaning of them as well as what is the meaning of the positive Law of God, and he must and will, if he be a vertuous man, act accordingly. *Therefore* (saith he) *though he that is subject to no Civil Law, sinneth in all he doth against his Conscience, because he hath no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a Common-wealth, because the Law is the publick Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided.* I cannot find how to apply this discourse closely to the question, for he who is not imbodied in a Common-wealth (saith he) is ruled by his reason, (but hark you) that reason ought to be ruled by the Law of Nature, according to his own doctrine; and according to mine, by whatsoever is a known positive Law of God. Likewise, although there is no Civil Law. And I will tell him farther that no Civil or Politick Law can have power to bind him to the breach of any of these, and therefore what he speaks of a publick Conscience is an unheard of Language, and not proper to be applyed to Conscience, and most undoubtedly only educeable out of that before unheard of, and most impossible principle of constituting a supreme, which hath been abundantly confuted in my former discourses. Let the Reader take notice that I am now in page one (169.) *(Otherwise in such diversity as there is of private Consciences, which are but private Opinions, the Common-wealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the Sovereign*

veraign power farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes.) In this clause he sets down the mischiefs (as he thinks) which may happen to a Common-wealth by diversities of Consciences, or Opinions. But before I proceed I will take notice of a mistake whereof he is guilty, when he saith, *That private Consciences are but private Opinions.* To this I say there may be such Consciences which arise only out of private Opinions, which ought to be overswayed with the greater weight of publick Authority: but there are other Consciences which are drawn out of the evident Law of Nature, or clear text of Scripture; these are so strong foundations to build Conscience upon, that a Conscience erected upon one or both of them cannot be shaken by that which he calls a publick Conscience: howsoever, it is an improper Phrase used by him to call Conscience, Opinion, or Science; for it is rather a Conclusion deduced out of either, as I have shewed. But then when he is angry in these Politicks with diversities of Consciences or Opinions (as he terms them) I would fain have him consider, how any Common-wealth should be able to make a Law to regulate mens thoughts, for they can judge of them only by outward acts, it is only God who can search the hearts and reins, and therefore he only can make Laws for them. Men may confine the external manage of Opinions and Consciences, which is fit the legislative should do, in all such things which might impede or trouble the well government of a Common-wealth, and punish the expression of them: but let all the power in the World make what Laws they can, men will think what appears most reasonable to their understandings; thoughts are far from the controul of any *Leviathan* whatsoever. And although it is true in some part, that distractions in Common-wealths arise from diversity of Opinions; yet it is not true what he saith, the Common-wealth must needs be distracted by them; for so long as they are but Opinions, they do no harm but to those Persons who have them; but if they justify their Opinions to the withdrawing others or themselves from

obedience.

obedience than they are dangerous. And therefore the *Leviathan* although he cannot know mens Consciences, and therefore not judge of them, must not make Laws for them: yet because he can know and judge of the outward act, which may disturb the peace, he must be severe both in making Laws against, and punishing those faults: yet I cannot chuse but wonder, how he who dares publish so many doctrines against all the *Leviathans* in the World, should not allow others the liberty of thinking against them.

CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. VI.

Faith and sanctity both inspired and acquired. Free-will and grace co-operating to the salvation of Men. Mr. Hobbs *his Arguments against this Opinion refuted. Faith and sanctity entitle not any man to government. The means of salvation most certain. Mr.* Hobbs *his Arguments against the former assertion retorted.*

HE proceeds in another Paragraph, *It hath been also commonly taught, that faith and sanctity are not to be attained by study and reason, but by supernatural inspiration or infusion.* I will not trouble my self to turn Authours where to find a defender of this proposition, but set down my judgement and then answer his cavil at it: my judgement is, that faith and sanctity are both inspired and acquired; faith is the Gift of God, as the Apostle speaketh, *Eph.* 2. 8. so likewise sanctification, 1 *Cor.* 1. 30. and yet they are acquired; and in the Parable of the Talents *Mat.* 25. we may observe, that the use of Gods gifts is blessed by Almighty God with a further enlargement; multitudes of Scriptures might be produced, which

which would but dull the Reader. So that in this case it is no other wise than it is with almost all the affairs in the World; neither the grass, nor the plants grow without light and influence from the Heavens; nor can the Heavens make them grow unless there be a specifical vertue in the Plant to adapt that influence to that particular operation which is in it. Neither can the Heavens without the Earth, nor the Earth without the Heavens, bring forth the least fruit, according to that Heavenly speech of St. *Bernard*, *Tolle liberum arbitrium, non erit quod salvetur; Tolle gratiam, non erit unde.* Take away free choice, and there will be nothing which can be saved (for no inferiour thing without that faculty is capable of Heaven, that being like the specifical vertue of Plants which co-operates with the general influence from above:) but take away grace there is no means by which these supernatural acts should be performed; that being the influence by which it is enabled to produce these blessed acts of faith and sanctity. So that I say, faith and sanctity are both infused and acquired. Now we will inquire into his exceptions against the absurdity of this opinion (as he conceives,) [*which granted,* (saith he) *I see not why any man should render a reason of his faith.*] If the Opinion were, as he sets it down, I can tell him why? that is for the satisfaction of others: but he goes on, *Or why, every Christian should not be also a Prophet.* I will tell him, because faith and sanctity, and prophecy are divers things, which may and do oft exist apart; and therefore one of them may be, and is oft without the other. Again he saith, *Or why any man should take the Law of his Country rather than his own inspiration, for the rule of his actions.* I answer, because there are many vain suggestions into the Soul of Man, which are often apt to perswade a man that they are inspirations by God; and therefore we are commanded to try the Spirits, and examine those suggestions whether they agree with such standing rules which ought to guide our actions, amongst which the National law is one. He goes on, *And thus* (saith he) *we fall again into the fault of taking upon us to judge of good*

and evil. I anſwer as before, there is no man but will judge of good and evil, if he be an honeſt man and guide his actions by that judgement, but yet as a private man, if he be ſuch He again, [*Or to make Judges of it, ſuch private men as pretend to be ſupernaturally inſpired, to the diſſolution of all Civil Government.*] I ſee no conſequence in this, for although a man may be inſpired, and can know he is ſo; yet that inſpiration can only ſerve his own turn, unleſs he can produce arguments to make me aſſured of it likewiſe; and then although a man may be inſpired with faith and ſanctity, which is the matter in diſpute; yet that hath nothing to do with the direction of any other mans actions, unleſs he can produce ſome urging argument to aſſure us that he is inſpired, with authority to direct us, which anothers faith and ſanctity cannot do; for men may be faithful and holy, and yet have no Authority to govern. He goes on thus, to ſhew by diſcourſe that faith and ſanctity are not infuſed thus [*Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by thoſe accidents which guides us, into the preſence of them who ſpeak to us.*] Faith comes by hearing, but it is by hearing the word of God, which is *Vehiculum Spiritus*, and brings the Spirit with it; for certainly as Heaven is more neceſſary to us, and of greater conſequence than all the things of this world; ſo the means of obtaining it are, without doubt, more certain than any thing in the world. And therefore faith, and the means of getting faith which is moſt ordinately by hearing, and no doubt but reading likewiſe, which are the means by which men may be acquainted with the will of God; ſo likewiſe [*hearing comes by thoſe accidents* (as he ſpeaks rightly) *which guide us into the preſence of them that ſpeak to us.*] What can be deduced out of this, but that a man uſing ſuch means as hearing, and ſuch accidents as bring him into that preſence, God bleſſeth them and pours into them thoſe graces which enable them with faith and ſanctification. That (ſaith he) *which accidents are all contrived by God Almighty; and yet are not ſupernatural, but only, for the great number of them that concurr to every effect,*

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unobſervable.] All this is nothing to the purpoſe, that is, to prove that faith and ſanctity are not infuſed: for whether God contrives thoſe means, or man, which beget faith, or whether thoſe means which bring us to hearing be natural, or ſupernatural, yet God bleſſeth them; our eyes are natural which ſee it; our ears are natural which hear thoſe things, which bring us to faith and ſanctity; yea our underſtanding is natural which apprehends them, but God bleſſeth both the one and the other (as his holy will hath appointed) with ſupernatural graces. He goes on. [*Faith, and Sanctity, are indeed not very frequent.*] Let that be granted: [*but yet they are not Miracles.*] And that is true likewiſe, for Miracles, as they are ſupernatural, ſo they are things beyond the ordinate and ſet way of Gods working; which theſe holy operations of his are not, but moſt congruous to his ſet and preſcribed way of acting them, upon ſuch productions according to his Covenants. He proceeds [*but are brought to paſs by education, diſcipline, correction, and other natural wayes, by which God worketh them in his elect, at ſuch time as he thinketh fit*] It is true; and yet theſe are wayes of Gods preſcribing, and which he bleſſeth; therefore he adds [*And theſe three Opinions, pernicious to Peace and Government, have in this part of the World proceeded chiefly from the Tongues and Pens of unlearned divines; who joyning the words of holy Scripture together otherwiſe than is agreeable to reaſon, do what they can, to make men think, that ſanctity, and natural reaſon cannot ſtand together.*] Give me leave, Reader, to retort this diſcourſe to his Perſon, who not long ſince in the 26 *Chap.* page 149. maketh faith not a duty, but a gift of God, and ſaith *it is barely an operation of God's, as likewiſe internal ſanctity.* And there put me to the trouble of proving mans concurrence in theſe acts; and I may aſſuredly affirm, that he is there exceeding guilty of what he chargeth ignorant Divines with here, (*viz.*) incongruous putting places of Scripture together, and as much as in him lies to make men believe that ſanctity and natural reaſon cannot ſtand together; for if faith be only a

gift and no act in the receiver, or use of it, *insomuch as no command can be given concerning that or sanctity*, as he speaks there, certainly natural reason hath nothing to do with it; and as there I was forced to prove the concurrence of man in these Heavenly duties, so here to justifie his former doctrine, I must prove the co-operation of God which he seems to deny. Let the Reader put that with this, and he shall find the affirmative part true, and the negative false in both.

CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. VII.

Soveraigns obliged by the positive Laws of God. The Laws of Nations, The Law Natural, The Royal Laws, or Laws of government obligatory to the Soveraign. The Soveraign free from penal Laws.

A *Fourth opinion, repugnant to the Nature of a Common-wealth, is this, That he that hath the Soveraign power is subject to the Civil Laws.* Truly I conceive by this Gentleman that he imagines Soveraigns to be strange things, which must be *subject to none, but the Law of Nature*, for so he expounds it presently, not to the positive Law of God, which having (by him) no assurance that it is such, but from the supreme, he can no further be obliged by it, than he pleaseth. And so that Deviliſh speech of that wicked woman to her imperial Son, would be made good, *Quodlibet, licet.* But this term [*Subject*] troubles me to find out what he means thereby, if he mean not, to be guided by it, or else he offends; without all doubt he ought to be ruled by the positive Law of God, and not only by the Natural Law, he ought to be ruled, that is, guided by his own Civil Laws, which he hath made, or given life unto. For how can he expect an observance from others, who will not keep his Laws himself? But if

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he means by *Subject*, subject to penalty; that cannot be, I am confident, in a well contrived Common-wealth; because all penalty for breach intimates an inferiority, and as he rightly speaks aftewards, *He who punisheth, either bodily, or with shame, or with whatsoever, is in that act superior to him who is punished.* But his dispute is out of his own principles, which have been twenty times confuted, that is, *He that is subject to the Law, is subject to the Common-wealth, that is, to the Soveraign representative, that is, to himself.* This is a weak argument because he is not the representative of the Common-wealth, but the head, and rules it. One word more, there may be Laws in a Common-wealth for Kings, and for Subjects, he must be guided by these which are the Royal Laws, the Laws of governing, although not by these which are inferiour, and Laws for Subjects; he must be allowed those prerogatives which are not fit for Subjects to have: But yet he ought to observe the rules of governing. This, I conceive, is enough for what he hath delivered in that Paragraph. He begins another thus.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. VIII.

Propriety derived from the ſoveraign of ſoveraigns. The quiet enjoyment of Eſtates. The reaſon according to Mr. Hobbs *of the imbodying of men. The propriety of the Subjects. The foundation of the publick interest. It excludes not the prerogative of the ſoveraign. The title of the King of* England *in many caſes decided by the Judges. Mr.* Hobbs *his indulgence to the late uſurped power obſerved.*

A *Fifth doctrine, which tendeth to the diſſolution of a Common-wealth, is, that every private man has an abſolute propriety in his goods; ſuch as excludeth the right of the ſoveraign.* I do not know what he means by this term [*abſolute.*] Certainly both private and publick men have their rights depending upon the Soveraign of Soveraigns; and all they have is at his diſpoſe. But otherwayes certainly it tends to the diſſolution of a Common-wealth, to deny an abſolute propriety in private men, and to affirm that in no Common-wealth a Subject can have ſuch propriety, for it being the reaſon, (according to his own Philoſophy) why they imbodied themſelves into a Common-wealth, that ſo they might enjoy the fruits of their labours peaceably, not only plough and ſow peaceably, but reap the fruits of that pains they take, and call it there own: It cannot be denyed, that that juſtly can be denyed them; and if it be they are in ſuch a ſtate as they were without the fruits of their vertuous labours. It is true in the Eaſtern Monarchies, I read they have not inheritances as they have here, but *pro termino vitæ*, and then all return to that ſea out of which they came: but it is otherwiſe in our European Countryes throught, and the Laws

Laws of every Nation are justly to be observed; but still according to that right which each person hath: and this propriety is so naturally dear unto every man, as there can be no wiser Laws made for the publick than such, as private men shall be bettered by them, for then every man will more industriously endeavour the publick good, when his private benefit results out of it. *I but* (saith he) *such as excludeth the right of the Soveraign.* Indeed I think in that he said more rightly than he meant; for certainly the Soveraign hath a right of a Soveraign, over all his kingdom, or dominion; nay, the propriety of a Soveraign (that is his legal propriety) over his Subjects, is over their estates, to determine their Controversies, to have dominion over their Persons, legally to punish, according to his just prerogative. But the title of propriety in his estate, is belonging to the subject in all such things as are not included in the supremes legal prerogative. So that when he has granted Laws which do limit the extent of his power, and indulge the vertuous industry of his subjects, he cannot justly infringe them and call that his right, which he hath condescended not to use. And upon this reason, with us, the Title of the King in many occasions is decided by the Judges in point of Propriety And therefore he did ill in publishing this book in English, (so that it principally concerns us,) and at that time when the liberties and proprieties of the Subject were so abominably invaded by the usurped powers, as if he would provoke them to out-do themselves, and oppress more, and more lawfully, than was pretended. He proceeds.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. IX.

The Soveraign protects the Subject in the enjoyment of that right and Propriety which the Law gives him. The rights of Soveraignty, not of propriety necessary for the performance of the royal Office, and protection of Subjects. Publick necessity justifies the invasion of propriety. The partition of the Soveraignty among the Optimates not destructive of it, according to Mr. Hobbs *his own tenents. The* responsa prudentûm *of high esteem among all Nations.*

EVery man *has indeed a propriety that excludes the right of every other Subject.* This is granted upon all sides, *and* (saith he) *he has it only from the Soveraign power; without the protection whereof,* (now I am in Page 170.) *every other man should have equal right to the same.* This is not truly spoke; for the protection of the Soveraign doth not make, or give right to any thing, but enables him to use the same; the law gives the right & the Soveraign protects us in the enjoying that which the Law hath given. But I wonder at his meaning in what follows, which is, *But if the right of the Soveraign also be excluded, he cannot perform the Office they have put him into.* That must be understood of the right of the Soveraignty, but not of propriety: if he be not allowed the prerogatives belonging to Soveraignty, he cannot protect them; but if he be denyed the right of propriety, he cannot well destroy them; but surely may protect them with his justice, and with his power. He expounds himself [*which is to defend them both from forraign Enemies, and from the injuries of one another; and consequently there is no longer a Common wealth*]

[CAP.]

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A strange inference, unless he have right to their Estates he cannot defend them *&c.* Surely many Soveraigns have defended and do defend their subjects, and yet have not propriety to their Estates. He who hath a propriety in an estate may use it how he will to his own advantage or content. But this Supremes cannot do with their subjects justly; there may be a case of extremity, where *Salus Reipublicæ* must be *suprema lex*; put the case an Enemy invades the Kingdome, the land of some particular subject lyes fit to make a Fort of; the King by force takes it for the publick benefit; not out of propriety that it belongs to himself, but that it belongs to the Commonwealth, to whose publick benefit all private interests and proprieties must submit. But I may term the right of such accidents to be an universality rather than a propriety, the universal right of the Common-wealth, not the particular right of one or another. That which follows to this purpose, receives the same answer, *In offices of judicature and the like.* I pass to a *sixth Doctrine which*, (he saith) *is plainly and directly against the essence of a Common-wealth; and 'tis this, that the soveraign power may be divided.* What he means by division, I cannot readily apprehend; if he means that it may not be divided into sundry persons, then he hath overthrown himself, when he constitutes other Government besides Monarchy, as Aristocracy, and Democracy, which are in divers persons, but united; if he means (which he seems to do by his following discourse) two several Kings in the same kingdome, I think it cannot subsist, because of distractions as he intimates; but the fountain of the errour, I think is not well derived from the Lawyers, *who*, (saith he) *endeavour to make the Laws depend upon their own learning, and not upon the legislative power.* Which way this should conduce to the dependance of the Law upon their learning, I see not; he himself hath discoursed that the *responsa prudentum* were alwayes in high esteem among the Romans, as the opinion of the Judges are amongst us; and all men have a great reverence of them in all Nations.

But these *responsa* declare what is Law, and they will cease to be *prudentes*, when they abuse the Law. He begins another Paragraph.

CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. X.

The Paragraph asserted. Not the form of Government, but the execution of good Laws makes a Nation happy. The History of the Grecians and Romans vindicated against Mr. Hobbs. *Mr.* Hobbs *his Precepts in his* Leviathan; *much more seductive and encouraging to rebellion than the forementioned Histories. The abuse of good things ought not to take away the use of them.*

AND *as false doctrine sometimes the example of different government in a Neighbouring Nation, disposeth men to the alteration of the form already setled.* In this truly I am of his mind; for when men see a neighbour prosper in that kind of life he leads, he is apt to pry into the wayes by which he so thrives, and then taking the same course hopes to find it as beneficial to himself, as it hath proved to the other. I approve the discourse throughout, and therefore need not transcribe any more. But yet would have been glad to have read some way, by which this evil, being known, might be hindred or avoided, and truly I can think upon none but by making our selves more industrious than our Neighbours, by better rewarding vertue and industry, and punishing vice and sloth than they. There is scarce that people whose fundamental principles are not such as may make the Kingdom happy under that government, if they were used to the best advantage; so that it is not the form of

Government

Government only, but the disposure in that form which felicitates a Nation, and so the making and execution of good Laws at home will redress the inconvenience which comes from a Neighbouring Nation. He enters upon a new Paragraph, [*And as to rebellion in particular against Monarchy, one of the most frequent causes of it, is the reading the Books of policie, and Histories of the Antient Greeks and Romans.*] I wonder he had not put in the Old Testament likewise; but certainly he is out in it: for these Books (he speaks of) do teach Kings and Supremes how to govern and avoid those Rocks upon which their predecessors have been split; they teach Subjects to avoid all rebellion, the most happy and prosperous of which brings confusion if not destruction to that Nation where they are, and very frequently ruine to themselves and their Families, who are Ring-leaders in such actions; But if books which encourage to rebellion must be laid aside, then let *Leviathan* be buried in silence; which I have, and shall shew shortly, not by example only, but precept to justify more rebellion than ever any Author did; *but*, saith he, (*from which* (*that is these books*) *young men, and all others as are unprovided of the antidote of solid reason, receiving a strong and delightful impression of the great exploits of war atchieved by the conductors of their Armies, receive withal a pleasing Idea of all they have done besides.*] I think this may be done, and that these excellent stories which relate the gallant and exemplary virtues of many, may, yea must likewise with them record the vices of others yea, many times the faults of vertuous men, without which never man lived, but our ever blessed Saviour. But what then? shall the Bee lose its hony, because the Spider may suck poyson out of the same flower? shall we avoid the Sun-shine because many are scorched by it? By this means we should avoid all good things, for there are none so good but foolish and wicked men have made ill use of them; even the mercies of God and all his glorious attributes have by some been applyed to evil. This Argument follows not therefore, because weak and ignorant

men have ill digeſted theſe excellent meats, therefore better ſtomachs ſhould not uſe them; without doubt theſe ſtories have abundance in them to ſhew vertuous men how to lead their lives, and expoſe them and lay them down *pro focis & aris*, which his ſelf-ſeeking doctrine will not allow. And yet theſe had been the moſt proper dictates from him, who writes Politicks as conducing more to the publick good than any ſelf-preſervation which he ſo much labours for. But a little after he proceeds to ſhew their folly who make ill uſe of them, which I allow; but preſently again he in the bottom of that page ſeems to argue thus.

CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. XI.

Truth deſired in this Paragraph. Tyrants diſtinguiſhed. An Uſurper juſtly killed by any ſubjects for the deliverance of his lawful Soveraign. Lawful ſoveraigns not to be depoſed or murthered for their ill government, but left to the juſtice of God. The former concluſion aſſerted. A further vindication of the Books and Hiſtories of the Grecians and Romans.

FRom the reading (I ſay) *of ſuch books, men have undertaken to kill their Kings.* Surely I believe among all the declarations that ſuch Traitors have made, never any one made his ſtudy of ſuch writers juſtify thoſe horrid acts; *Becauſe* (ſaith he) *the Greek and Latine writers in their books and diſcourſes of Policy* (I am now in the 171 p.) *make it lawful and laudable for any man ſo to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant.* I would have wiſhed that he had named his Authours, for then I could have diſcerned whether he had abuſed them or no; to turn and examine all Authours

were

were too tedious for me; yet ſomething I may ſay in general, that I believe no man of honour for learning and policy, did either amongſt the Greeks or Romans affirm, that if he hath called a Monarch a Tyrant, it is laudable for him to kill him; for certainly no man can found the juſtification of ſuch a Villany upon his fooliſh calling him ſuch, but his being ſuch. Now, as I remember, they make Tyrants of two ſorts; ſuch as invade the kingdome and uſurp it from the right owner; and no doubt but any of thoſe Subjects that owe obedience to their lawful King, may vindicate him and their fellow ſubjects from that unjuſt invaſion. The other way of Tyranny is by ſuch a man who is a lawful King, by his ſucceſſion or election according to the Laws of the Realm, but governs arbitrary by his will, not the Law: Now becauſe his right of title and poſſeſſion, puts him above the reach of legal (though he can never be out of the reach of private) judgement; and ſeeing it is not lawful for a man to kill any one upon a private judgement, therefore it cannot (*ex abundanti*) be lawful to kill him, but leave him, *Deo ultori*: ſo that if he find ſuch doctrine amongſt the Greeks and Romans, he may rationally judge them amiſs, and it is no more reaſonable for men to be barred the great happineſs of the wiſdome contained in theſe books, becauſe fools make ill uſe of them, than to barr men a ſober and healthful uſe of wine becauſe vitious men abuſe it by drunkenneſs. He goes on [*from the ſame books* (ſaith he) *they that live under a Monarchy conceive ſuch an opinion, that the ſubjects in a popular Common-wealth enjoy liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all ſlaves.*] I wonder why he ſhould impute this to the Greek and Latine, more than to the Italians, Germans, or Dutch ſtories. Certainly moſt people when they find their own condition hard, are willing to change, and think any other would be better; and it is the ſame with all other Common-wealths, as well as Monarchies; And therefore he truly added what follows [*I ſay, that they who live under a Monarchy conceive ſuch an opinion;*

not

not they that live under popular government: for they find no such matter. But as I said before why this should be imputed to the Romans, and Grecians only; not to the Italians, Germans, and others who live equally with them in Common-wealths, I cannot discerne; and therefore cannot chuse but be offended with that which follows most hyperbolically false.

CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. XII.

Mr. Hobbs *his impossible remedy to a suppositious disease. The learning of the Grecians and Romanes again vindicated. Mr.* Hobbs *his opinion of the necessity of forbidding the use of the Greek and Roman Authors nowhere to be found but in Julian the Apostate.*

IN summe, I cannot imagine, how any thing can be more prejudicial to a Monarchy, than the allowing of such Books to be publickly read, without presently applying such correctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to take away their venome. Here he sets down a monstrous disease and applyes an impossible salve: that is, that our Grammar Schools (where these books are taught) should be supplyed throughout this large kingdome with men of Mr. *Hobbs* his sufficiency; (for I think none else would serve his turn) none else having discovered this fault in these books, and yet in all the World who are delighted with learning, these books are taught in the initiation of scholars, both Christian and others. Only, I remember *Julian* the Apostate made a Law by which he thought to have gotten as much ground upon Christianity, as by any that he ever made, which was, that no Christian should read any humanity-books, nor have them read to them. Mr. *Hobbs* should have

have been his Chaplain. What follows in that Paragraph is nothing but a comparing this disease in a common-wealth with the biting of a mad Dog in an humane body, which I willingly enough assent unto, and so let it pass, and move to the next Pargraph which begins thus.

CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. XIII.

This Paragraph of Mr. Hobbs *when the powers are made contra-distinct and opposite to one another affirmed from the Primitive practices. The decrees of the antient Councils not passed into Laws, till they were confirmed by the Emperour. The Authors reason of this truth superadded.*

As there have been Doctors, that hold there be three Souls in a man; so there be also that think there be more Souls (that is more soveraigns) than one, in a Commonwealth; and set up a supremacy against the soveraignty; Canons against Laws; and a Ghostly Authority against the Civil. Certainly this word *against*, makes this faulty, and therefore we shall find that in the primitive times decrees of Councils themselves grew not into laws, but by the confirmation of Emperours. But the consideration of this Paragraph I leave to the Doctors in the Church of *Rome* whom it principally concerns, but not us, whose Ecclesiastick Laws are confirmed by the Civil, and therefore need not this dispute: And yet I can add one clause to confirm his conclusion (stronger I think, than any he produced,) which is, that dominion is over persons not parts; he who hath dominion over the Soul hath dominion over the body, which is governed by the Soul; and he who hath dominion over the body hath likewise dominion over the Soul, without which it cannot act any obedience

or

or diſobedience. And ſo I let this alone for the preſent and come to the next diſeaſe, which is page (172.)

CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. XIV.

Mr. Hobbs *his reflection upon the Government of* England *obſerved and cenſured; his parallel from the diverſity of Souls not enforcing.* The *compariſon of leavyes of money not rightly applyed to the nutritive faculty.* The *power of conduct not well reſembled to the Motive faculty in the ſoul.*

IN the midſt of that page this diſeaſe begins thus. *Sometimes alſo in the meer Civil Government, there be more than one Soul; as when the power of leavying money, (which is the Nutritive faculty) has depended upon a general aſſembly; the power of conduct and command (which is the motive faculty) on one man; and the power of making laws, (which is the rational faculty,) on the accidental conſent not only of thoſe two, but alſo of a third.* There he turns his ſpleen againſt our Government in *England*, without nameing it, but clearly intimating that ſtate and condition which is fundamental to the conſtitution of our Kingdome. I cannot imagine why, unleſs he had a mind to provoke the then preſent Uſurper to be moſt tyrannical in his Government. For certainly this Government as eſtabliſhed in *Magna Charta* at the firſt, was ſetled with ſo grave and weighty conſideration, and ſuch a ſerious manner of confirmation, as never any but the Law of God delivered on Mount *Sinai* (with thunder, and ſuch aſtoniſhments) and in it ſelf ſo prudent, that nothing can reaſonably more conduce to the perpetuity of a kingdome. But let us ſee what he ſaith (*there is* (ſaith he) *more than one Soul.*) I think it would trouble his Philoſophy to anſwer theſe Arguments which are brought by thoſe

thoſe Philoſophers who affert there are more in every man, as alſo to prove the contrary. But I let that alone, there is no enforcing that from this eſtabliſhment; for all theſe ſeveral operations (which he ſpeaks of) do ariſe from the ſame Soul; ſo that the loweſt, even the giving of money to our King, is by his Authority, and that power is enſouled (as I may ſpeak) by him. But as he is the Soul by which his ſubjects are enabled to leavy ſuch mony for his neceſſity and the neceſſities of the kingdome; ſo they are the body which muſt act by this power, he enables them, for without his aſſent they cannot leavy that money from any but their own particular purſes; this he compares to the Nutritive faculty, and indeed not amiſs; for as that faculty is diſperſed throughout the whole man and each part of him which doth receive nouriſhment; ſo theſe are diſperſed throughout the whole kingdome, and indeed they in particular, and the whole kingdome in general receives nutriment in being protected in proſperity and ſafety, which the Monarch is enabled to do by theſe ſupplies. But yet he is miſtaken in the application, when he calls this an act of the nutritive faculty, (*viz.*) to leavy money, that is afterwards an act of the King, who makes uſe of that aſſiſtance, to that purpoſe; this in the firſt act of bare leavying mony, looks like an act of exhauſting or conſumption rather than nutrition. But as wiſe nature diſpoſed thoſe contributions, which the ſingular parts ſometimes afford the fainting ſtomach by a return to their advantage afterwards ſo doth the wiſdome of a King make thoſe payrings from the other parts produce their greater happineſs and plenty: but ſtill obſerve, this is not as if there were many, but one Soul. All is acted by the ſupreme power which enables the other to perform, what he doth. From hence he paſſeth to the King, (*The power of conduct and command is (which is the motive faculty on one man.*) Why he ſhould call this the motive faculty I do not perceive, ſince that is Philoſophically ſeated in the ſenſitive or animal part; but the power of conduct or command muſt

certainly be in the ſupreme and rational part, for where that is, it commands and governs the ſenſitive ſo that they move or acquieſce according to its conduct. But I would he had ſet down what he means by this faculty and how far he meant it, there would then have been ſomething to be underſtood. There is no doubt but the King hath the power of conducting even in thoſe things he named before and in thoſe which follow, none of which can be a ed without him, and therefore ought to have a higher faculty allowed him than that of Motion.

CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. XV.

Mr. Hobbs *his reflection upon the Houſe of Lords and Commons in Parliament. His ſuppoſed danger for want of the conſent of one or either of theſe refuted. All humane conſtitutions ſubject to error. Government rightly ſo ſtiled, though without power to take away the lives or eſtates of Subjects. The ſeveral Eſtates in Parliament termed factious by Mr.* Hobbs. *No government abſolutely and practically pure according to the definition of Politicians, but denominated from the predominant part. The ſoveraign not the repreſentative of the Common-wealth, no more than the head is of a man. His inſtance of the Unity in the holy Trinity impertinent. Unity in ſubordination.*

AND *the power of making Laws (which is the rational faculty) on the accidentall conſent not only of thoſe two but alſo of a third.* By the third he means the houſe of Lords, and here he underſtands that theſe three ma e the rational part, which without doubt was neceſſarily required to the act of conduct, as before; but he attributes nothing

thing in particular to the Lords; let them vindicate themselves, and the House of Commons themselves, I shall only meddle with the inconveniences which arise out of this policie which he begins immediately to fall upon, *this endangereth the Common-wealth, sometimes for want of consent to good Laws* This danger I never found, but many times the stop of evil Laws, which have been projected by private men, or perhaps might pass one house, & faults which have been observed by one which were not taken notice of by the other. A multitude of Councellors gives safety to laws; a weaker understanding many times sees that which a greater overlooked: that which appears lovely to some, may be known to be faulty by others. But certainly these two houses being compounded of men of all conditions who must needs be acquainted with all the unhappinesses in the Government, cannot but be thought most fit to have the examing and passing Laws for the Government. He goes on, *but often for want of such nourishment as is most necessary to life and motion.*] I doubt this can hardly be made out where the necessity of such contributions shall be made appear, but at such times when his rebellious principles have been infused, for without doubt where such necessities are the necessities of the Kingdome, and the King lacks the supplies proper to such motions as war defensive and offensive, the very state and condition of every man is endangered, and his doctrine of self-preservation will compel men to it, although they cast one eye upon the publick. But such things he will say have been done: it is true that the niggardlines of the People to such expences have brought the kingdome to destruction, I can call it no less; the same may be said of some Kings whose too much frugality has made them lack both men and hearts to serve their occasions. There is nothing humane that is not subject to error, and a possibility of being mistaken. But certainly this as little as any, because this assembly (as he calls them) are men selected for their estates and prudence, and because they are prudent, it is likely they are able, and because of their estates, it is

reaſonable to think that they ſhould be willing to give their beſt aſſiſtance to the publick good. He goes on, *for although few perceive that ſuch government, is not government, but diviſion of the Common-wealth into three factions, and call it mixt Monarchie* Indeed I think that never man did conceive that this Government is not Government. Mr. *Hobbs* doth govern his ſervants, yet his government is limited with many more bounds than this is, and yet that is a government; he cannot take their cloaths from them, or their Eſtates, much leſs their lives or limbs, yet he is their Governour. And though he ſaith only a few did perceive, yet I think until he wrote this none did ever perceive three factions; factions do oppoſe one another, they are not joyned, neither do they co-operate in the ſame effect, as theſe do in all things which are done by them. And in this buſineſs it ſeems not to be a co-operation of equal ſhares in the work, but like an univerſal cauſe working with particular cauſes. The Sun with the ſame light ſhines upon a Roſe, a Violet, and a Primroſe. Yet with theſe particular ſpecifical cauſes produceth thoſe various effects with thoſe ſeveral ſubordinate powers to his, but they were not inſtituted for factions, nor are ſuch, but ſubordinate to him, and to concurr with him in the legal ſettlement of that is good for the publick it was therefore very ill phraſed of him, to call *the factions a mixt Monarchie.* For my part I am of the Opinion which I have expreſſed before, that there is no Government in the World ſo pure, that it hath no mixture in it, either Monarchy, Ariſtocracy, or Democracy, but the denomination in all theſe is from the predominant part; *yet,* (ſaith he) *the truth is, that it is not one Independent Common-wealth, but three Independent factions.* Again, factions; this needs not unleſs he can infuſe factions, which I hope, he ſhall never be able to do either with this book or any other; *and* (ſaith he) *not one repreſentative Perſon, but three.* The vanity of this language I have heretofore ſpoken to. In a Monarchie the Monarch cannot be called the repreſentative Perſon of the Common-

wealth,

wealth, no more than the head can be termed the repreſentative of man, he is the head of this body politick, and governs it, but not repreſents it. He is ſo fond of that conceipt (as indeed it is the foundation of his whole politie) that the error mixeth it ſelf in almoſt every page. But let us go on with him. [*In the kingdome of God there may be three Perſons independent, without breach of unity in God that reigneth.*] Yes by him there may be twenty, a hundred, or a thouſand, and indeed are ſo many; for as he makes a Perſon to be a man who repreſents another as *Moſes* did God (of which I have treated at large in my former part againſt him) certainly there was a thouſand ſuch which repreſented him in his Kingdome in this World; and therefore this inſtance is nothing to the purpoſe, eſpecially concerning the repreſentation here treated of. *Yes* (ſaith he) *this is without breach of unity in God who reigneth.* There can be no doubt of it, for though God be repreſented by a thouſand ſeveral men, his unity is the ſame. And I may ſay of a King though he be repreſented in divers Provinces by divers Vice-royes, yet he is the ſame King and the only King. *But where men reign that are ſubject to diverſity of opinions* (ſaith he) *it cannot be ſo.* What doth he mean by that? I think that where divers men are ſupremes that have divers opinions, there will be breach of Unity; For perfect Unity there is none ſuch but in God, who being without compoſition is abſolutely not one only in the concrete, as created things are, but Unity which nothing elſe is, as there is no one man who is ſo at unity in himſelf, as not to differ from himſelf, now judging one thing, then another; yea at the ſame time, he may have combuſtion in himſelf by diverſity of Arguments which ariſe in his thoughts at the ſame time ſo that he cannot imagine any perfect Unity amongſt men: but yet when there is a ſubordination, that reduceth them to the neareſt method of unity that may be; therefore where there ſhall be many ſupremes without ſubordination, there can be no unity: But where there is a ſubordination there

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we may find the greateſt unity that this ſubject is capable of, which will appear by my anſwer to what follows.

CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. XVI.

The houſe of Commons not the King repreſentative of the People. The King only the ſoveraign; the Peers the Councellors of the King. Mr. Hobbs *his unworthy expreſſion of there ſoveraigns cenſured. The odiouſneſs of his compariſon of two men growing out of the ſides of another, obſerved. The danger of cutting off thoſe ſprouts, aſſimilated to the removal of the two houſes of Parliament.*

THerefore (ſaith he) *if the King bear the Perſon of the People, and the general Aſſembly alſo bear the Perſon of the People, and another Aſſembly bear the Perſon of a part of the People, they are not one Perſon and one Soveraign, but three Perſons and three Soveraigns.* I anſwer, the King is not the repreſentative of the People, but their Soveraign; neither doth he act any royal thing by their Authority, but by his own right; the Houſe of Commons are the repreſentative of the People, that is, the Common People, when by the Soveraign they are called, and elected by them *pro tempore*, during their ſitting in Parliament: and as their beginning is by the Kings Writ, ſo their determination is by his diſmiſſion. This ſhews that although they may repreſent the People, yet he, not they, are Soveraigns. The houſe of Lords which he means by thoſe who repreſent a part of the People, repreſent no body, but their poſterity, for whom they act, otherwiſe they do that buſineſs the King calls them for, that is, to adviſe with him in the great and difficult affairs of the Kingdome; they are as Councellors not Soveraigns; he

he only Soveraign: and neither one houſe nor other ſits in their ſphere, but when he calls them, nor ſtayes after his diſmiſſion; nor when they are there can act any material matter concerning the Kingdome, (only adviſe and inform) but what he who is their Supreme and Soveraign enables them to do. So then there is but one Soveraign in *England*; though he moſt unworthily threw in ſuch proud ſpeeches to make them three He proceeds, and I with him. *To what diſeaſe in the Natural body of a man, I may exactly compare this irregularity of a Common-wealth, I know not. But I have ſeen a man, that had another man growing out of his ſide with an head, armes, breaſt and ſtomach of his own; If he had had another man growing out of his other ſide, the compariſon might then have been exact.* Thus he. I anſwer, there is no need of this fancy of his to compare every publick diſeaſe with a natural, but if he had ſtudied King CHARLES the firſt his moſt incomparable Book he would have found this compoſure not to have been a diſeaſe, but a perfect conſtitution of a healthy body: but ſince he makes this compariſon, I ſhall tell him, that in ſuch a man take away or cut off that humane ſprout which grows out of the principal man, even he will quickly dye. I doubt not, but believe confidently it would be ſo with this politie.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. XVII.

The propriety of the ſubject again aſſerted againſt Mr. Hobbs. *His objection of the difficulty of raiſing money anſwered. The inconvenience of inveſting all propriety in the Crown. The convenience and* decorum *of raiſing money in a parliamentary way. His late Majeſtie* CHARLES *the Firſt, his incomparable eſſay to this purpoſe recommended to the author of the* Leviathan. *Mr.* Hobbs *his diſaffection to the government of this Kingdom cenſured.*

I Am now in p. the (137.) where, after he hath confeſſed that theſe diſeaſes which have been *hitherto named are of the greateſt and moſt preſent danger*: (that is his phraſe) although a man would think that this form of Government that hath laſted ſo many hundreds of years could not be in ſo ſuddain or preſent danger; however he now enters upon others which, *tho' leſs*, are not unfit to be looked into. He begins, [*as firſt, the difficulty of raiſing of money for the neceſſary uſes of the Common-wealth; eſpecially in the approach of War,*] I muſt confeſs this is of dangerous conſequence. [*This difficulty ariſeth from the Opinion, that every ſubject hath of a propriety in his lands and goods excluſive of the Soveraigns right to the uſe of the ſame.*] I have heretofore taught that men have proprieties in their eſtates, yet in caſes of neceſſity, as in War, any mans houſe may be made a fort, any mans land digged to make a trench, with multitudes of the like Nature, according to the neceſſities and exigencies of the Common-wealth Therefore this propriety without neceſſity cannot be dangerous, nay, a man may ſay, that without this propriety we ſhould not

not have a legal, but arbitrary Government, and that which he himſelf hath ſuppoſed to be the reaſon why a Common-wealth is inſtituted would be fruſtrated, which is that men may peaceably ſow and reap, and enjoy the profits of their induſtrie; which if the ſupreme might lawfully take away together with their eſtates for the ſupport of his condition, it would quickly come to paſs that an Eſtate inveſted in the Crown may be the prey of other Subjects, as it was with the Church revenue, which although in Queen ELIZABETHS time it was alienable to none but the Crown, yet we know that from thence it paſſed to mean Tenents, until King JAMES moſt happily gave a ſtop unto it, by enacting that there ſhould be none afterward paſſed to the Crown; ſo that this cannot fitly be termed a hinderance, without which a Common-wealth loſeth the end for which it was inſtituted. But give me leave to ſpeak to the main propoſition it ſelf. Why ſhould it be difficult to raiſe juſt ſummes for the defence or good of the publick? every man hath an intereſt in it, and they are reaſonable creatures, which will conſider both their own and the publick benefit. I, but he will ſay it hath been ſo; let this be granted, it is true that all ſins and wickedneſſes have been too, and certainly this is a mighty great one. But let him conſider, whether this way of their conſent to the performance of this duty be not a decent way of doing it. For firſt, we may conſider that few Perſons of great eſtate do know their own eſtate, much leſs a Monarch of a great kingdom. How then can he be able to give a juſt eſteem of every private mans eſtate to proportion him juſtly to that ſervice? this cannot be done but by ſuch Perſons who are univerſally acquainted with the generality; and without an equality upon ſome legal meaſure the Tax will be unjuſt and the execution (no doubt) worſe. Secondly as to the making a Tax for ſuch a ſupply the Commonaltie are neceſſary, for by them the Collection will be more ſpeedy than by any other means, and therefore I think it a difficulty which may eaſily be taken away, by letting them ſee, what

neceſſity there is of ſuch an aid, (I mean not to meddle with theſe diſputes,) and then no doubt but they will be ſo prudent in the execution of their truſt, as to give a proper aſſiſtance, or elſe they are mad or worſe. I will conclude this point with that paſſage in thoſe incomparable directions which that ever to be honored King CHARLES the Firſt gave his ſon in his own words (which none elſe can imitate nearly, much leſs match) ſpeaking of the Laws of this land which he ſhould govern by, ſaith, [*Which by an admirable temperance give very much to ſubjects induſtry, liberty and happineſs, and yet reſerve enough to the Majeſty and prerogative of any King who owns his People as ſubjects, not as ſlaves.*] And I may ſay who can add any thing to what this moſt incomparable King hath writ down which is matchleſs? Yea what he ſpeaks afterwards of the ſhifts Kings are put to, and the Compariſon Mr. *Hobbs* makes of this diſeaſe to an ague, I let paſs, and do only affirm that ſuch diſcourſes ſavour of an ill diſpoſition to this government, and as I can gueſs, can tend to no good; neither then when they were firſt printed nor afterwards. I mean to trouble the Reader no further with his obſervations of theſe leſſer diſeaſes, as he terms them, in a Common-wealth, but come cloſe to a cenſure of this which I have formerly noted in this Book.

CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. XVIII.

The concluſion of all; the Authors juſt cenſure of this book of Mr. Hobbs.

FIrſt, I affirm, that it is not a book to be tolerated by Kings or ſupremes: becauſe according to his doctrine concerning the original of all ſuch there is none in the Univerſal World: for if it be neceſſary (as he ſaith it is in the 17 Chap. where he handles the *generation of Common-wealths*, and in the 18 Chap. where he ſets down the *inſtitution of a Common*

Comm n w'alth, and in the 13 Chap. *This only is the way to erect a Common wealth, which way, &c.* Now if this be the only way which have shewed not only not to be practised but not practicable, there not only is none in the World, but there can be none hereafter, and therefore this doctrine is not to be tolerated, either by them who think themselves supremes, or may hereafter be such, becaus they neither are nor shall be such supremes as he describes, and they (by his doctrine) ought to be.

Again it is to be abhorred by supremes, becaus it leaves too easie and open a gap, yea a countenance for rebellion: for if the Law of Nature be only to take care for a mans own particular (as he saith it is) and that every man should endeavour and ought by any means to free himself from death or wounds, or any thing which may render his life unhappy, how easie it is for these suggestions to be whispered in the ear, of people upon any mishap in government, without which none can be, let the reader think. (I will not teach him.) So that by this doctrine the deliverance from private misery may justify the execution of a publick ruine. So that whether we look upon the generation of supremes, (concerning which there neither is nor can be any such,) or upon the preservation thereof, there is according to his doctrine, no security in the throne of soveraignty, but it may justly be disturbed by their subjects upon any terrors struck in them from a jealousie that they may be deprived of their contented being.

Now as this book is dangerous for Kings and Supremes; so it is in some conclusions destructive to the Comfort & happy being of subjects, when he takes away their propriety: for if they have no title to the enjoyment of their lives and estates, but these must be at the will of the Lord only (that is of the supreme) which he affirmed but a little before, then the very end of polity is lost, which is that men may quietly enjoy the fruits of their own vertue and industry, may sow and reap, work and receive the benefit of their labour without fear of loss or injury. It is true that there is an impossibility that there should be any such thing, but to that man who is guarded by Gods providence, who alone can foresee and deliver a man from all danger: But yet humane providence, with good Laws and Vertuous execution of them may protect men in safety against all humane oppression,

which

which in wisely settled Common-wealths ought to be done; and although a Supreme may by force wring from a subject what is his, yet he doth it unjustly and shall be responsible for it to his supreme, which again he hath denyed by saying that a Soveraign can doe nothing unjustly. So that in such a Case there is no room for any man who may have his Estate taken away without injustice, (that is, justly without breach of Law.) It is not fit then to be tolerated by Soveraignes, or Subjects.) I may yet go further and affirm it not fit to be tolerated by Christians, because it robs them of all Assurance of heaven, and all the Covenants of God by saying that they have no assurance that their holy Books are revealed by God, which if it were true, their confidence and trust in Gods promises are vain, and all the Religion performed to our Blessed Saviour, which only depends upon that assurance they have of the Revelation made in that Book.

Lastly, it is not to be tolerated by those Theists who think there is a God; because all such do think that this God hath many glorious attributes; Is infinite in Essence, infinite in all his attributes, power, wisdom, justice, mercy; all which do propagate in men a fear and love of him, and are in themselves so excellent, that the least of them (if any one may be said the least) is to be valued by every knowing man beyond a world: yet his legislator, his supreme must have power to Eclipse this glorious Sun, and to have so much as he will, and no more be revealed of him.

Again, this glorious God is by all Theists apprehended to be the governour of Heaven and Earth, rewarder of good men and a punisher of all such as work wickedness, when he makes him to reward only and punish his own decrees and acts, not those of men; And therefore I think it a Book not to be suffered amongst Christians, and I am confident, would not be tolerated amongst such kingdomes which do not acknowledge our Saviour, but only one God.

FINIS.

To Mr. *Hobs*, or the Reader, or both; I dedicate this ſhort *POSTSCRIPT.*

CAP. I.

A ſhort Introduction declaring the reaſon of this *POSTSCRIPT.*

IN my Epiſtle before this Treatiſe, I have ſaid that I heard of ſome amendments Mr. *Hobs* would make in his *Leviathan*, and upon that ſtop'd theſe papers which were intended for the Preſs; being deſirous rather that he ſhould do it himſelf with his own hand, than I; a work which would be very beneficial to his own ſoul, and more ſatisfactory to thoſe Readers upon whom his name had gain'd an Authority; but after a tedious expectation, I found nothing correſponding to my Expectation. Wherefore I urged this Treatiſe to the Preſs, where I thought to have it Printed when I came to *London*; but I was no ſooner arrived, than a cruel Cold locked me up in my Chamber, which gave me leaſure to enquire after him whileſt theſe Notes were Printing, and found that he had Printed his *Leviathan* in *Latine*, which I never before had notice of; I ſent for it and viewed it, hoping that it might prove the deſigned retractation as St. *Aug.* calls his, or at leaſt a recognition as *Bellarmine* calls his of the like nature; but truly I found little to that purpoſe, only the virulency of ſome Engliſh Phraſes, now and then more gently expreſſed in *Latine*; And at the latter end, which was not in the Title, I found an Appendix conſiſting of three Chapters, the firſt of which was of the *Nicene* Creed, the ſecond of Hereſie, the third an Anſwer to ſome Objections againſt his *Leviathan*.

In theſe three I hoped to have found much matter which might ſhew his Ingenuity, in the true cenſuring his own writings; but indeed very little, what I find I ſhall deliver here, eſpecially reflecting any ſuch thing as hath already paſſed my pen, for other things which will deſerve whole and entire diſcourſes, I ſhall reſerve to a future conſideration, as God ſhall pleaſe to ſpare me life, and my Epiſcopal duties afford me leaſure.

CAP. II.

Of things omitted in this Diſcourſe.

I Begin with his Chapter upon his *Nicene* Creed which he enters upon in his 328 page, where I omit his obſervation upon that Phraſe (*I believe in*) and that likewiſe which is in the bottom of the precedent, and the ſubſequent Page, about the expoſition of that phraſe, which is not in the Creed, that is, *Deum eſt*, God is, which is not in the Creed, for the language of the Creed is (I believe in one God the Father Almighty) in which it is not ſaid there is a God, but ſuppoſed, and he affirmed to be one, and he the Father Almighty, ſo that if we muſt be forc'd to make one or more propoſitions of it, they muſt be theſe (I believe there is one, and only one God, and that he is Father Almighty,) where is, is a copula not a ſubſtantive as he makes it; and upon which he makes his diſcourſe, but I let it paſs as he might well have done being nothing conducing to his or my diſpute, 'tis true, *à tertio adjacente ad ſecundum valet argumentum*, and therefore when I affirm there is one God, it muſt be imply'd there is a God, but this propoſition there is one only God, ſuppoſeth and implicitely affirms it not by any expreſs propoſitions.

CAP. III.

The Nature of Light examined.

I Come to page the 330. which oppoſeth ſomething that I have delivered, there you ſhall find in the letter (*a*) which ſignifieth the Opponent, a queſtion asked, *Quid eſt lumen?* and anſwering himſelf, *lumen ut mihi videtur phantaſma eſt, non res exiſtens.* This propoſition I have oppoſed in my firſt part, Cap. 4. Sect. 2. where I have divers arguments for it, and the Reader may obſerve my Anſwers to his Arguments, no one of which is touched here, but a ſtrange new Argument, which I now proceed to examine; whether I may term it argument or illuſtration of his concluſion I care not, which is thus framed; *Exempli gratia ſi inter oculum & Candelam vitrum ſtatuas, cujus ſuperficies ex multis planis conſtat, certo modo diſpoſitis, multæ tibi videbuntur candelæ, ſcimus tamen unicam ibi eſſe candelam veram, & proinde cæteras omnes meræ eſſe phantaſmata, idola, hoc eſt, ut dicit ſanctus Paulus nihil.* For my part I cannot obſerve where the force of this Argument lies, to prove that *lumen*, or light, is a meer Phantaſm or nothing, this light ſhews the Candle, or if he will, repreſents it, now what repreſents another muſt be like it; but nothing cannot be like a thing, being clean contrary, or rather privatively or negatively oppoſed to it, therefore if light were nothing, it could not repreſent the Candle; but perhaps the force may be couched in theſe words, *Multæ tibi videbuntur Candelæ*, there ſhall many candles appear, *to wit*, by the reflection of thoſe many plains of glaſs, but ſurely this no way enforceth his concluſion, for every one of theſe plaines (for all I know) repreſents the true Candle, and are ſo far from being nothing, as they muſt therefore be ſomething; becauſe they repreſent ſomething; but they may by a falſe reflection multiply the Candle, and make it ſeem many; what if it does? Does the erroneous repreſenting make

the repreſentor nothing? certainly no; for then every man who tells a lye ſhould ſay nothing; for that lye is a falſe repreſentation; we ſee that light makes us ſee the Candle from whence it comes; and indeed any body elſe in the Room where it is; truly, if it be not abuſed by ſome *Hocus Pocus* tricks, or ſuch devices as thoſe juggling glaſſes he mentions, but the abuſe lies in the plains in the glaſs, which returns the repreſenting light wrong ways, not in the light it ſelf, which is retorted, he might therefore from hence fitter call that nothing, which abuſeth the *medium*, than the light which is abuſed; he proceeds in the ſame place with a ſtrangely unneceſſary diſcourſe to this purpoſe as it ſeems to me, *neque tamen* (ſaith he) *earum una eſt verior Candela, quam reliquæ quatenus apparent.* I need repeat no more if there be ſtrength in any part of his diſcourſe it is in this; but here is none, for although none of theſe Images of the Candle, is the Candle, yet they are things, ſuch things as did repreſent the Candle, for the Candle could not be repreſented to the eye, by that which is nothing, the thing that repreſents another and that which is repreſented are two, but both of them muſt be things, or neither; but now it may be replyed to me that this is not Mr. *Hobs* his opinion, but the Objectors, I anſwer with Mr. *Hobs* who is perſonated by (*b*) *ita eſt* ſo it is, ſo that although (*a*) ſeemed to object this, yet Mr. *Hobs* aſſents to it.

CAP.

CAP. IV.

The Nature of Hypoſtaſis.

AND in the 331. he proceeds thus, *Sed Patres Eccleſiæ illis temporibus, tum ante, tum poſt concillium Nicenum, in ſcriptis ſuis vocem Hypoſtaſis videntur alio modo interpretare, myſterium Trinitatis Chriſtianis omnibus intelligibile reddere cupientes.* The meaning of this is, that the Fathers, both before and after the Council of *Nice*, gave another ſence of the word *Hypoſtaſis*, and (ſaith he) *They thought beſt to do it by the ſimilitude of fire, light, and heat, the fire they refer'd to the Father, the light to the Son, the heat to the holy Spirit, in which ſimilitude* (ſaith he) *the congruity would perhaps be accurate, but that fire, ſplendor,* (here he changes the term light) *heat, neither are ſubſtances, nor were thought ſo by the Fathers, chiefly ſuch as were* Ariſtotelians (of which kind he can produce very few Ancient) unleſs (ſaith he) *Ignis ponatur pro ignito, fire be put for a fiery thing.*

SECT. II.

That a Particular Fire is an Hypoſtaſis.

I Will ſtop here, and make this Note that *I* can gueſſe, that never man before him ſaid that a particular fire was not an *Hypoſtaſis*, for *Hypoſtaſis* being nothing but an individual ſubſtance which then is the ſubject of accidents, no man can deny that to fire, yes (ſaith he) unleſs fire be put for a fiery thing, certainly there is no man that ſees or reads this word fire, but it repreſents to him a fiery thing, as when he reads theſe words, Earth, Water, Aire, they make him think of Earthy, Watry, Airy things, there is the ſame reaſon for fire, and what he puts down that *Ariſtotelian* Philoſophers ſhould be of his mind, I am perſwaded he can produce none that ever affirmed that a particular fire was not an *Hypoſtaſis*; but

he has reaſon for what he ſpeaks, and therefore follows this diſcourſe with (*enim*) *homo enim, & ignem, & lumen, & calorem extinguit quotiès libet.* The ſum of this is, that becauſe a man can at his pleaſure extinguiſh Fire, Heat, and Light, and that ſo infirm a thing as man is, ſhould extinguiſh ſo ſubſtantial Creatures created by an omnipotent God, and ſo reduce it to nothing, *We are not commanded to believe it, neither is it credible*; theſe are his very words as near as I can tranſlate them, and I think they are truely done.

SECT. III.

His Diſcourſe Cenſured for changing his Termes.

NOw I can obſerve one thing, which is too frequent a fallacy throughout his Book, which is a changing his Termes, which ought not to be when a man brings a Philoſophical reaſon for what he ſpeaks; this appears in thoſe main and ſubſtantial Termes of this diſcourſe, to wit, extinguiſhing fire in the firſt propoſition, and that inlarging which fallows extinguiſht, *& ad nihilum redigere*, to annihilate it. Certainly as nothing can create but God, ſo nothing can annihilate but he himſelf, for annihilation is reducing a thing to nothing, as Creation is a producing ſome creature, or bringing a thing out of nothing; now although nothing can annihilate but God, yet not only man, but many inferiour creatures to man can extinguiſh creatures of his, as in particular, water or earth can extinguiſh fire, and both watry and earthy bodies, this extinguiſhing is putting out the Candle, a choaking the Fumes, but annihilation deſtroys the very matter, which no *Ariſtotelian* will allow to be poſſible for any created thing to do, and therefore he was much to blame in a deceitful manner, to mingle Truths and Falſhoods as if they were one thing.

SECT. IV.

His Argument Confuted.

BUt now let us conſider his Inference, which is, that it is not credible that ſo infirm a thing as man ſhould deſtroy the works of God: Alas! what a pittiful Plea is this, if man by his own ſole power ſhould do it; this might look like an argument, but if man doth it by Divine aſſiſtance, as the firſt and moving cauſe, why ſhould it be hard to think ſo; I hope the Almighty cannot be denyed to have a power of granting ſuch powers; or if he ſhould, we may produce thoſe invincible inſtances which are formerly given, and thouſand more to prove the contrary, where God hath given to creatures inferiour to man, abilities to do ſuch works, as water, earth, and the like; yea, fire hath ſuch a power to dry up water, to deſtroy wood, and the like. And indeed, let him but conſider how any man hath a power given him of God, by which he is enabled to deſtroy another man, a much more noble creature than fire, and then it need not be thought ſtrange that he ſhould have the abilities to do the leſs; there is enough I think ſpoke to this.

CAP. V.

His Anſwer to quid eſt Hypoſtaſis *examined.*

I Will skip to page 339. where you ſhall find in the midſt of that page a queſtion put by (A) *What is it which the Græcians mean by Hypoſtaſis*, and the anſwer framed thus, *Quum aliquid intueris quod vocas album*, in Engliſh thus, *When you behold any thing which you call white, you impoſe that name to a ſubſtance or a body ſubject; ſuppoſe marble, although the ſharpneſs of your ſight cannot penetrate the ſubſtance of marble, or any other thing*; all this I let paſs as a

ſuppoſed

ſuppoſed Truth, and ſerves but for an Introduction to what follows; which is *album igitur, a white thing, therefore is the name of a body which is ſubſiſting by its ſelf, not the name of a colour*; he is out here very much without doubt, it is the name both of the body and the colour, a body coloured; as when we ſee a man in his cloaths cloathed; it is more and another thing then when we ſee him naked; ſo when I ſee a body adorned with white, it is more then when I ſee only a body which may be in any other colour beſides white; He proceeds *& impoſitum, this name is impoſed for a certain appearance, or as the Græcians ſpeak* εἰμφαον or φαντασμα, *which ſeems to be ſomewhat, but is nothing indeed.*

SECT. II.

That Colour is a Real thing.

SUre here again he croſſes both me and himſelf, he croſſeth me in that I have delivered in my firſt part of Cenſures upon his *Leviathan*, *Cap.*4. *Sect.*2. himſelf as you may obſerve *Sect.* 3. I will begin with himſelf, he affirms *colour to be nothing but perturbed Light, or light by reflection from ſome uneven body.* Now then, if this be ſo, then colour is light, then it muſt be ſomething, not a meer phantaſme, a nothing as he tearms it; nay, I dare affirm, if it be but a phantaſme, yet it is ſomething, *ens intentionale*, although not a *reale*, an intentional, although not a real thing; for firſt conſider, it is the work of a noble power, the Phancy, if we take it for the operation, which is the art of Phancying any thing, but if you take it for that eminent effect which is wrought by that operation, and left in the memory, it muſt be ſomething, and has an abode and being there, it muſt needs be ſomething therefore, ſo that if we conſider theſe colours only in the Phanſie, they are ſomething if we conſider them as he hath taught us, in that being they have without our heads, they are real things; but to write to that which moſt eſpecially reflects upon me my ſelf, that colour is nothing, I could wiſh

wiſh the reader ſo much leaſure as to peruſe what I have writ in my former treatiſe, and he will find that Mr. *Hobs* hath neither anſwered thoſe arguments I there produced, nor confuted any anſwer I gave to his arguments; I will add ſomething more, and conſider (*good Reader*) if it be not rational; that which not only works real effects, (which I have formerly ſhewed invincibly that *Colours* do) but likewiſe in its ſelf ſuffers change muſt needs be ſomething; for nothing cannot be changed, it is a pure non-entity, and will be ſo alwayes, and when it is changed upon any ſuppoſition of ſuch a thing, it muſt be changed to ſomething: Now colours we ſee changed from white, to redder or greener, and therefore muſt needs be ſomething: If he ſhall ſay, it is but a diverſe imagination, we ſhall cleare that by the examination of his following diſcourſe, which is this, *Quam apparitionem*, which apparition without ſome cauſe and foundation we ſufficiently underſtand is impſſible, *viz.* white cannot be without ſome ſubſtance to ſubſiſt to the apparition which is its cauſe, and as *Logicians* ſpeak, its ſubject here is a great deal of truth in this diſcourſe, but I can find nothing that Proves his concluſion, which is, that colour is nothing, nay, I will retort his diſcourſe to him and prove his concluſion falſe by it, which thus I do, That which ſubſiſts to *White* muſt ſubſiſt to ſomething, or elſe that which requires or needs ſomething to ſubſiſt to it, muſt be ſomething, for nothing is nothing, and needs nothing to ſubſiſt to it, nor can any thing be ſaid to ſubſiſt to nothing, for any entity added to nothing, makes it ſomething, which is moſt abhorring to nothing. Again, whatſoever hath a cauſe is ſomthing, but theſe *Apparitions* have a cauſe according to him here and elſewhere, for as he makes refracted light in other places to be the cauſe, ſo here he makes the ſubject to be the cauſe of them, the major is evident, for nothing can cauſe nothing, for although God by his almighty hand can annihilate any thing what he pleaſeth, yet that anni-

hilation is not so properly a production of nothing, as a destruction of a Being; for there is no existence of that nothing, either to or in another, but a takeing away of that Being which did formerly exist; so that there can be no Existence of nothing, and therefore to say that nothing is supported or subsisted by a Substance, seems to be a contradiction: That which follows in this *Paragraph*, is nothing to his purpose, I let it pass therefore, and come to *Page* 340. and skip divers things which indeed might deserve a sharp Censure, and prosecute only such things which oppose what I have heretofore judged mistakes in him, and to that purpose in the formerly 340. *Page*, you may perceive, that the Objector (A) puts the Question.

CHAP. V.

His Definition of Substance by Ens *Examined.*

Q*uid ergo est Substantia?* what is substance? and he is answered by (B) *Idem quod Ens*, the same with a thing, that is, whatsoever is truly existing, distinct from phantasme and name; this definition or description of substance I must blame, it being only a fuller and clearer expression of that of which I immediately before discoursed, that all these things which we commonly call accidents, are nothing but imaginations, or meer names put to nothing existing, and I will oppose to this that which he delivered in the preceeding page, where he saith, that the *Latines* call the subject of these accidents, *ens*, *subjectum*, *suppositum*, *substantium*, *basem*, & *fundamentum*. Let me urge hence, whatsoever is a foundation is a foundation of somthing, therefore these must be somthing to which substance is the foundation: consider a little (good Reader) that I may make

make all things clear to the moſt eaſy capacity; can the Reader think that that heat which ſcorched his or my hand is nothing? I ſpeak not of thoſe pointed Attomes, of which ſome write that they cauſe heat, but this heat which you and I feel ſo ſenſibly, can any think it is nothing? or that cold which benums my hand now whilſt I am writing, is that nothing? why ſhould we then be troubled with nothing? or that ſharpneſs which enabled the knife or bullet to peirce my fleſh, is that nothing? or that they are meer names? which certainly, as ſuch hurt no man, or that they are meer phantaſmes? can any man think that the meer phantaſme of one man can warm, cool, or hurt another? I remember, I think, I have read in *Parmelſus*, *That if one mans inward man be too hard for anothers, he may with an engine, as he deſcribes, draw another to him many miles diſtance.* I am not peremptory in the Author, having not my books about me, but I have certainely read it, but did never hear or read that by his fancy, a man could cool or warm another, or ſupport ſuch a burthen as we ſee Carpenters or Builders do by a Mathematical diſpoſing of thoſe materials which they uſe: Nay, give me Leave to tell the Author of this *Paradox*, that no man can think that thoſe habits which diſpoſe any man to a ready acting vertuouſly or vitiouſly are nothing, or but fancies or names. Nay, I will tread one ſtep further, if his doctrine were true, thoſe promiſed joyes of Heaven, which we hope for, and thoſe dreaded torments of Hell, which wicked men are threatned with by God, ſhould be nothing but empty names or fancies, which appeares a moſt horrid thought to a Chriſtian man; for theſe are not bodies, and therefore by him at the beſt but fancies. I will here make this obſervation, that when men vent extravagant opinions, and ſuch as are not uſual in Philoſophy, intending perhaps they ſhould not proceed beyond their own condition, (which is only Philoſophy) and give plauſible reaſons to perſwade thoſe opinions,

they believe not, nor can foreſee, what ill conſequencies they may have in Divinity, but they are like new Laws, which may ſeem reaſonable at firſt, but nothing but time and experience can aſſure the benefit of them.

SECT. II.

Many Errors in his citing Scripture for his Opinion.

AND now Reader give me leave to look a little back upon what I skipt before, which is at the top of Page 340. his Anſwer to that queſtion, how is *Hypoſtaſis* taken in the new Teſtament? His Anſwer is, *after the ſame manner as it is by othe Writers*, that manner is it which we juſt now treated of: And then conſider what fearful conſequencies will follow out of his inſtances; his firſt is, *Heb.* 1. 3. *Our Saviour is called the Character of his perſon, here* (ſaith he) *the word Hypoſtaſis* (*or perſon as we render it*) *that is the ſubſtance to the Image of that ſubſtance*: And then obſerve by this Philoſophy, Chriſt is nothing, being not the ſubſtance; and he adds, to make his concluſion more apparent, *he is in the ſame place called ſplendor, the ſplendor of the Divine glory*, (that is his Tranſlation) and therefore he adds, *ſive*, or which is the ſame, *lumen de Lucido*, light out of a lucid body (ſo I render his words, for *Lucidum* or the light body, is the ſubject or ſubſtance, and light is the accident, or nothing rather which proceeds out of it; ſo that by this Philoſophy, the Father ſhould be a ſubſtance, and the Son but an accident, or nothing: Let us go on with him, *Heb.* 1. 11. And the firſt faith is called the *Hypoſtaſis of things hoped for*, that is (ſaith he) *for the Speech is Metaphorical*) Faith is the Fundament of hope: Now Reader, by his Philoſophy, Faith ſhould be a ſubſtance, a body, (for he allows no other ſubſtance but bodies) which without doubt is a quality inhærent in the Soul, and by him the things hoped for, or (to give him what ſcope his words can bear) the hope of future bleſſings which is founded upon faith is nothing, or at the beſt but a phancy:

a Phancy: He produceth another Text, 2 *Cor.* 9. 4. where I do not find the word *Hypoſtaſis*, nor any thing relating to his intent: But now, that the Reader may diſcern how theſe Texts are abuſed by him, I will lend ſuch aſſiſtance to him as my preſent conceipt adminiſters to my ſelf; let him conſider how in the firſt to the *Hebrews* the 3. it is ſaid, that the Son of God is the brightneſs of his glory, here firſt is not any mention of *Lumen de Lucido*, of Light proceeding out of a Lucid body, as he expreſſeth it; but the ſplendor or moſt Illuſtrious appearance of that unutterable Glory, which was manifeſted by the Incarnation of the Son of God, and his converſation amongſt us in the fleſh, which indeed clouding and vailing the extremity of that infinite glory which was in the Deity, with his humanity, he made it more clearly and brightly appear to us then it could have been diſcerned by humane eyes without it, and in that regard he may well be ſaid to be the brightneſs of his Glory, becauſe it made that glory which was inviſible in its ſelf, viſible to us, and thoſe glorious Attributes with it, which were not poſſible for Nature to reach, or any way comprehend to be apprehended by Faith in him, the Son; And in all this we find neither ſubſtance, nor ſubſtantiated, which ſhould be founded upon it; But then to proceed to the ſecond paſſage in that verſe, which he made the firſt, (and the expreſs Image or Character of his perſon) conceive Reader if you can, how it is poſſible to make an Image of ſubſtance meerly ſubſtance, not cloathed with any accident, colour, figure, or any ſuch thing which is ſubject to ſenſe, for theſe are the only things by which we can Caracterize any thing, and theſe are not in God, this Image or Character thereof muſt needs be ſome ſubſtantial thing, and that muſt needs be ſome ſubſtantial thing, and that muſt be repreſented to the underſtanding, (not the ſenſe) which only can apprehend ſubſtances, eſpecially abſtracted from all accidents; then conſider whoſe Character it muſt be, to wit Gods, who is infinite, immenſe, unimmaginable, unintelligible, not to

be represented by any thing less than himself, it must needs therefore be another of the same, another it must be, because the Representors and the Represented must be Two, the same it must be, because nothing, no Art or Conceipt or any thing, can imagine any thing to Characterize God but God; here then in clear termes are two Persons and one Nature; and not his imagination of a substance and accident, or indeed nothing.

Then we will explain his second place, *Heb.* 11.1. faith is there the *Hypostasis* of things hoped for, we read it substance, there will be no difference about that, he ingeniously confesseth it to be a Metaphor, and surely so it is, and the likeness consists in this, that as a substance is it out of which accidents are produced, which supports and maintains them; so hope (as he expounds it) or the things hoped for, that is the blessings of God either in this or the other world (for Gods blessings in this world may be hoped for) arise out of Faith, in which God hath founded them, and which is the sole and only thing by which God hath Covenanted to continue and preserve them to us; thus taking it Metaphorically, as he, but then take it litterally, as the Schools distinguish *subjectum quo*, and *subjectum quod*, a subject by which this subsists in another, and a subject which supports really the inherent accident; so may I speak of substance, or *fundamentum*, the foundation of hope without doubt is the reasonable soul of man, out of which this act or habit is produced, and to which it doth adhere or inhere; this soul is the *subjectum* or *fundamentum quod*, but faith the substance, or *fundamentum quo*; by the mediation of which, hope is there fixed and setled; for he that hopes for blessings from God, without Gods revealed promises, which are apprehended only by faith, trusts in his own wit, not in God: thus this Text being explained, there is no violation offer'd to any Term, but each word hath its proper and genuine signification, and it lays open a clear and manifest truth, which cannot be denyed; but contrary-wise by his explanation, every word is wrested out of its pro-

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per ſenſe and meaning; for faith which is an accident, a habit, muſt be a ſubſtance, hope to exiſt in the Aire where is no foundation, no ſubſtance to ſupport it.

SECT. III.

Some other things Examined.

HE comes next in that 340 Page to enquire, *Quid eſt eſſentia?* which is anſwered, it is not diſtinguiſhed from *ſubſtantiæ*; the next quære is, what is *ſubſtans*, the ſame with *ens*, the ſame with a thing; that is, whatſoever is truly exiſting, diſtinct from fancy and name: Here the Reader may diſcern how violently he proſecutes the former conceipt, that there is no real thing beſides ſubſtance, as if to inhere, or adhere, were not to exiſt, but only ſubſiſtance were exiſtance; but I ſhall proſecute this no further now, it being a concluſion to which I do not remember that I have objected any thing heretofore, which are the only things I intended to vindicate in this paper; next he enters upon a long diſcourſe how the Greeks and Latines have diſtorted names as he termes it, which I omit upon the ſame reaſon before, although a moſt unhappy perſwaſion of his; But in pag. 342. in his diſcourſe of a perſon, he oppoſeth what I have delivered in my 34 Cap. againſt his fifteenth, which I find much alter'd in his Latine Edition, and if the Reader will trouble himſelf ſo much as to peruſe that Treatiſe of mine, he will find that Mr. *Hobs* hath added nothing here that was not in the former, nor anſwered any thing of my diſcourſe, which I doubt not to affirm, doth much more clearly explain the nature of a perſon, then any thing he hath put down for it; and I will paſs the reſt of this Cap. as not oppoſing any former cenſures of him; ſo likewiſe his ſecond Cap. of Hereſie, which was only writ to excuſe himſelf from Hereſie, which I never charg'd him with as I remember, and do here ſo far acquit him, that I think he never can be judged for one amongſt

mongst us, nor ever will be, for by him a man may deny any Truths if *Leviathan* exact it; yea, he must be of *Leviathans* Religion, and then he can never be judged an Heretick, because *Leviathan* must be supream judge, but withal, I think he doth deliver Heretical Doctrine; and that that very conclusion is one, according to the Laws established in our Nation: And I will pass to his third Cap. which is Intitled of certain objections against *Leviathan*, and is entered upon Page 359.

CAP. I.

His Exordium Censur'd.

HE begins this third Cap. which concerns the objections against *Leviathan*, with the story of these last unhappy times, where he raiseth the cause of the War, only from the difference between the Episcopal men and Presbyterian: I will not undertake to take up that *Kennel*, although perhaps I might be able to speak something pertinent, but this I dare affirm, that although the Rebellious party had an animosity against the Episcopal, as they had against all Authority, until they had made themselves sole Governors; yet their cheif aime was to pluck down the Regals, and in order to that, it was necessary first to take down Episcopy, which was a support of it; and indeed you shall find that almost all Treasons do pretend Religion; that under the cloak of holyness, they may cover such horrid impieties as must be acted by such parties: It is in vain to give instances which are much too frequent: but then as he well observes, *P.* 359. towards the bottom, when the Episcopacy was plucked down, *Nulla amplius potestas remansit inter Anglos.* [There was no power left among the English of discerning Heresy, but all Sects appeared in writing, and publishing what divinity every one would. I believe him and the

the miſcheiſe of the indulgence is yet ſenſible amongſt us, well upon that opportunity ſaith he *Page* 360. the Author liveing at *Paris uſed that Liberty in writeing*: But oh! how much more honourable had it been for him to have writ againſt it, and to have foreſeen thoſe unhappy events, which might have been eaſily diſcerned without the help of his Mathematicks: but I go on, *& jura quidem Regalia*, (*ſaith he*) *the rights of Kings, he hath egregiouſly defended both in temporal and and ſpiritual matters*: here I muſt pauſe, and in a little, put down ſomethings more Largly delivered in the preceeding Treatiſe; he hath ſupervindicated the Kingly authority in ſpirituall things, for he hath made him above God himſelf; ſo that if God himſelf command one thing in his word, and the King command another, we muſt obey the King; he hath done as much in temporal things; for although God by his infinite power confirms the Laws of men, concerning *meum & tuum*, in appropriation of their temporal eſtates; yet he gives Ahab leave rightly to take Naboths vineyard; Nay I ſpeak it freely, as he hath exalted it in ſome things too high, ſo in ſome conditions he hath made it nothing, in regard that he hath made every man King of the whole world by nature, which natur cannot be put off whilſt he is a man; and therefore whatſoever any man, either by fraud or force, can get from him, is but a juſt acquiring that which was his natural right; conſider then, whether this be *egregiè vindicare jura Regalia*, egregiouſly to vindicate the Regal rights, but (ſaith (A) for all this is ſpoke by the Objector) whilſt he endeavoured to prove this out of Scripture, he lapſed into unheard Opinions, which by moſt Divines are accuſed of Hereſie and Atheiſme; certainly the Objector ſpoke truely, and (B) puts him to the proof, what are thoſe opinions ſaith he, and ſo now I will apply my ſelf to ſuch things as reflect upon my former Treatiſe, omitting ſuch other unhandſome expreſſions, which if I live, I am likely in a fuller way to treat of.

CAP. II.

In which is cenſured his Definition of Religion.

THat which immediately follows his making God a Body, which is abominable, but I will not ſpeak of it here but page 361. towards the bottome he enters upon a third Objection, which I have cenſur'd in my former Treatiſe, *Cap.* 13. *Sect.* 4. which is thus framed by (A) the Objector, *Timor inquit inviſibilium potentiarum*, the fear of inviſible powers, whether thoſe powers be feigned by the man who fears, or conceived from Fables publickly permitted, is Religion; but from them which are not publickly permitted, Superſtition; *quando vero*, when the powers which are feared are true, it is true Religion.

Thus far the Objection; and firſt I commend his *Latine* Edition better then the *Engliſh*, for in his *Latine* Edition he changed this word (Fables) which is uſed amongſt us for a vain or fooliſh relation, and put in Hyſtories, which hath a more graceful acceptance; ſo that the ſenſe is, that Religion is drawn from Hiſtories publickly permited, which is a milder expreſſion, although the beſt will be bad enough, as you ſhall ſee preſently.

That fear, and reverential fear of theſe inviſible powers, is an Act of Religion, I think no wiſe man will deny, but that Religion ſhould be ſhallowed up with fear, and ſhould be nothing elſe (as he ſeems to require) is too much; for therefore in that 6 Cap. where theſe words are, (as that Cap. conſiſts of nothing but definitions, and theſe definitions pointed at in the Margent) he puts in the Margent againſt this (Religion) ſo that this was his definition of Religion, of which it is but one ſingle Act, there being many more of a higher nature proceeding out of it; for Religion being as I defined it, and as it is generally

generally uſed, that part of Juſtice by which we give God that Honour and Worſhip is due to him; certainly, faith in what he ſpeaks, truſt and hope in what he promiſeth, Love of thoſe excellencies which we diſcern in him, are much more requiſite and due to God then any fear, but a Reverential fear which flowes out of thoſe other; fear oppoſeth truſt, and faith, and love: and conſider again, he divides Religion only according to the divers application of this fear to the object; ſo that one way it is Religion, another Superſtition, if conceived of Hiſtories, permitted Religion, if otherwiſe Superſtition; when the powers are true powers, it is true Religion; any man may draw the other concluſion out of theſe premiſes, if the powers be falſe, it is falſe Religion.

SECT. III.

The Termes are ſo put as cannot agree in the Definitum, *with ſome Scriptures examined.*

AGain, conſider that he puts theſe Termes *Powers Inviſible*, without any limitation; ſo that the fear of Angels or Devils is Religion; for although he ſeems to be againſt the ſpirituality of thoſe dominions good or bad, (of which, God willing, I mean to treat more fully hereafter) yet he doth not deny them to be inviſible, and then the fear of them muſt be Religion, which indeed is only due to God, and therefore not to be admitted in that generality; but this is only an objection by (A) let us ſee what (B) anſwers; His anſwer is thus, *Idem aſſeritur*, the ſame is aſſerted by *Eccleſiaſtes*, *The fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wiſdom.* I will not examine the place where it is, I remember the ſentence perfectly, but do wonder what he can collect hence for his purpoſe; this fear *Eccleſiaſtes* ſpeaks of, is the fear of the Lord, his, of inviſible Powers; there are other powers inviſible beſides, which are governed and commanded by him, and

therefore he deſerves all awe, fear, and reverence from us; but they, ſome of them, I mean the ill Angels or Devils, hatred and contempt as is evident; ſo that the fear of the Lord is one thing, and the fear of the Inviſible powers is another, much more large then the former: Again, *Eccleſiaſtes* ſaith, *That the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wiſdom*, when without queſtion Religious worſhip is that which perfects a man ſo far as he is capable of perfection in this world, and is the perfection of wiſdom; and therefore out of this Text it cannot be deduced, that the fear of Inviſible powers is Religion, which is mans chief perfection: Conſider good Reader the truth of *Eccleſiaſtes*, how it conſiſts with what I have deliver'd; when a man ſhall be taught that there is an inviſible Agent, who by his Almighty power, and Infinite wiſdom, made and ſtill governs this Univerſe, and will one day judge us men according to our works; then he trembles at the apprehenſion of it, and that cauſeth him to ſeek out which way he may pleaſe him, and ſtop the fury of his wrath from falling upon him, and act accordingly: Thus wiſdom is begun, but afterwards this ſame man out of theſe beginnings, proceeds to ſearch out Gods will and believe it, to truſt and rely upon his promiſes, to be enamoured with God, and delighted with his excellencies, with following Acts far exceed in the worſhip of God and his Honour, that firſt of fear only; ſo that although the fear of God may introduce and begin Religion, yet unleſs a man go further, it is not Religion, nor that it is can that Text prove, but he hath another Text which I wonder what he can do with it to this purpoſe, which is,

SECT.

SECT. IV.

How that Text the Fool hath ſaid in his Heart there is no God, can be applied to his purpoſe.

THat the Fool hath ſaid in his heart there is no God; certainly if he ſaid ſo in his heart, he could not fear God, but that becauſe he thinks there is no God, he could not fear him; therefore ſhould Religion conſiſt in fear? he that thinks there is no ſuch thing, cannot oppoſe, be angry with, or hate God; doth Religion therefore conſiſt in theſe? and yet there is leſs conſequence in it, if a man will conſider his propoſition to be proved hence, it is not that fear is the Religion paid to God, but to inviſible powers; many a man who did not think there was a ſupream God governing all, did think that there were inviſible powers to which they paid their Religious Duties, as moſt of them to *Semedei*, and *Heroes*, and good *Genii*, and the like; ſo that men may have Religion who ſay in their hearts there is no God; that is, ſuch as he is generally conceived to be, an infinitely able, and wiſe Creator, and Governor; yea, ſome that thought there was a God who had *infinitam virtutem*, by which he governed the world, yet would not allow him *infinitam potentiam*, to make it out of nothing; of which nature I conceive *Ariſtotle* to be, ſo that although he and others may think there is no ſuch God as we conceive, yet they might have Religion to ſuch as they conceived to have ſome peices of theſe Divine excellencies; ſo that that ſeems to me an objection but weakly anſwered by him.

CAP. IV.

AND I paſs to a fourth Objection made at the bottom of the ſame page, which is out of the ſixteenth Cap. of the ſame *Leviathan*, when having treated of perſons, and what things may be perſonated, he at the laſt affirms, *etiam Dei veri, the true God may be perſonated as he was firſt by* Moſes, *who governed not his people but Gods, ſaying, thus ſaith the Lord*; I have diſcourſed at large upon this expreſſion of his in the 30. Cap. of my firſt Notes upon his *Leviathan*, *Sect.* 11. and thoſe which follow, it would have become him to have given at the leaſt ſome obſervations upon what I ſaid, but he hath not; and I muſt refer an Impartial Reader to that, but I muſt obſerve that this clauſe is left out in his Latine Edition, and inſtead thereof, put, that *the true Gods perſon is and hath been born, for in his proper perſon he created the world*, this is put inſtead of *Moſes* his bearing his Perſon; Good Reader ſee how he hath amended the matter, did God in Creating the World bear the Perſon of God? It is a Phraſe unheard of in any Divinity Writer; he that bears the perſon of any man or thing, muſt be another from that thing which he bears, but in this he deſtroys his bearing the perſon of God, when he affirms, he did it in his own, *in propriâ perſonâ*, in his own proper perſon; ſo that his alteration is to the worſe, but I return from whence I came, to *Moſes* again, in which I referr'd the Reader to my former diſcourſe ſo far, that he affirms the Son to be, as it ſeems, the Second Perſon in the Trinity after *Moſes*, and that of the Holy Ghoſt, all which I have ſpoke of at large, and now let us review his anſwer to this Objection, it may be the Candor of his Expoſition will take away the ſcandal of his Aſſertion, and that begins in the laſt line of that Page, and ſo follows on in the next, and is this.

SECT.

SECT. II.

His Queſtion of our Catechiſme Examined.

Videtur Author hoc loco, the Author ſeems in this place to explain the doctrine of *Trinity*, although he do not name the *Trinity*: I ſtop here, he hath outgone himſelf in his Engliſh *Leviathan*, for I did not ſo far dive into his thoughts, when I ſpoke of *Moſes* repreſenting God, but one, how that could be underſtood: but now it ſeems abominable that *Moſes* ſhould be placed as a perſon in the *Trinity*; well, let us ſee his anſwer further in this place, that (ſaith he) *the Authour did labour to explain the Trinity, was pia voluntas, but erronea explicatio*; it was a pious deſire, but an erroneous explication; ſurely it is a pious deſire in any man, to endeavour to explain any Divine truth, but certainly it cannot be imagined, that a man of his parts, and learning, could be ſo overſeen in ſo high a Point of Divinity, as to think that ſuch a perſon ought to paſs for the father, but that he would ſteal a diſcredit of that great and moſt univerſally received truth, by interpoſing ſuch a cloud before it; for (ſaith he) *Moſes becauſe he after ſome manner ſeems to bear the perſon of God, (as do all Chriſtian Kings) he ſeems to make him one perſon of the Trinity, valde negligenter, this was exceeding negligently done*: and pittiful repentance for ſuch a crime, to blaſpheme God, and call man God, (for ſo muſt each perſon in the Trinity be) no, it looks not like repentance, but a vain excuſe, which near upon amounts to a juſtification, but he proceeds, *If* (ſaith he) *he had ſaid that God in his proper perſon had made the world, in the perſon of his Son, had redeemed mankind in the perſon of the holy Ghoſt, had ſanctified his Church, he had ſaid no more then is in the Catechiſme put out by the Church*: certainly he is much out in this ſaying, for the Catechiſme of the Church of England, has no ſuch

ſuch ſaying, as God in *propriâ perſonâ*, God in his proper perſon did make the world, this expreſſion *propriâ perſonâ* is not there, nor I think in any confeſſion of any Chriſtian Church, to be uſed for the Father; all three are proper Perſons, no one more then other, neither doth the Catechiſm uſe that very phraſe Perſon in that whole anſwer, for it is thus, *I believe in God the Father, who hath made me, and all the world*, not that he made it in *propriâ perſonâ*, for it was the work of the whole Trinity, and the God, who is the whole Trinity, is the Almighty Father which made the world, no one word which ſignifieth one perſon to be more proper then another: Secondly, in God the Son, who hath Redeemed me and all mankind; it is true, this Redemption being a glorious effect of the Death and Sufferance of Chriſt, which muſt needs be acted in his humanity, which was united to his Divinity, to the ſecond Perſon in the Trinity, hath a moſt proper termination in the Son; ſo that I do yield it muſt be implyed that it was acted in the Son, but it is not expreſſed; and therefore, although it was materially the ſame, yet formally it was not, and he ſaid more then was in the Catechiſm; and for the laſt, it is not ſaid in the Catechiſm that God in the Perſon of the Holy Ghoſt did Sanctify his Church, but in God the Holy Ghoſt who ſanctifieth me, and all the Elect People of God, which although God the Holy Ghoſt in the Catechiſm be the ſame with the third Perſon, yet he is not called ſo there, and we may mark, that although theſe three Perſons are put down in the Catechiſme, as fountains of thoſe great Bleſſings comminicated to man; yet no where is any called proper perſon of God more then the other, nor is any of thoſe bleſſings appropriated to any perſon excluſively, ſhutting out the other; ſo that although it is ſaid, God the Father, who made me, it is not ſaid without the Son of which abundance of Scripture affirms he made the World, and Mr. *Hobs* dealt unhandſomly with our Catechiſm, when he forced ſuch a ſenſe upon it.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Another Anſwer Cenſur'd.

BUt perhaps he hath a better Expoſition afterwards, for when the Objector immediately after urged that Mr. *Hobs* uſed that Language in divers places, he anſwered, *That all of them might receive that Expoſition*; but he a little further explains himſelf thus, *Vel ſi dixiſſet*, or (ſaith he) *if he had ſaid God in his proper perſon, had conſtituted himſelf a Church by the Miniſtry of* Moſes, *in the perſon of his Son had redeemed the ſame; in the perſon of the holy Ghoſt, had ſanctified the ſame, he had not erred:* Thus far he, but it ſeems to me ſtrange that both theſe ſhould be without Errors, for they are extreamly different; in the firſt God in his proper perſon to Create the World, and the ſecond in his proper perſon by the Adminiſtration of *Moſes* to conſtitute a Church; but that phraſe of, in his proper perſon, is unheard of amongſt any who are not with it called Hereticks; for if God the Father did any of thoſe great works in his proper perſon, then the Son did not operate in them, which is againſt the whole ſenſe of Scripture, *Joh.* 1. 3. *All things were made by him, and without him was nothing made that was made*, Of which I have treated at large in my former Piece with much more, which is to be ſeen in every Writer upon this Subject, or elſe the ſame muſt be the very perſon of the Father, which is horrid Divinity, or elſe not a proper, but an improper perſon of the Deity, which is alike hateful: Then conſider his next propoſition, that God in the perſon of the Son did redeem the ſame; what is that he calls the ſame? ſurely that was the Church of the *Iſraelites* only, for *Moſes* conſtituted no other Church; then Chriſt Redemed them only, when before in the former oppoſition, according to our Church Catechiſme he Redeems Mankind, which is much larger then the Church which *Moſes* conſtituted; and then laſt of all, when he ſaith, that

God in the perſon of the Holy Ghoſt did ſanctifie the ſame, it is too narrow for his former propoſition, which was, that in the Perſon of the Holy Ghoſt, God did Sanctifie the Church which is much larger then the Synagogue which was conſtituted by *Moſes*; and when he ſaid he had not Erred, if he had phraſed it after that manner, I ſay it is evident he had erred, and erred grievouſly in expreſſing himſelf either of theſe ways.

CAP. V.

Joh. 1. 1. *Explained.*

I Paſs now to Page 364. where at the top is objected, that in his 43. Cap. he ſhould ſay, *Joh.* 1. 1. that the word *there, and ſo likewiſe in the* 14. *verſe, doth ſignifie a promiſe, and that promiſe is the ſame with the thing promiſed; that is, Jeſus Chriſt, as it is Pſalm* 105. 19. *and the* 40. 13. *and other places*; I will not diſpute this further, I have writ at large concerning this place, and do anſwer to him both in this objection, and to his Juſtification of it in his anſwer, that avails him nothing towards his diſgrace of the Divine Nature of this word, if it ſhould be allowed ſuch a ſenſe: for that he was the perſon is evident out of his gloſs, and let that perſon be eternally with God, and be God as the Text ſpeaks, that he ſhould make all things, and the like he muſt needs be that perſon which we conceive he is, and referring the Reader to what I have formerly writ, where the genuine ſenſe of that word is expreſt; I paſs to the next objection which immediately follows, and croſſes one concluſion of mine in this Treatiſe, though I know not punctually where, my papers being now with the Printer.

CAP.

CAP. VI.

Whether it be Lawful for a Faithful man to deny Chriſt, Examined.

THe Concluſion by the Objector ſet down, is drawn from an anſwer to a Queſtion, What? *If a faithful man ſhould be commanded by his Prince to deny Chriſt, what ſhould he do? he ſaith, it is lawful to obey his Superiors by the Example of* Naaman *the Aſſyrian, who was by the Prophet bid go in Peace, which words, ſaith the Objector, ſeem to me not a permiſſion, but a form of Valediction*: Mr. *Hobs* juſtifies the concluſion, and begins his anſwer *fortaſſe, perhaps it is ſo, if he had anſwered any thing elſe, either approving or diſproving his Petition, but in this place it can be underſtood of nothing but a Permiſſion*: I will ſtop here for this preſent, and examine it, firſt what the offence was that he ſeems to parallel with the denying of Chriſt; the Story is Recorded in the ſecond Book of *Kings*, *Cap.* 5. where in the 17. *verſ.* you may obſerve that *Naaman* profeſſing thy Servant, will from henceforth neither offer burnt Offerings or Sacrifice to other Gods, but unto the Lord. By burnt Offerings and Sacrifice, we muſt underſtand all Religious worſhip which was due to God, for ſo it was to him, but then in the 18. *verſe*, he begins to make a ſcruple, that his attendance upon his Maſter at his Idolatrical worſhip, may ſeem to be a Divine worſhip, becauſe it might ſeem to have an affinity with it, and in this doubt he prays a pardon thus, *In this thing the Lord pardon thy Servant, that when my Maſter goeth into the houſe of* Rimmon *to worſhip there, and he leaneth on my hand, and I bow my ſelf in the houſe of* Rimmon, *the Lord pardon thy Servant in this thing*: Mark you this, it was a tender nicety in this man, who was but little acquainted with true Religion, and but newly converted to one Article of Faith, that the Lord was God; but certainly I find not ſo great fault in this action as Mr. *Hobs* ſeems to do, in comparing it

with the denyal of Christ; for first, it is not said he did worship *Rimmon*, but only that he went into the house, and bowed in the house, not to *Rimmon*, but if he had, I think I may boldly say, that Idolatry, worshiping a false God, is not so bad as to deny a true one; and therefore, if he had worshipt *Rimmon* it had not been so bad, as to deny Christ; but I deny that he did worship, or in that act shew so much as a practical Idolatry; for to bow to *Baal*, to bow to *Rimmon*, is the sin of Idolatry, not to be in the house where *Baal* or *Rimmon* was, or to bow in that house, which yet is all that is desired by him; If *Elisha* had the thoughts which I have, that valedictions may seem to imply a tacite assent of his to what he said, he going no further in worshiping *Rimmon*; but he proves it farther from the practise of the Primitive Church.

SECT. II.

The Canons of the Councel of Nice *Examined.*

I Will set down his words, *You know* (saith he) *that there were many Christians a little before the* Nicene *Synod good men, but not most valiant, who being threatned with Deaths or Torments, renounced their Christianity, what punishment do you think was appointed them in that general Synod at* Nice? *In the* 19. *Canon of that Councel, it is Decreed, that he who should do that* (*is his Phrase, which is deny his Christianity*) *without Torments or danger, should return to the Catechism: Here I will pause,* and indeed did when I read it, for I was well acquainted with that Councel, and the story of it, but remembred no such easie Penance, whereupon being not in my Study, I borrowed *Binnius*, and there found in his two first Lections no such thing in the 19. Canon of either, as he speaks of, or relating to it; in the 11. of both the vulgar Editions, and the 19. of *Pisanus* I did; it would be tedious to transcribe the words, but what is material will easily appear in the canvassing his discourse; consider therefore first, that in his answer to the question,

he

he ſaid it was lawful to obey his Prince, commanding to deny Chriſt; how can any thing in this Cannon prove it to be ſuch, if it were only, as he ſaid, condemning to be amongſt the Catechiſmens, this ſuppoſeth it a fault for which a man ſhould be amongſt the Catechiſmens, this ſuppoſeth it a fault for which he ſhould be baniſhed the Communion, and on ſuch terms as they were, it could not be, unleſs they had thought it a hainous crime; then I obſerve, that in that Eleventh Canon, as the vulgar, it is ſaid of thoſe which prevaricated, without neceſſity, or without the taking away their goods, or danger of the life, as was done under the Tyranny of *Lucinius*; here is not Mr. *Hobs* his caſe, *Licinius* perſecuted Chriſtians ſeverely, which being diſcerned by many a fearful Chriſtian, they would deny Chriſt before they came to ſuffer for him, rather than put themſelves in that hazard, juſt as Mr. *Hobs* would have men; afterwards repenting of that fault, they would ſeek admittance into Gods mercies communicated in the Church; what thinks the Councel? Thus, although ſuch men are adjudged unworthy of humanity, yet let benevolence be adminiſtred to them, or as the other Reading, although they are unworthy of mercy, yet let them have humanity ſhewed them: Here you ſee what a ſevere judgment was paſt upon theſe men for this Crime, that they are unworthy of any mercy in themſelves who ſhould deny Chriſt, to flatter Princes; but let us ſee the humanity judged, fit to uſe towards them; it is true, the Church ſhould imitate God, who hath ſhut the Gates of Heaven to no penitent Soul, but becauſe the Church cannot have the All-ſeeing Eye of God to diſcern who is penitent, but by the outward expreſſions; therefore the Councel ſets down what ſhall be thought a ſufficient evidence of it. That which he termes (*redire ad Catechumenos*) to return the Catechumens was ſomewhat, but not half his work. for ſaith that Councel, *quicunque*, whoſoever do truly Repent, let him ſpend three years *inter audiculos*, amongſt the hearers, which were the Catechumens; for they were admitted

to hear the Catechiſtical Sermons Preached before they went to Prayers, but not to the Communion of Prayers, which kind of Penance too many men amongſt us puniſh themſelves with; but this is not all, then let him deteſt himſelf ſeven years more with all contrition, nor hath the Councel done yet, let them communicate with the people two years more in Prayer; ſo that here are twelve years Penance, and if in this time he relapſed, he was to begin again, and as it is expreſſed in other caſes, not until his death to receive the Communion; and if he recover, to be where he was when he did receive it; becauſe that out of Chriſtian piety the *Euchariſt* was given him for his *viaticum*, (as it is called) to ſtrengthen him in his long Journy he was to go; after all this, conſider good Reader what a miſerable ſhift Mr. *Hobs* was put to, when he took this Canon for to countenance ſuch a horrid concluſion; that it is fit in obedience to man to deny Chriſt, when this Canon moſt ſharply puniſheth that horrid Sin, and he that will read but the next Canon, which is the 12. ſhall find the like ſeverity uſed to them, who having at firſt left the Military girdle ſtoutly, would afterwards put it on; the ſtory was thus, the Emperors for a reward of their gallantry would give deſerving Souldiers a girdle, and by it many priviledges: But if they were Chriſtians, and would not renounce their Faith, this girdle was taken from them, and with it, all priviledges; divers, after they had refuſed it upon theſe accurſed terms, being over allured by the pleaſures and honours of the world, would deſire it again, and then this Councel paſſeth the like judgment upon thoſe as the former; ſo that all kinds of denying Chriſt was moſt hateful to thoſe Fathers, and ſentenced as a moſt grievous ſin, having a moſt ſevere pennance injoyned it; but hear Mr. *Hobs* again.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Peters *Denial of* Chriſt *Examined.*

IT *were a Sin* (ſaith he) *in an Apoſtle or Diſciple, who had undertaken to Preach the Goſpel againſt Chriſts Enemies, and in* Peter *a great fault, but of infirmity, and eaſily pardon'd by Chriſt*: where good Mr. *Hobs* was the infirmity evident, in *Peter* more then any other perſon; ſure you have no Scripture ground for it, he was forewarned by our Saviour, and ſo armed againſt it, yet (ſaith he) it was eaſily forgiven by our Saviour: Good God what eaſineſs do we find, it was not without Repentance, and how ſharp that was, we cannot tell, the word of God notifies that he wept bitterly; and how powerful thoſe tears wrought upon our Saviour we know, ſo that it was hardly ſpoke of him, and more then he could know to ſay it was eaſily; and worſe in his concluſion, when he ſaid that horrid ſin might be committed without a fault, and that it was lawful to do it; I am ſure that ſevere ſentence which the Councel of *Nice* lay upon it, and the bitter tears of St. *Peter*, are no arguments for it; and the whole courſe of Divinity delivered by our Saviour and Apoſtles, makes againſt it, and the conſtant practiſe of holy and religious men: for our Saviour, *Luk.* 9.23. *If any man will come after me, he muſt deny himſelf, and take up the Croſs and follow me.* Mark you, it is deny himſelf, not Chriſt, it is take up his Croſs, not caſt it away and reject it; his Croſs, that is, all affliction which is upon him, as in this caſe he muſt either Sin or bear it; thus it is laid upon him; as likewiſe there are other caſes, but this is one and a main one. Again, *Mat.* 33. *He who denies me before men, him will I deny before my Father who is in Heaven.* What more pertinent and cloſe againſt his concluſion; and you may perceive, that as we demean our ſelves towards Chriſt here, he will ſo demean himſelf towards us hereafter; if we ſuffer for him, we ſhall raign with him; if we forſake him to ſave this life, we ſhall have no ſhare in his life or death hereafter;

and

and ſurely if a man might lawfully deny Chriſt, it was a ſtrange folly, yea madneſs in all thoſe glorious Martyrs, who ſuffered ſuch torments rather then they would deny their Saviour. I have ſpoke of this before in this very Treatiſe, and I ſee nothing oppoſed to any thing there which was brought againſt his or for my concluſion; this might have been therefore ſpared.

SECT. IV.

A Digreſſion to Mr. Hobs.

BUt now Mr. *Hobs*, I again beſpeak you, leave off the Juſtification of ſuch horrid Errors as this; conſider, if you intend to act according to this Doctrine, you can have no part in Chriſt, he will reject you at the laſt day; conſider again that you have taught, and by that teaching have tempted others to be of that Error, to love and prefer this temporal life, before that eternal: An Atheiſtical practice which men may eaſily be induced to entertain and practiſe, when there is little reaſon produced for it; and conſider with your ſelf, that although this is one of the greateſt ſins a man can commit; yet according to that ever honoured Councel in the Canon cited by you, there is room for you in the Church here, and in Heaven hereafter, if you prove penitent; Repent therefore of this your wickedneſs, that God may according to his Sacred Covenant, have Mercy upon you; Judge your ſelf, that you be not judged of the Lord; and make amends for this publick Scandal you have given to the Church of Chriſt; which I think ſince the firſt Converſion never had any ſo publickly profeſſed this Doctrine before *Leviathan*; do it therefore in ſome publick Treatiſe, and that in *Engliſh*, whereby there may be amends to thoſe who have been ſeduced by your Doctrines, and ſo Farewell; This is all which concerns me in this Appendix of yours at this time, therefore I meddle with nothing elſe.

---An

AN

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10. 8.	23. 4.
12. 42. 43.	22. 14.
Acts.	
3. 22. 23.	22. 13.
4. 5.	18. 11.
18. 19.	10. 1.
19.	18. 11.
25. 11.	20. 6.
Romans.	
1. 9.	23. 4.
3. 4.	20. 4.
27.	22. 14.
13. 3. 4.	20. 4.
1 Corinth.	
1. 30.	23. 6.
2 Corinth.	
1. 23.	23. 4.
Epheſ.	
2. 8.	23. 6.
5. 22. 23.	16. 4.
Phill.	
1. 8.	23. 4.
Hebr.	
11. 6.	22. 13.
1 St. Peter.	
2. 14.	20. 4.
St. James.	
5. 12.	23. 4.

F I N I S.

ERRATA.

PAge 3 Line 24 read 81 l. 30 r. all authority, p. 4 l. 2 r. impoſſibility, l. 24 r. you will ſay, l. 26 r. this election, p. 5 l. 31 r. eems to me, p. 9 l 25 r. impoſſible, p. 11 l. 26 r. fraud, p. 13 l. 5 r depoſe, p. 17 l. 6 r. parts, p. 19 l. 2 r. vindictive, l. 13 r. it, l. 22 r. ſibi for tibi, p 41 l. 5 r. conceipt, l. 8 r. conquered, l. 31 r. therefore, p. 49 l. 13 r. any of the other, p. 50 l 3 r principaliori, l. 20 r. principaliori, p. 53 l 14 r. had done it, p. 54 l. 16 r. other, p 65 l. 6 r. expreſſed, l. 8 r. more, l. 20 r. participate, l. 21 r. reſembles, p. 67 l. 5 r. miſreckon, p. 68 l. 19 r. but in thoſe, l. 30 r. exemplyfied, p. 69 l. 11 r. 103 p. 71 l. 17 r. diſpoſe, p. 74 l. 14 r. to a law, p. 77 l. 7 r. guift, l. 17 r. his, l. 16 r. Oeconomical, l. 23 r. creatio, l. 25 r. accident, p. 79 l. 14 r. about, p. 80 l. 8 r. conqueſt of, p. 86 l. 11. r. and ſo every man, l. 28 r. by, p. 87 l. 12 r. that like Vertue it is commended l. 14 r. and produceth it to ſatisfy, p. 90 l. 3 for and r. but, p. 92 l. 19 r. ſafety, p 94 l. 11 r. find, p. 109 l. 21 r ſpirits, p. 116 l. 15 r. paſſing, p. 133 l. 10 r. againſt, l 21 r. And, p. 137 l. 12 r. Chryſoſtom, p. 140 l. 15 r. although, p. 146 l. 29 r. ſelf, p. 148 l. 36 r. poſſible, p. 144. l. 31 r. proceed, for cauſes r. cauſes, p. 155 l. 23 r. divine, l. 24 for four r. for, p. 160 l. 8 r. infallible, p. 163 l. 14 r. cuſtom, l. 16 for them r. them, l. 17 r. famous, p. 169 l. 6 r. weak, l. 13 r. publiſhed, l. 30 for one r. no, p. 172 l. 27 r. obey it, l. 28 r. it, p. 173 l. 7 r. authority, p. 174 l. 12 r. infidelity, p. 180 l 26 r. this, p. 184 l. 21 r. Hobbs, p 190 l. 24. r. to it, p. 203 l. 8 r. thus, p. 225 l. 28. r. afterwards, l. 25 r. (which is the motive faculty) p. 226 l. 9 r. acted, p. 227 l. 17 r. examining, p. 228 l. 32 r. independent, p. 235 l. 3 r. which I have ſhewed, l. 14 for it is r. is it.

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